Oral Answers to Questions

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Secretary of State was asked—

Military Sites

Jim Devine: How many military sites there are in Northern Ireland serving security purposes; and if he will make a statement.

Shaun Woodward: The peacetime Army garrison in Northern Ireland currently retains 12 sites.

Jim Devine: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that answer. Of course, all of us across the House welcome that further symbol of normalisation. Has he received any representations on handing over some of the disused sites, either to local communities or to the Northern Ireland Assembly, for their overall benefit?

Shaun Woodward: I have indeed received a number of representations. It may be worth reminding the House that following the reinvestment and reform package in 2002, five sites were transferred to the Executive. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I are in correspondence with the Executive on questions to do with making available further sites that arose following the joint declaration.

Gregory Campbell: Further to that answer, will the Secretary of State elaborate on any discussions that he is having with the Ministry of Defence, given that some sites are now coming into the public domain and are offering economic regeneration, such as Fort George and Ebrington in Londonderry? If other sites were available, they could act as an economic driver in deprived communities, offering them employment opportunities.

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. May I congratulate him and the hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Dodds) on the work that they have done to try to attract investment to Northern Ireland? Obviously, I wish every success to the investment conference in May, which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I will support in every way that we can. The gifting of military sites is obviously an important issue for the Assembly and the Executive, and the five sites that were gifted in 2002 are an important part of the process. Discussions are taking place with Members of the Assembly and the Executive, and with the hon. Member for West Tyrone (Mr. Doherty), about the two sites in Omagh. I do not want to raise expectations about what the Government may be able to do, but I should just say that the proposal for an educational campus is an extremely good and imaginative one. The Government remain committed to helping to encourage investment and development in Northern Ireland in every way that we can, as we did through the £18 billion investment package and the comprehensive spending review.

Laurence Robertson: Given that before demilitarisation in south Armagh the police expressed concern about their ability to deal with the security situation there, what assessment has the Secretary of State made of general safety in the area, and the ability of people there to work with the police? No arrests have been made following the Paul Quinn murder, and there has been an increase in fuel smuggling. Is not the situation in south Armagh rather difficult? How happy is he with that?

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman raises a number of issues about the security situation in south Armagh, particularly in relation to the investigation into the murder of Paul Quinn, murder that everybody has condemned. I met Paul's parents immediately before Christmas to discuss the progress of the ongoing police investigation, which, as hon. Members will know, is being conducted by the Garda, because the murder took place south of the border. There is extremely close co-operation between the Garda and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and the Chief Constable has observed that there is unprecedented co-operation from the community in south Armagh, but it is of course a very difficult investigation.
	On the wider issue of criminality in south Armagh, as Independent Monitoring Commission reports have observed, there are clearly still problems of criminality in that part of Northern Ireland but, again, that should be seen in the context of an improving situation, improving—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not wish to stop the Secretary of State, but I must have briefer replies, in fairness to those whose names are on the Order Paper. I call David Taylor.

Devolved Government

David Taylor: What recent assessment he has made of the effectiveness of devolved government in Northern Ireland.

Shaun Woodward: The restoration of devolved government in May last year has given Northern Ireland what it wants: locally elected, accountable politicians taking decisions on the issues that matter to the people of Northern Ireland.

David Taylor: As Northern Ireland's institutions bed down, devolved government is starting to deliver a shared future of peace and partnership for nationalists and Unionists—a future of which a past generation, involved in that all too recent nightmare of sectarian violence, could only have dreamed. Is not the logical next step to encourage a political realignment and framework on the island of Ireland under which more parties are organised on a 32-county basis, thereby denying Sinn Fein fundamentalists the effective free rein that they too often enjoy?

Shaun Woodward: My hon. Friend makes an important observation. Political parties and political organisation is a matter for people who live and work in Northern Ireland. However, as he remarked and I underline, it is an illustration of just how different life is today in Northern Ireland that the discussion now is about the future of democracy and political institutions, and a vibrant political culture it is, too.

Nigel Dodds: We all welcome the progress that has been made in devolution in Northern Ireland in terms of stability moving forward, but does the Secretary of State accept that in both communities in Northern Ireland there is little appetite for the devolution of policing and justice powers? Does he accept that as far we are concerned, it is not on the agenda? Does he further accept that continuing to push against a door that is not only locked, but triple locked, is counter-productive?

Shaun Woodward: There are many matters on which I would be delighted to agree with the hon. Gentleman, but on the proposition that people in Northern Ireland are not looking forward to further devolution of policing and criminal justice, I beg to disagree. Opinion polling shows that more than 60 per cent. of people in Northern Ireland now want the Executive and the Assembly to make progress on the second stage of devolution. That is a matter on which Members have been elected to the Assembly in Northern Ireland and it is what people in Northern Ireland expect. It flows from the St. Andrews agreement, and I encourage the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues to make progress on the matter as quickly as is sensible.

Mark Durkan: I join the Secretary of State in recognising how well institutions are working. That goes to show that when everyone is committed to allowing arrangements to work, they will work well. If we want to add to the effectiveness of the institutions of devolution, surely we need to add to the confidence by ensuring the devolution of justice and policing, not just to complete the devolution project and the policing change, but so that all parties can unite to defy and deny the dangerous lie coming from dissident republicans that the policing arrangements are about Crown forces and the British police force. Is not the best way of all parties uniting against the agenda of dissident republicans is to secure the devolution of justice and policing?

Shaun Woodward: I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman. The best way of demonstrating that to every dissident in Northern Ireland is for politicians to reflect what people who live and work in Northern Ireland want, which is the second stage of devolution that of policing and criminal justice. In relation to the investment conference and attracting investment, there could be no greater show of the future stability of Northern Ireland than local politicians embracing the devolution of policing and criminal justice sooner rather than later.

Alistair Carmichael: I hate to be the one to break the cosy consensus, but does the Secretary of State accept that the operation of devolved government could be much more effective if the Executive were to take on board and to demonstrate the same commitment that his Government demonstrated towards working for a shared future? Although it is part of the ministerial oath of office, there is no reference to it even in the programme for government. The Executive could give an early indication of a small commitment to working towards a shared future if they would get on and appoint a victims' commissioner.

Shaun Woodward: The appointment of a victims' commissioner is a matter for the Executive. I invite the hon. Gentleman to be part of the cosy consensus that we all so warmly enjoy. Huge progress is being made. It is sometimes best to judge these things not by words, but by actions. When the Executive unanimously agreed the draft programme for government, the investment strategy and budget, as they did in October 2007, we can see what progress has been made by politicians across the spectrum in Northern Ireland.

David Anderson: Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the ways to make sure that the long-term settlement in Northern Ireland works is through the expansion of integrated education? At present, 95 per cent. of children do not meet people from other cultures. What can he do to encourage integrated education?

Shaun Woodward: Academic selection is the issue that my hon. Friend touches on. It is entirely a matter for the devolved Administration. The Minister of Education has set out her vision for the education system. That is now a devolved matter, but I look forward to hearing more about the details of how she will take it forward.

Owen Paterson: I wish the Secretary of State a happy new year. I am sure that he is relieved to be in his place and that the predictions made by the new year blogs have so far proved incorrect. In his own new year message, the Secretary of State said that devolution would be effectively completed by the transfer of justice and policing in 2008. Further to his reply to the hon. Member for Belfast, North (Mr. Dodds), does he think that that will happen this year?

Shaun Woodward: Yes, I do, and I do because I see that this is something that the people of Northern Ireland want, and from which the people of Northern Ireland continue to draw every confidence. They see an Executive working effectively, being prepared to make difficult decisions and being able to embrace the clear vision and future for those areas that have been devolved. The appetite for devolution of policing and criminal justice is growing in Northern Ireland. Of course, it is based on confidence, but the embracing by Sinn Fein of policing and criminal justice and the steps that have been taken in the last few months are yet more signals of that. It is now up to local politicians to push the agenda forward and to adopt stage two.

Owen Paterson: But in the past six months, I have not met a single Unionist who either expects or wants that to happen in 2008. In the short time that the right hon. Gentleman has left, how does he propose to persuade the Unionist community that he is right and it is wrong?

Shaun Woodward: I am sorry to disturb the cosy consensus in my turn, but I do not really think that it is a judgment of right and wrong. Most Northern Ireland politicians believe that it is right to move to stage 2; the issue is when. Therefore, this is not a matter of right and wrong; it is a matter of whether we should move within the St. Andrews timetable, which I believe that we should, and on which the Government will be ready to deliver. It is a matter for consensus to be achieved between the politicians and the Executive, but whenever they stand ready to ask for it, we will be ready to deliver devolution, and I believe that the confidence will be there to deliver that this year.

Antisocial Behaviour

John Robertson: What recent discussions he has had with the Police Service of Northern Ireland on measures to deal with antisocial behaviour.

Paul Goggins: Tackling antisocial behaviour is a central theme of the community safety strategy and a priority for community safety partnerships. The police and other agencies work closely through the partnerships to reduce antisocial behaviour and the fear of crime.

John Robertson: My hon. Friend will be aware that antisocial behaviour is not just specific to Northern Ireland, but occurs throughout the United Kingdom, and devolved Administrations have different solutions for different problems. Is it not time that we got together with the devolved areas and set up a national taskforce under the UK Government to bring together all the good practice to stamp out such behaviour once and for all?

Paul Goggins: My hon. Friend is absolutely right that antisocial behaviour is an issue throughout the United Kingdom, in his constituency and mine and throughout Northern Ireland. He makes an interesting suggestion. Although it would need more than my agreement before such a taskforce could be established, I am happy to consider his proposal, to discuss it with ministerial colleagues and to report back to him. But most important of all is that we must learn the lessons of good practice wherever they occur throughout the United Kingdom.

Sammy Wilson: One of the tests of policing in Northern Ireland and making the police acceptable is how they deal with antisocial behaviour. Does the Minister agree that it is difficult to persuade the public that the police are serious about antisocial behaviour when some senior officers seem to suggest that the police should empathise with gangs of youths rather than deal with them when they engage in criminal acts? In Northern Ireland, antisocial behaviour orders are rarely used by the police. What, in his discussions with the Chief Constable, will the Minister push the police to do to ensure that antisocial behaviour is dealt with?

Paul Goggins: I have regular discussions with the Chief Constable and I had a meeting with him earlier this week when we discussed antisocial behaviour. It is a priority for him and for the PSNI, and he was able to report to me that antisocial behaviour is down by more than 3 per cent. compared with last year. So rest assured that this is a priority for him and the police, but in the end, for the short term—this is relevant to the devolution of policing and justice powers—we can manage a situation where some agencies, such as the police and the Youth Justice Agency, are accountable to Northern Ireland Ministers, but other agencies, such as the Housing Executive and social services, are accountable to locally elected Ministers. But surely the day must come soon—people should have confidence in this—when the system is joined up and accountable at a local level.

Alasdair McDonnell: Does the Minister accept that in my constituency the police claim time and again that a lack of resources, particularly human resources—manpower and womanpower—restricts them in dealing with antisocial behaviour? How will we reconcile that situation? Can we get extra resources into policing, and not only into Belfast, South? This morning, I heard the mayor of Antrim on the radio discussing the same problem in Antrim town. Can the Minister give us some assurance that the resources will be provided and that the police are not simply left saying that they are too overstretched to tackle antisocial behaviour?

Paul Goggins: I do not accept the argument on resources; we have just had a superb settlement on financing policing for the next three financial years. It will enable the Policing Board and the Chief Constable to keep in place 7,500 police officers in Northern Ireland over the next three years.
	The hon. Gentleman is right to say that that the police need to be applied and focused at the community level. Indeed, the Chief Constable himself is committed to the development of community policing in Northern Ireland and to working in partnership with other agencies and the community. The police cannot resolve the issues alone; they have to work with other partners. I assure the hon. Gentleman that the PSNI is committed to that.

Crime

Stewart Jackson: What assessment he has made of trends in crime in Northern Ireland.

Nigel Evans: If he will make a statement on levels of crime in Northern Ireland.

Paul Goggins: In the past five years, crime overall fell by 15 per cent. in Northern Ireland. Domestic burglary fell by 33 per cent., and car crime by 52 per cent. Figures released by the police before Christmas showed a further reduction in crime during the current financial year.

Stewart Jackson: Does the Minister share my concern at the findings of the Independent Monitoring Commission that vigilantism and extra-judicial violence, threats and intimidation by Sinn Fein-IRA are still prevalent in many areas?

Paul Goggins: Whenever such actions by paramilitary organisations and others take place, they are to be deplored. However, I put it to the hon. Gentleman that between 2001 and 2005, paramilitary attacks reduced by half; indeed, in the following year—2005-06—they halved again.
	We have moved to far more normal times in Northern Ireland, where paramilitary attacks are becoming a thing of the past. However, of course criminality continues. We need to bear down on it and all the agencies concerned are committed to that.

Nigel Evans: Is the Minister content that enough is being done to tackle fuel fraud in Northern Ireland? He will know that recent figures show that only 1 per cent. of seizures end up in convictions. Has that something to do with the fact that in many cases fuel fraud results in intimidation of petrol retailers and their families? What more can be done to close down the illicit trade of the fuel thugs in Northern Ireland?

Paul Goggins: We need to do everything that we can to crack down on those dealing in fuel fraud in Northern Ireland. Criminal convictions alone are not the only measure that we should use, however, because disruption of such activities is also an important aspect of the strategy. I assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that in December I had a meeting with Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs and with the PSNI. We intend to establish within the Organised Crime Task Force a specific action group to deal with fuel fraud. I am determined to crack down on it wherever we can.

Chris Ruane: Does my hon. Friend agree that, as elsewhere in the UK, much of the crime in Northern Ireland is low level crime and disorder, which can be effectively dealt with by crime and disorder partnerships? If my hon. Friend is taking up the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North-West (John Robertson)—to have a national-level crime and disorder partnership—will he look at the best practice in Wales? Of the 376 crime and disorder partnerships in the UK, the one in my constituency, in my county of Denbighshire, is the third best.

Paul Goggins: We are always happy to learn lessons from colleagues in Wales, and I am sure that the whole House will be interested in my hon. Friend's experience there. In the end, cracking down on low level criminality, social disorder and antisocial behaviour requires effective local partnerships. In Northern Ireland there are 26 local community safety partnerships in which the police work with local councils and a range of other agencies to make sure that those issues are dealt with. That will be in common with my hon. Friend's experience; that is the kind of approach that works.

David Simpson: The Minister will be aware of recent criminal and sectarian attacks on Orange halls; most have taken place in my constituency. Will the Minister confirm that by February of this year he will move legislation through the House to enable those Orange halls and lodges to claim compensation?

Paul Goggins: We all condemn unreservedly the attacks on Orange halls. I was able to join the hon. Gentleman in a visit to Ballyworkan in his constituency, where a deplorable attack took place before Christmas. Members of the Orange Order are trying to do their best to put something into communities through their Orange halls, and I condemn unreservedly those who attack them. As he knows, I am committed to ensuring that where Government compensation is due it should be paid quickly, but we need to ensure that the commercial cover works as well. Over the next few weeks, we will do everything possible to ensure that the commercial option is thoroughly investigated and examined. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has made a clear commitment to the Orange Order and to members of the hon. Gentleman's party that we will look at this again in early March.

Drug Smuggling

Daniel Kawczynski: What recent discussions he has had with the police authorities in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on drug smuggling; and if he will make a statement.

Paul Goggins: There is close co-operation between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and An Garda Siochana, and I have regular discussions with all law enforcement agencies about drug smuggling and other forms of organised crime.

Daniel Kawczynski: I thank the Minister for that reply. He will know that drug smuggling is becoming an increasing problem in Northern Ireland. What is he doing to ensure that the drug bosses at the very top are dealt with and prosecuted?

Paul Goggins: What is required is close collaboration between the police forces north and south of the border. They are actively engaged in that; they have regular contact and share intelligence. Indeed, in December—just a few weeks ago—a joint operation north and south of the border intercepted an organised criminal gang, some of whom were arrested north of the border and some south of the border. There have been a number of arrests and some people have been charged. That kind of effective enforcement action will, in the end, remove the drugs barons and others who profit out of the misery of drugs, who should rightly be out of the community and in prison where they belong.  [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Will the House come to order? One corner is very noisy indeed.

Michael Mates: I am sure that the Minister is aware that the Chief Constable feels that he is being severely held back by the amount of time that his force is having to spend looking back over past matters and not getting on with matters such as that which my hon. Friend the Member for Shrewsbury and Atcham (Daniel Kawczynski) mentioned—the joint pursuit of those responsible for the drugs problem. Will the Minister do all that he can to ensure that the Chief Constable is allowed to get on with his job, which is policing for today and tomorrow rather than so much for yesterday?

Paul Goggins: The right hon. Gentleman is entirely right. Every pound that is spent on policing the past is a pound that is not spent on policing the present and making the future absolutely safe. The Government have established, under Robin Eames and Denis Bradley, a commission to investigate whether there is a way of drawing a line under the past that will enable the whole of society in Northern Ireland to move forward, including on policing. We must devote all the resources that we can to ensuring that Northern Ireland is a safe place in which to live and work.

William McCrea: Does the Minister understand the frustration that is felt within communities in Northern Ireland when they see the godfathers of the drug smuggling industry swanning around the countryside endlessly enjoying their ill-gotten gains, many of them not having worked a day in their lives? When will we have effective measures taken against these abusers of society?

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman is right to express his anger about such people. Where possible, they should be arrested, prosecuted and put behind bars. Short of that, it is also possible to seize and remove the assets that they have gained through their criminality. I can tell the hon. Gentleman, and the House, that in the first six months of the current financial year some £10 million-worth of criminal assets were seized and confiscated. That is an encouraging use of the powers that we now have to track down and crack down on those criminals wherever we possibly can.

Security Situation

Andrew Selous: If he will make a statement on the security situation in Northern Ireland.

Shaun Woodward: The security situation in Northern Ireland has vastly improved in recent years. However, the recent serious, although isolated, incidents highlight the continued threat posed by a small handful of individuals who continue to live in the past, not the future.

Andrew Selous: What success are the police having in dealing with dissident organisations that are now turning their focus from terrorist to criminal activities?

Shaun Woodward: The police continue to make significant progress in dealing with criminality in Northern Ireland, which is why crime figures there are among the best in the UK. However, at no point will we be complacent about those dissident elements in republicanism and loyalism that continue to pose a small and isolated threat. Equally, let it be clear that those people have no support in the community and that we will continue to hunt them down.

Jeffrey M Donaldson: While the security situation has undoubtedly improved, does the Secretary of State agree that it would be entirely wrong and a deep injustice if the perpetrators of terrorist crimes in Northern Ireland were to be granted an amnesty?

Shaun Woodward: The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. I realise that he is effectively commenting on remarks made by the commission on the past. Let me remind him that its deputy chairman, Denis Bradley, has said that nothing is ruled out and that nothing is ruled in, and what matters is that the commission collects views. He accepted that there are some who have a view about an amnesty and that it is for others to have a view about that and for the group to make an assessment of that.

PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister was asked—

Engagements

Dai Havard: If he will list his official engagements for Wednesday 9 January.

Gordon Brown: This morning, I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in this House, I shall have further such meetings later today.

Dai Havard: The Prime Minister will know that economic inactivity in constituencies such as mine will only be successfully tackled with sustained investment in the creation of jobs, and the giving of skills and support to people. However, given the growing economic global uncertainty, will he meet me and colleagues who represent the valleys to look at the work already being successfully done by the Department for Work and Pensions and others to build our economic capacity? Will he assure me that any responses he makes to the global uncertainties that there may be in the economy will not be allowed to damage the sustainability of that investment?

Gordon Brown: Long-term unemployment in my hon. Friend's constituency is down 72 per cent. since 1997. Since 1997, there have been 135,000 new jobs in Wales, and there are nearly 3 million new jobs in the country. I believe that as we face these uncertain global times, when there are difficulties that have started in America that affect the whole of the world economy, it is important to remember that what makes us well placed to face such difficulties is the low inflation and high levels of employment we have achieved in this country, and the low interest rates that stand us in good stead to face global uncertainties. Of course I will be happy to meet my hon. Friend and his colleagues to talk about those issues.

David Cameron: May I start be welcoming the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg) to his post?  [ Interruption. ] He is moving away from me already. He is the fourth Liberal Democrat leader that I have faced, and I wish him well— [ Interruption. ] —although not that well. I am simply relieved that it is no longer my party that has this habit of replacing its leader on quite such a regular basis.
	A few months ago— [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

David Cameron: I am on my second Labour Prime Minister as well.
	A few months ago, a Home Office Minister said:
	"It is the Government's policy that ID cards should eventually be compulsory for everyone resident in the United Kingdom who is aged 16 or over."—[ Official Report, 20 March 2007; Vol. 458, c. 784W.]
	Is that still the Government's policy?

Gordon Brown: That is the policy, but it is a matter for Parliament to decide after we have looked at the voluntary system in place. All the evidence we have had over the past few months is that where information— [ Interruption. ]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Allow the Prime Minister to answer the question.

Gordon Brown: The whole purpose of identity cards is to protect people's identity and the way to do that is to use, in addition to the passport information that will be part of the identity card, biometrics so that use of the information cannot be triggered other than by the facial or fingerprint data that are part of the biometrics. That is the purpose of identity cards.
	The right hon. Gentleman's police adviser, Sir John Stevens, and Lady Neville-Jones, his security spokesman in the House of Lords, both support identity cards.

David Cameron: We have learned in the past few months that it is completely unsafe to trust the Government with any more of our identity information. If the Prime Minister wants to trade quotes, what about one from the Chancellor of the Exchequer? He said that identity cards were "not necessary". He continued:
	"I do not want my whole life to be reduced to a magnetic strip on a plastic card."—[ Official Report, 2 March 1992; Vol. 205, c. 70.]
	Compared with being Chancellor in the Government, being a magnetic strip on a plastic card would probably be a welcome relief.
	If it is the Government's policy to press for compulsion, why did the Prime Minister say in  The Observer on Sunday that,
	"under our proposals, there is no compulsion for existing British citizens"?
	Why did he give such a misleading answer?

Gordon Brown: Because there has to be a vote of Parliament. We have passed the original identity cards proposals. That is a voluntary system. I have to tell the right hon. Gentleman that not only do some members of his party support identity cards, but people recognise that the identity card will contain little more than the information that is now given for passports. I have to ask him: does he support identity cards for foreign nationals, which we are introducing this year?

David Cameron: Everybody in the House wants proper biometric visas for people visiting this country. The question for the Prime Minister is why he cannot give a straight answer on identity cards. Let me try it another way. What is his personal view? My personal view is that I am against compulsory identity cards. What is his view? Is he in favour—yes or no?

Gordon Brown: It is the Government's policy to move ahead with this, but subject to a vote of Parliament, and depending on how the voluntary scheme works. I ask the right hon. Gentleman again: does he support ID cards for foreign nationals—yes or no? He says that he is against them; is he in favour of them for foreign nationals?

David Cameron: I just answered the Prime Minister's question. Does he not recognise that part of his problem is that he cannot give a straight answer to a straight question?
	Let us have a look at another vital decision, this time on the economy. It is only three months before the start of the financial year. Businesses throughout the country want to know the capital gains tax rate that they will face in April. Will the Chancellor go ahead with his 80 per cent. increase in capital gains tax rates, or are we set for another humiliating U-turn?

Gordon Brown: I see that the right hon. Gentleman's incursion into identity cards did not last long. He cannot answer the central question of whether he supports ID cards for foreign nationals. He could not give me the answer on two occasions. I suggest that the whole country supports ID cards for foreign nationals, and that that is the best protection we have, and one of the best against illegal immigration. If he cannot answer that question, he is not fit to ask questions about other issues.
	On capital gains tax, when we came to power it was 40 per cent. Now, under the Chancellor's proposals, it is 18 per cent. The Chancellor has agreed to consult on its implementation and will report back to the House of Commons in due course. Why did the Conservatives have 18 years of not reducing the rate of capital gains tax?

David Cameron: I remember our cutting taxes and the right hon. Gentleman's opposing every single tax cut we proposed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer promised the House of Commons that he would make a statement on capital gains tax by Christmas. Business needs to have the answer to that question.
	Here is something else about the economy. Goldman Sachs, the Prime Minister's advisers, state that
	"the UK is slowing more than the rest of Europe, the 'Northern Rock' factor has badly dented the UK's reputation... and the UK balance of payments...deficit is now bigger than that of the US".
	Those are the words of the Prime Minister's advisers.
	Let us consider another big economic decision that the right hon. Gentleman must take. At a time of financial turmoil the markets need clear leadership, not more dithering from the Prime Minister. Will he confirm, here and now, that he will recommend Mervyn King for another term as Governor of the Bank of England?

Gordon Brown: The choice of the Governor of the Bank of England will be made in the usual way and announced in the usual form. On capital gains tax, again the right hon. Gentleman does not return to the issue. He was principal adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer when capital gains tax was 40 per cent. He was also principal adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time of Black Wednesday. The difference between our country then and now is that inflation at that time was 10 per cent. and the Conservatives could not reduce interest rates, whereas inflation at the moment is 2 per cent. and the Governor of the Bank of England was able to reduce interest rates. We face the global crisis with higher employment than ever before, and we face the global turbulence with low interest rates and low inflation. It is a record that they could never match.

Hon. Members: More!

David Cameron: There is plenty more. I remember a shadow Chancellor who sat here and supported every aspect of being in the exchange rate mechanism and every single step that was taken. I seem to remember a politician who when he was in his 20s supported wholesale renationalisation and punitive tax rates, and wore his CND badge with pride. That was the Prime Minister. Is it not the case that his capital gains tax policy is in complete confusion, he cannot make up his mind about the Governor of the Bank of England, and his ID policy is in full retreat? All that is from a Prime Minister who has lost everyone's identities, seen a run on a bank, and whose Ministers are rocked from one funding scandal to another. He can talk about long-termism all he likes, but everyone knows that it is just a smokescreen for the short-term mess that he has made. Is that not why his relaunch is utterly doomed to fail?

Gordon Brown: Once again, all these pre-rehearsed lines, all these lines rehearsed in front of the mirror— [I nterruption.] They mean absolutely nothing. When it comes to the economy— [Interruption.] Oh yes, we get all these pre-rehearsed lines. People are asking the question: when will the right hon. Gentleman face up to the big challenges? Nobody knows what he thinks about the big challenges: not the country, not the party, and probably not even himself. He flits through all these issues today. When it comes to the economy, let us remember that there were 3 million unemployed under the Conservatives, and we have created 3 million more jobs. Under the Conservatives, 250,000 people lost their mortgages and were repossessed. There are 2 million more home owners under Labour. Interest rates went as high as 18 per cent. under the Conservatives; they have averaged 5 per cent. under Labour. We will return to his record as chief adviser to the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, because he has no credibility when he talks about the economy.

Hon. Members: More!

Mr. Speaker: Order.

Alun Michael: You are aware, Mr. Speaker, that the President of Somaliland and members of his Cabinet are visiting Parliament at present. Will my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister join me in congratulating Somaliland on the way in which it has worked over the past 18 years, very quietly, through local government elections, parliamentary elections and presidential elections? When the people of the south have no real government and are still in a state of chaos, does not that record command respect from the international community?

Gordon Brown: I agree with my right hon. Friend, who is a friend of that country. I welcome the visitors to this country, and we will do everything that we can not only to help with international development for the countries with which we are associated, but to help to build the institutions of democracy.

Nicholas Clegg: rose—

Hon. Members: Hooray! This is going to be an expensive year for the countless British families who face fuel bills of £1,000 or more for the first time. With as many as 4 million British families unable to afford their fuel bills, does the Prime Minister seriously think that a single letter from the Chancellor to the energy regulator is an adequate response?

Gordon Brown: Let me welcome the hon. Gentleman to the leadership of the Liberal party. I look forward to working with him on many of the issues facing the country. I have said to him in our private conversations that there is an open door for him, and we are ready to discuss the major issues that affect the country where there is common ground.
	As far as fuel prices are concerned, it is regrettable that utility prices have to rise, which is as a result of a 60 to 80 per cent. rise in the cost of coal, gas and electricity. That, in turn, is the result of factors that are hitting every economy in the world. What we have done in Britain over the last few years is devote £12 billion to fuel poverty issues. We have had the winter allowance, which I believe the hon. Gentleman's party did not support, and other allowances to help with energy bills. Only in the last few days, companies have announced that those amounts will rise from £40 million to £56 million in order to protect energy users. We will do everything in our power to avoid fuel poverty in this country.

Nicholas Clegg: With 25,000 people predicted to die from the cold in this winter alone, we need a more specific commitment from the Prime Minister. Will he agree today to take action to stop the energy companies from hitting the poorest families with higher bills on prepayment meters so that we can end the scandal of the poorest families paying the most for their energy needs?

Gordon Brown: We have asked the fuel companies to look further into prepayment energy meters and it is very important to do so. I hope that the hon. Gentleman shares our common interest in avoiding loss of lives as well as suffering and illness as a result of fuel poverty and the cold winter weather. I thus hope that he will support us in asking the energy companies to provide extra money to subsidise the fuel bills of people who are lower paid, and that his party will continue to support us in all the measures, including the winter fuel allowance, that we have taken to deal with fuel poverty.

Jim Cunningham: Given that there is an ongoing debate in the country regarding the building of nuclear power stations and given that my right hon. Friend will have received advice from all sorts of people about it, can he say whether he has received any advice from Zac Goldsmith, who advised the Leader of the Opposition that building such power stations would be a tragedy?

Gordon Brown: We face a major decision about the future of energy in this country. Tomorrow, the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform will make a statement on energy and on nuclear power. I hope that we can take a decision that will protect the long-term interests of the country. Without taking such a decision on this matter and on renewable fuels, we will become more dependent on foreign sources of supply. It is therefore a shock to me that other parties are looking in different directions on this issue. I know that the Leader of the Opposition wants to be consistent in what he says. However, he said to the CBI that he wanted to make it easier for people to build fuel stations, while also saying to the readers of  Green Futures magazine that
	"if...we have to keep the lights on, then nuclear might come into the picture".
	Nuclear as a last resort—that is not the proper way to plan for the energy needs of our country.

Nigel Dodds: Will the Prime Minister take the opportunity to pay tribute once again to the gallant service of the security forces of Northern Ireland in the fight against terrorism and crime over many decades of violence? Will he also take the opportunity to rubbish any attempt by the commission on the past in Northern Ireland to validate or vindicate terrorists and criminals in their sordid terrorist war by describing it as a war? Will he utterly rule out any suggestion of an amnesty for terrorists and criminals?

Gordon Brown: Yes, and it is important to say two things. First, our respect for the security services, the police and the armed forces for the difficult job they did over many years and for the loss of life suffered as a result of their difficult work is clear. Secondly, it is important to move forward with reconciliation. The efforts made by a number of bodies, including the one to which the hon. Gentleman referred, are an important element of building for the future. What we want is a safe, secure, peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland.

Michael Connarty: Given that the new deal, including the new deal for the disabled, has been in place for 10 years and that the Government have passed several Acts to deal with disabled people's rights, I hope that there is a consensus in this Parliament that people with disabilities deserve the right to work. Does the Prime Minister share my concern that Leonard Cheshire's report on poverty and disabled people, published this week, shows that 50 per cent. of people with disabilities are unemployed and that one in three children who live with a disabled adult in the household live in poverty? What are we going to do about that?

Gordon Brown: I think it is true that, as my hon. Friend suggests, disabled people are twice as likely to be in poverty as people who are not with disabilities, but it is also true that disabled people should be helped into work when that is possible. That is why about 900,000 disabled people have found jobs over the last 10 years, why our pathways to work programme is so important for the future—it has already put 32,000 people into work—and why, in my view, it would be a mistake to abolish the new deal, which does so much to help people back into work.

Julian Brazier: Members in all parts of the House have expressed concern about the conditions in Guantanamo Bay, and most people are glad to see that it is at last winding down, but can the Prime Minister explain why he has just offered places in Britain to five people from Guantanamo Bay not one of whom is a British citizen, although two of them are wanted in connection with the most serious terrorist charges in Spain?

Gordon Brown: When people are wanted for arrest in Britain, they will be arrested. When people have to be returned to other countries, we will expedite the process if at all possible. I think the whole House agrees with the hon. Gentleman that Guantanamo Bay should be closed as soon as possible, but when people have moved to our country we will deal with them if there are offences for which they are to be prosecuted.

Hugh Bayley: In his speech on Monday, the Prime Minister made an important commitment to patient power—giving patients choice in regard to which hospital they go to, which doctor treats them and when they are treated. Will he ask Lord Darzi to work with the medical royal colleges to develop a series of outcome indicators—indicators of the quality of care, hospital by hospital and doctor by doctor—and publish them, so that patients can make informed choices about who treats them when and where?

Gordon Brown: The future of the national health service means that patients will have more power over the decisions that affect their lives: decisions about where they have their treatment, the times at which they have their treatment, and with whom they have their treatment. That is an important element of the next stage of the development of the health service. However, it is also important for patients to have information about what is happening in their local hospitals and health areas. One of the next stages of reform—and Professor Darzi is looking into exactly this—is how more information can be made available to patients, and how more patients can become foundation trust members, and how the flow of information can empower patients in a way that gives them more control over their health and their health care. That is the right direction for the 21st century health service.

Bob Spink: Does the Prime Minister think it would be acceptable for the Secretary of State with responsibility for the poor to endorse a sub-prime lender and then accept a £5,000 donation from that lender? How does he think the public will see that?

Gordon Brown: As I understand it, the Secretary of State for Wales was visiting a company in Wales, and praising the work that it had done in creating jobs in Wales.

Laura Moffatt: The education and business communities are working hard in Crawley to attract a university campus. Does my right hon. Friend agree that that is the best way to improve aspiration and get our young people into higher education in their own towns and cities, so that they may strive to make this a better country?

Gordon Brown: In the last 10 years, there have been more than 300,000 more people in higher and further education. We want to create more institutions of higher education—including universities—in areas that do not have that facility, and my hon. Friend has put the case eloquently for new facilities in a range of areas in her constituency. I think it right to say that we want to increase the number of universities, further education colleges and colleges generally in cities and towns that do not already have them, and that will be a big feature of future education in this country.

Steve Webb: When my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg) asked about fuel prices, the Prime Minister mentioned the winter fuel payment. Is he aware that the typical pensioner household now faces bills at least £300 higher than those of four years ago, which more than wipes out the winter fuel payment? Against that backdrop, why are the Government cutting spending on the Warm Front insulation programme?

Gordon Brown: Over the last 10 years, we have increased spending on home insulation dramatically. We have encouraged people to insulate their homes and have encouraged draught-proofing, and will continue to do so. As for the winter allowance, I remind the hon. Gentleman that it started at £20, was raised to £50, and for the over-80s is now £300.

Paddy Tipping: In the 60th year of the NHS, there remain major challenges such ashealth inequalities and the need to provide preventive care. Will the Prime Minister ensure that in the light of the statement he made on Monday areas of disadvantage such as the Nottinghamshire coalfield receive sufficient focus and a fair share of resources?

Gordon Brown: I am grateful to my hon. Friend because he raises an important question about the disparity in life chances and the disparity in the ages to which people live in different parts of the country, partly as a result of poverty and partly as a result of information about health. It is important to recognise that, as we expand preventive medicine and as more and more people can have check-ups, whether for breast cancer, heart disease or stroke, the people who will benefit most are the people who are most susceptible to those diseases, who will get quicker treatment, will have their illnesses diagnosed earlier and will then be able to lead healthier lives. That will have a major effect on health inequalities in our country.

Mark Lancaster: Only yesterday, the Prime Minister said that he wanted to do more to help the Open university, yet last night the Government voted effectively to cut its budget. How exactly does his decision to stop people studying for second degrees square with his supposed commitment to lifelong learning?

Gordon Brown: Our commitment to lifelong learning is, first, that those people who have no qualifications whatever should get better chances than they have had in the past to enable them to get both qualifications and in many cases degrees. If the hon. Gentleman has read the report that was done by Lord Leitch, he will know that he says that by 2020 we will need 40 per cent. of the country with degree-level qualifications. Therefore, the first priority for money—that is why there has been that transfer of money—is first degrees and qualifications for those who do not have them at the moment. There is no cut in the overall budget. There is more money going to education than ever happened under the Conservative Government. The difference is between cuts under the Conservatives and expansion under Labour.

Louise Ellman: Now that Liverpool's year as European capital of culture is well under way, has the Prime Minister booked a seat at Anfield for the Paul McCartney concert? Does he recognise the outstanding work being done by Phil Redmond and the Northwest Regional Development Agency? How can the Prime Minister help Liverpool to ensure that the benefits last well beyond 2008?

Gordon Brown: The Paul McCartney concert is not the only major event in Liverpool during the year of culture. People not only in Liverpool but all over the country are looking forward to a great success for Liverpool in this year of culture. It is already one of the greatest cities in the world for music, sport and the arts. More people go to museums and art galleries in Liverpool than in any other city, so we wish it well as the city of culture.

Crispin Blunt: When the right hon. Gentleman started as Chancellor, he was told by the Treasury, "These are fantastically good figures." Now there is a record trade deficit, record private and public debt and record insolvencies. We know that he has never thanked his predecessor, but will he now say to his right hon. Friend, "Sorry, Darling"?

Gordon Brown: When I arrived at the Treasury, I was told that, because inflation was rising and as a result of the failure of the previous Conservative Government to increase interest rates, interest rates had to rise. That was the first statement made to me at the Treasury. That is why we made the Bank of England independent, a more opposed by the Conservative party, and that is why, as a result of our actions, interest rates are half what they were under the Conservative Government on average, inflation is half what it was, and employment is at a record level. We are proud of our record as a Labour Government.

Anne Begg: What is my right hon. Friend's analysis of the best way to get people from welfare into work? Is it the expansion of the new deal, pathways to work and good-quality child care to help people to overcome the barriers that they face, or is it to force them into work gangs— or be stripped of all their benefits?

Gordon Brown: The right policy for getting people back to work is to work with employers who will help people to find the jobs. That is why the local employment partnerships now have 200 companies signed up to them, and it will be 300 very soon. The right way to get people back to work is not to abolish the new deal, as the Conservative party would do, but to place a duty on people to have skills for the future. That is why we will move forward with our plans to create jobs.

John Randall: Does the Prime Minister agree that the forcible removal of people from their homes, such as happened during the highland clearances, has no place in the 21st century? If so, why are he and his Government doing exactly that to hundreds of people around Heathrow?

Gordon Brown: A consultation is taking place at the moment. I understand that it goes through to the end of February. The proposal is for a third passenger runway at Heathrow. I believe that many people think that that is in the national interest, but I also believe that local views must be taken into account and that is why the consultation is taking place.

Patricia Hewitt: Will my right hon. Friend join me in sending the deepest condolences to the family, friends and fellow students of my 16-year-old constituent, Bradley Whitfield, who was killed in the early hours of new year's day, and will he reassure them that he and the Government will do everything possible—that we will redouble our efforts—to work with the police, schools and community groups to try to protect young people from such appalling acts of violence?

Gordon Brown: I agree. The whole country was shocked by what my right hon. Friend refers to, and my sympathies go to the family—I believe that the whole House will join her in wanting to pay tribute to the family. We are determined to do everything in our power to deal with these crimes of violence. That is why the Home Secretary will be announcing new measures very soon. That is why we will step up all the actions we are taking against gangs and knives, and against guns as well. We are determined that in those areas where there is the greatest violence, we have the greatest surveillance as well, and we will also take action against the hot spots. My sympathies go to the family of my right hon. Friend's constituent.

Runaway and Missing Children

Helen Southworth: I beg to move,
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make requirements regarding the safeguarding of runaway and missing children; and for connected purposes.
	Every year in the United Kingdom, more than 100,000 children go missing from home or care. Most of them return home safely, but research by the Children's Society indicates that about 10,000 children every year are hurt or harmed while they are missing. Many thousands of those children are running away to escape abuse in the first place; they have no safe home to return to. Some children are hurt very severely while they are away and suffer lifelong consequences. Vulnerable children on their own are targeted by predatory adults. Evidence from police and children's charities has identified children drawn into prostitution, trafficked or groomed into drug-running by adults who pretend friendship. Some children disappear without trace. Police estimate that about 50 children every year die or are killed while they are missing; that is a child death each week that could be prevented.
	All such figures are estimates because, astonishingly, there is no requirement for data to be recorded or collected nationally; and without data identifying need, statutory bodies are not allocating resources to safeguard these vulnerable children. A small number of police forces are leading initiatives to identify and protect runaway and missing children and the Association of Chief Police Officers issued guidance on the management and reporting of missing persons in 2005, but a number of police forces are still using paper-based systems. Better information is still available nationally on missing cars than on missing children. Police have a key performance indicator set by the Government on vehicle crime, so they allocate resources and collect information. Children are more important than cars, but the Department for Children, Schools and Families—the lead Department—collects no data on runaway and missing children.
	Recently, a welcome announcement was made that children missing from home and care will be included as a national performance indicator for local authorities from April 2009. But the relationship between the police and local authorities is crucial, because people report a missing child to the police, not the local authority. Police forces must have a proper and effective method of collecting and analysing information about missing children. Some 40 per cent. of police forces are unable to provide information about the level of need in respect of runaway and missing children in their area.
	In November 2005, and again in January 2007, this House gave consent to publish a Bill to protect runaway and missing children. Both Bills received support from Missing People, the Children's Society, Parents and Abducted Children Together, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Crisis, the lead officer for runaways from the Association of Chief Police Officers and many hon. Members. In the previous Session, more than 200 hon. Members supported the call for time to be granted for this Bill's consideration. It does not seem too much to ask that vulnerable children are identified so that they can be helped, that information is collected when a child is reported missing to the police and that there is effective co-ordination between the police, health authorities and local authorities.
	We must ensure that a child who is calling for help can get it. In October, the sponsors of this Bill and other hon. Members held parliamentary hearings, where we received evidence from a range of charities, police forces, local authorities and Government bodies. We heard about some excellent joint local working between the police, local authorities and voluntary organisations. Such partnerships demonstrated effectiveness in reducing the incidence of running away, in better protecting children who had gone missing and in tackling predatory adults who target runaway children to prey on them. Such effective partnerships are few and far between, and the reality for many children is bleak, with no local service either in place or planned.
	The Children's Society has just completed an extensive review of services for runaways in England on behalf of the Department for Children, Schools and Families. It told us that there was exemplary practice in few locations and that adequate services do not exist in the majority of places. The survey identified that only about 12 per cent. of local authorities have organised responses to the needs of young runways. More than two thirds of local authorities are not even planning a response, despite the fact that having a plan is part of the local authority guidance issued under a local authority circular by the Department of Health in 2002. More than two thirds of local authorities are not fulfilling even that part of the existing guidance, and that serious failure is leaving some very vulnerable children and young people without any protection. Poor data collection is making it impossible to identify failures or to direct resources and allocate priorities. We received a wealth of evidence relating to real dangers that are being faced by some young people who are alone in Britain's streets today and identifying that this issue must be made a clear and urgent safeguarding priority.
	Lancashire police's "Mountains into Molehills" project produced significant evidence of risk levels to young individuals and the successful results of early intervention. The force also identified the hugely wasteful cost to police authorities and the hugely attritional effect on children's life chances of having only a reactive approach to missing children. It worked out that just investigating cases was costing Lancashire police about £6.2 million a year. Some 77 per cent. of the force's missing person cases involved young people under the age of 18, and the same people were going missing over and over again—one girl from a care home was the subject of 78 missing person investigations. Three children did not survive; one was killed in a road traffic collision while missing, one was murdered and her body was never found and the other visited some adults who had chaotic lifestyles and who plied her with drink and prescription drugs—she died as a result.
	Many runaway children return home safely, but we repeatedly heard evidence of children being targeted by predatory adults for sexual or drug-related exploitation. Such children were being encouraged to run away repeatedly by people who were pretending to be their friends. The police's ability to tackle such predators depends on the good retrieval and recording of information from young victims, who often feel no trust in authority figures.
	The most effective local action depends on a good working relationship between police, local authorities, health authorities and the voluntary sector. The voluntary sector was consistently cited as a key partner because of its role as a trusted friend for young people. However, despite their crucial role in supporting children at risk, most of the charities working to provide support for runaway and missing children are uncertain about continued funding for their work. Most do not know whether they will have funding to continue in just three months' time. Even Missing People, the national charity that provides 24/7 helplines for missing people and their families and a runaway helpline that took 50,000 calls last year, receives only modest core support from Government and does not know whether it will receive any funding beyond March this year. More alarmingly, the National Policing Improvement Agency, which took responsibility for missing people, including missing children, from September, has been allocated a budget of only £261,000 from the Home Office in this financial year.
	ACPO has calculated that the social cost of policing runaway and missing children is £220 million a year, which is set against a total Government investment to tackle the issue of £1.1 million in the last year. It beggars belief. Targeted early intervention, using data to identify children at risk and involving senior-level leadership are proven to reduce the number of children who run away, to help those who do run and to tackle the underlying problems. Early intervention saves money and saves children. Urgent action must be taken to make the simple changes that are needed to reduce the number of children who run away or go missing in the first place and to ensure the immediate safety of those children who go missing. The Bill is a simple measure to require the collection and reporting of information. It is our job to protect those children and it is about time we did it. I commend the Bill to the House.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	Bill ordered to be brought in by Helen Southworth, Ann Coffey, Dan Norris, Mr. Barry Sheerman, Mr. Russell Brown, Alan Keen, Fiona Mactaggart, Mr. David Chaytor, Mr. Kevin Barron, Ms Dari Taylor, Annette Brooke and John Bercow.

Runaway and Missing Children

Helen Southworth accordingly presented a Bill to make requirements regarding the safeguarding of runaway and missing children; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 20 June, and to be printed [Bill 51].

Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill (Programme) (No. 3)

David Hanson: I beg to move,
	That the Order of 8th October 2007, in the last Session of Parliament, (Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill (Programme)), as varied by the Order of 11th October 2007 in that Session (Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill (Programme) (No. 2)), be further varied as follows:
	1. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order of 8th October 2007 shall be omitted.
	2. Proceedings on consideration shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table.
	3. The proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the times specified in the second column of the Table.
	TABLE
	
		
			  Proceedings  Time for conclusion of proceedings 
			 New Clauses relating to section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; amendments relating to those new Clauses. Two hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Motion for this Order. 
			 New Clauses relating to self-defence; amendments relating to those new Clauses. Three and a quarter hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Motion for this Order. 
			 New Clauses and new Schedules standing in the name of a Minister of the Crown relating to sentencing, the release or recall of prisoners, or bail, except those relating to the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 or referral orders; amendments relating to those new Clauses and Schedules. Four and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Motion for this Order. 
			 Remaining proceedings on consideration. Seven hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Motion for this Order, or 7.45 p.m., whichever is the earlier. 
		
	
	4. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion eight hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Motion for this Order, or at 8.45 p.m., whichever is the earlier.
	I recognise that the Opposition will undoubtedly not share the Government's wish to support the programme motion. I almost anticipate the fact that the official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats will oppose it. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, I shall let you into a little secret, between ourselves: if I were an Opposition Member I might well oppose the motion myself. I know that it will be very difficult for us to discuss some of the amendments before the House in the time that we have allocated for today's debate. I am sincerely grateful to the Government Chief Whip, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Mr. Hoon), for securing extra time for today's business, beyond the normal point of interruption, so that we can continue the Third Reading debate until about 8.45 pm.
	My right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor and I understand that the official Opposition and others would like to have more time. We have tried to use the programme motion to make available as much as possible, consistent with the need to get the Bill to the other place on time.

Richard Shepherd: I do not understand the logic of the Minister's argument. He concedes the position of those who oppose this dire programme motion and says that we must complete our deliberations in the time available, but it is in the Government's power to ensure that legislation is not forced or rushed through. It should not be left to the House of Lords to deal with the Bill, so why do not the Government withdraw the motion so that we can adopt a proper approach to the business?

David Hanson: I understand the concerns of the Opposition. With my right hon. Friends the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Whip, I have tried to make available as much time as is practicable, consistent with the need to get the Bill through this House and the other place.
	The programme motion ensures that the House will have eight hours today for Report and Third Reading, on top of the 47 hours that we had in Committee. The Bill was debated fully in Committee, where hon. Members of all parties supported the Government's programming provisions.

James Duddridge: I note what the Minister has said about the Committee proceedings, but hon. Members had no opportunity to discuss the new clauses being introduced today. They include new clause 1 on blasphemy, new clause 2 on prostitution and, to a lesser degree, new clause 17 on graffiti. That last new clause is my own modest contribution to the Bill, but although I believe that the Secretary of State is sympathetic to it, we are not likely to reach it.

David Hanson: As I have said, my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor and I have tried to structure today's proceedings so that there is a reasonable amount of time to debate three significant new additions to the Bill. We had a full debate in Committee and covered all the matters that arose then. In fact, we completed the Committee stage 15 minutes before the allotted time expired, but we have made available a reasonable amount of time so that the new clauses that we have had to introduce—on the reserve statutory prohibition on prison officers taking industrial action, the clarification of the law on self-defence, and the proposed changes to sentencing and bail arrangements following Lord Carter's review of prisons—can be considered by the House.
	I recognise that the programme motion will be debated, and that the Opposition will not support it. However, given the circumstances and the extra time that we have been able to secure today, I commend it to the House.

Edward Garnier: May I begin by congratulating the Minister on his ability to keep a straight face?
	This Bill was first presented to the House before the summer recess and its Second Reading debate took place in the spillover period of the previous Session. In those days—at a time when the Government and their spin doctors were threading their wobbly way through the Corridors, bars and Lobbies of this building, having returned from the hazy pleasure domes of Bournemouth—a general election was in the air. We all expected the Prime Minister to announce when it would be held: certainly, the topic and was being spoken of by journalists and by the younger and more excitable members of the Cabinet.
	Indeed, political commentators were promised not only an election in the first week of November but a crushing victory for the Labour party that would see the end of the Conservatives as a credible party of opposition. What that meant, of course, was that the Bill that we now have the misfortune to be considering was intended to die with the Parliament. It was, as anyone who has given it even the most cursory glance will know, a disastrously muddled Bill. As I suspected when it was published—and my suspicions have only got stronger since—the Bill was not meant to be passed into law; instead, it was intended as a headline catcher to give the impression that the Government, despite the departure of Tony Blair, were still at work.
	Today is a dark day for the House and for parliamentary democracy as a whole. The Government—who do not enjoy the public's trust or confidence, or the respect of the membership of this House—now tell us that this Bill should complete its remaining stages by 7.45 pm, or possibly earlier. Were this a 10-clause Bill that had gone through Committee with a few amendments, this timetable would not be objectionable and the motion would pass without debate, let alone a Division, but let us see what sort of Bill this is and the timetable into which the Government intend to fit our debate. The Bill that left Committee bore little resemblance to the Bill that was debated on Second Reading, and the Bill that we are debating this afternoon bears little resemblance to the one that left Committee. It had 128 clauses and 23 schedules on Second Reading.
	It was, by any standards, a large Bill. That had much to do with the fact that it was the product of two ministries, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice. I suspect that Ministers from both Departments would privately prefer that this Bill had nothing to do with them because neither ministerial team wants to take responsibility for the mess it has become—and I do not blame them. Success has a thousand parents and failure is always an orphan, and this Bill is a legislative failure. It has been used as a dumping ground for every half or ill-considered idea that has been languishing on the shelves of the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and Downing street.
	We heard evidence in Committee from several witnesses who pointed out numerous deficiencies in the Bill that were the result of the omission of necessary or desirable provisions and the inclusion of provisions that would not work or were not likely to deal with the problem they were said to be curing. Of course, the Government paid no attention to that.
	Ministers have seen this Bill—as will become evident this afternoon—not as an opportunity to improve the criminal law, but as a chance to invent new laws and offences and to stick them, like decorations on a Christmas tree, anywhere they could reach. It was a mis-shapen tree in the first place—how else can one describe a Bill that deals with youth justice, adult sentencing, the creation of a commissioner for offender management and prisons, a Northern Ireland commissioner for prison complaints, proceedings in magistrates courts, international co-operation in criminal justice matters, violent offender orders, antisocial behaviour and disturbances in hospitals, parenting orders, financial assistance for police authorities, inspection of police authorities, misconduct proceedings against police officers, special immigration status, the disclosure of information about sex offenders, sales of tobacco to those under 18, and amendments to armed forces legislation?
	I now come to a stark illustration of the chaotic nature of this incoherent Bill, because the following subjects are not just in the same Bill, but in the same part of the Bill. Part 7 includes provisions on pornography, prostitution, sex offences committed abroad, adoption and offences relating to nuclear facilities.
	It gets worse, because in Committee the Government introduced 85 new clauses and 11 new schedules, only one of which—that covering the offence of hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation—was mentioned on Second Reading. Where have the Government stuck this addition? It is to be found in clause 107—right next to clause 108 on offences relating to the protection of nuclear material and facilities. In addition, the Government introduced 400 amendments in Committee. We have a Bill that now—by that I mean as at midday today—runs to 176 clauses and 34 schedules. Some of those schedules have as many as five, eight or 10 separate parts. Today we have a Bill that can only be contained in two volumes of 121 and 131 pages respectively, whereas on Second Reading it was contained in one volume, albeit big enough at 239 pages.
	One might have thought that the Government would stop there, but, no, not content with the mess they have already created, they have sought to go further. A further 204 new Government provisions—new clauses, new schedules and amendments—have been tabled for discussion today. Some were tabled as recently as Monday, and some were tabled at the end of last week before the House returned. Issues as important to the management of our prisons as the restoration of the statutory denial of prison officers' right to strike—a fundamental U-turn in Government policy—were brought forward only on Monday, although quite where that fits into the long title escapes me at the moment; further elucidation might be provided in the short debate to come.
	Government proposals on issues as important as the repatriation of foreign prisoners and the return of British criminals from abroad, sentences for public protection and for serious sex offenders, on extended sentences—whether time spent on tag before sentence is to be treated the same as time spent in custody before sentence—and the adjustment in the law of self-defence have all been put before the House for the first time today.
	This timetable motion, even if it permits us to debate just a few of these important issues for the first time in this House and even if it allows us seven hours from now, is not just inadequate: it is an abuse of power and an affront to this House and the public on whose behalf we make laws. The Government have the numerical majority in the House so I have no doubt what the result of the Division will be. But that is not the point. This is not the Bill that came to this House in October. This is not the Bill that the House permitted to carry over into the new Session. This is not the Bill that Ministers and other witnesses gave evidence about in October. This is not the Bill that left Committee after 16 sittings on 29 November. This is not even the Bill that the House expected to be dealing with even as recently as last Wednesday. This is a vastly expanded, vastly more incoherent and vastly more ridiculous Bill than it was at any stage before today.
	I said to the Minister for State last year that this Bill was a plum duff with a lot more duff than plums. In response, the Government have added to the duff, but given us no time to digest it. The Government are beyond hope and beyond rescue, but this House need not follow them into the abyss. Let us do what we were elected to do—hold this Government to account. Let us throw out this disgraceful, shameful motion.

David Heath: It really will not do for the Minister of State to open this debate by saying how much he agrees with the Opposition about the inadequacy of the timetable for the Bill. I do not take, and never have taken, the reflex view that all timetable motions are of necessity inadequate for the purposes of the House. However, I do say that if the House is prepared to forgo its responsibility to consider some of the most basic legislation that we are here to consider—criminal law—and to sub-contract it to the other place to do the job that we are supposed to do, all the guff about the primacy of the House of Commons and how important this place is as a debating Chamber means absolutely nothing.
	These are matters of life and liberty and we are being asked to pass them on the nod because of a timetable exercise by the Whips, against the interests of the Department that leads on the Bill. We are asked to believe that there is no time in January, in a Session that started in November, to find a second day for a Bill that comprises two volumes, 176 clauses and 34 schedules, and to which hundreds of substantive amendments have been tabled today. Many of us could have tabled many more amendments if we had felt that there was the slightest chance that they would be considered.
	We are being asked to agree that the House of Commons cannot find the time to discuss criminal law properly and to pass it, without consideration, to the other place. The hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) has already said that many new clauses—which were not in the original published Bill—were introduced in Committee, often at short notice. Since then, we have had whole new provisions introduced, some of which we are seeing for the very first time today. They are not trivial matters, because they include provisions that affect the governance of our prisons, the basic law of self-defence, the terms for recall of prisoners and public protection. Those are not trivial, but even if none of them had been introduced today, I question whether it is right that the House should be given a mere few hours to deal with fundamental issues such as homophobic hatred crime. Parallel offences were discussed for days and days, but today we are expected to dispose of the provision in a matter of minutes.
	Repeal of the law of blasphemy is an important issue on which the House is entitled to have an opinion. People are concerned to make sure that we get right the law on prostitution, both to reduce the incidence of prostitution and to avoid the trafficking of women and men for the purposes of prostitution. However, we may not even have the opportunity to debate those measures.
	The Bill introduces what could be termed a Sarah's law or Megan's law. It would certainly be an important change to our criminal procedure in protecting children against those who have been found guilty of sexual offences against minors. We may not have a chance to say a word about those proposals because of the timetable. There are to be huge changes to the role of the Court of Appeal, and we are being asked simply to pass the issue down the corridor; the attitude is, "The Lords will sort out the Court of Appeal. It is not for the Members of the House of Commons to have an opinion about its role in the judicial process."
	We are talking about an abuse of the House, made that much more difficult to stomach by the fact that the Lord Chancellor—I am sorry that he is not in the Chamber—told the Commons when he was Leader of the House how important it was that we respected the House's role, the rights of Back Benchers to intervene in debate, and the importance of Report as a part of the legislative process in which the whole House had the opportunity to debate matters that would otherwise be considered only by members of a Committee. That same Leader of the House was to reform and improve the House's procedures, to make it capable of doing the work entrusted to it. It is he who puts before us today an abuse of process that will prevent us from doing our work. It means that eventually we will have to rely on an unelected House to do the work that we should do. That is quite wrong.
	The Minister of State knows that I have argued from day one that this is a big Bill that needs proper consideration. He knows that, whenever possible, I have tried to argue that we need sufficient time for Report. The answer is wholly inadequate. It will not do, and I hope that the House will, for once, take it upon itself to do its job properly by rejecting the programme motion.

Roger Gale: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. We have now heard from all three Front Benchers, and it is abundantly plain that what is taking place today is an abuse of the processes of the House. The Procedure Committee sits at 2.30 pm. I will ask the Chairman of that Committee, on which I sit, whether he considers the issue to be within his remit. When you leave the Chair, as no doubt you will fairly shortly, will you be kind enough to summon the Leader of the House to your apartments, and ask her to look carefully at what is happening today, with a view to extending Report for a further day?

Mr. Speaker: As I have said to the House on many occasions, the House expresses its opinions, but the Speaker cannot be drawn into such matters. The House is debating the motion and making its views known, and I will not be summoning the Leader of the House. It is for the House to make its views known at this stage. Everything has been done in perfect order; I am therefore bound by the rules of the House.

Neil Gerrard: I will be brief, because I want to get on to debating the amendments, particularly the first group, in which I have a considerable interest. The Opposition Front Bencher says that the timetable is an abuse, but I am confident that if there were a Tory Government—I trust that that will not happen—and they wished to get a controversial Bill through the House, they would use the same process of introducing a timetable motion and not leaving much time for debate. They would do that because it suits Governments to be able to get their business through.
	This afternoon we are being asked to deal with 100 pages of amendments. I know that a considerable time was spent in Committee, but those of us who are not on the Committee have a legitimate right to take part in debates on Report, and to raise issues about which we have concerns. Looking at the timetable, I can see that in the last two and a half hours of the time available, there are a dozen groups of amendments to be dealt with, and some are on issues, including blasphemy and prostitution, that are of major interest to a lot of Members on both sides of the House. There are issues that may not be of great interest to everyone, but about which some of us have concerns. For example, my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and I have tabled an amendment on violent offender orders, but we can be almost 100 per cent. sure that the group of amendments concerned will never be reached. It does the House's reputation no good when we try to rush through 100 pages of amendments in a limited time.
	When it comes to such Bills, I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench to think not only about getting the business through, although clearly they have a legitimate, perfect right to get the Government's business through, but about Back Benchers who have an interest and wish to take part in the debates. Almost certainly, they will find this afternoon that there are issues in which they take a real interest, but on which they will not be able to say a word.

Edward Garnier: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that his concerns are shared by those of us who were on the Committee, because many of the issues that we are to debate today—or rather that we will not debate—are wholly new to the Bill, and not just to the Committee?

Neil Gerrard: Of course there are many issues that are to be discussed that are new to the Bill, and people who were on the Committee will have a legitimate interest in them. As I say, however, I am under no great illusions: if a Tory Government were dealing with such a Bill, they might well adopt exactly the same process, because it suits the Executive. It does not, however, suit the interests of Back Benchers.

Lynne Jones: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Neil Gerrard: No, I have finished.

Stewart Hosie: When the Bill was published, its territorial extent was described. Only minor matters related to Scotland—issues to do with the commissioner for offender management, nuclear material and facilities, the Data Protection Act 1998, the British Transport police, defence policing, and immigration status for foreign nationals. The explanatory notes said that there would be no requirement for a consent to legislate motion. By and large, the measures seemed reasonable. However, I understand that there has since been published in the Scottish Parliament an intention to pass a consent to legislate motion in relation to bribery and corruption by foreign officers, violent offender orders and the repatriation of foreign prisoners. We will not, or are very unlikely to, debate the latter two issues, so in trying to defend the programme motion, will the Minister tell us what the extent is of the changes to Government amendments, which now require a consent to legislate motion from the Scottish Parliament?

Lynne Jones: Mr. Speaker, I apologise for not being present at the start of the debate, although I was able to listen to the speeches of the two—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I did not know that. If the hon. Lady was not here for the opening of the debate, I am afraid that I must call someone else. She should not have made that known. I call Mr. Shepherd.

Richard Shepherd: Thank you, Mr. Speaker; I have been here from the beginning of the debate. The path to hell is paved with Home Office criminal justice Bills. They have had a long career: the number of criminal justice measures is now well into the 60s. However, that is not the issue. The Government, under the new Prime Minister, started off with the idea of reinforcing the powers of the House of Commons. He was to return to the House its proper functions. Under the presidency, as I suppose I would call it, of the now Lord Chancellor—a former Home Secretary, Leader of the House, and Foreign Secretary: the éminence grise of the new Labour Government—the Government are back to their old role of ensuring the steamrolling of discordant Bills through the House.
	How can it be that, as has been set out so adequately by all those who have spoken so far, the House of Commons is to be denied the opportunity to judge on matters relating to the criminal law? With these measures, we will be consigning people to prison for new offences—yet we will not discuss all of those. This is the very antithesis of good government. A compendium Bill that covers every last thought of anyone in the Administration is not easy for the public to understand, is awfully difficult for the world to get to grips with, and casts our hopes, our securities, our freedoms and our liberties into the hands of lawyers.
	I am glad to see that the éminence grise has returned. The debate is seminal to his role. We have heard much preaching about every one of us being able to contribute to the process of law. We were all sent here by distinct electorates to be able to affirm or reject propositions for what should be contained in law. The programme motion, as was honourably said by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), denies Members that right, and deliberately so.
	The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr. Hanson) spoke honourably and nicely. I do not criticise his approach. It was a humble approach to the House. He understands the position of the Opposition, but he goes on to say that in the circumstances it is necessary to adopt this course of action. What circumstances constrain the Government so that they cannot do away with this guillotine motion—for that is what it is?
	Perhaps the éminence grise, the Secretary of State, the lord high panjandrum, will get up off his haunches and tell the House why the circumstances, whatever they are, do not enable the House to discuss the Bill. It is farcical. People outside the House would not begin to understand how, after they have sent Members here to examine criminal matters, the high panjandrum and his cronies deny the House the opportunity to consider those matters. That is what it amounts to.
	I have listened to the lord high panjandrum over many years, as both Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary, with all the soothing, the sympathy, the understanding and his love for the House—but he denies the House the basis of its existence. This is fraudulent and we do ourselves a grave disservice. I shall watch to see whether the hon. Member for Walthamstow votes against the motion. It is appalling. I should like to see every one of those brave new Labourites who believe passionately in the chance and opportunity to change Britain voting in the Lobby to deny the British people representation on criminal law.
	The Bill is a mess. Everyone knows that it is a mess. I am surprised that it has not been reconsigned to Committee. That is how serious the matter is. This is not the Bill that originally came before the House, yet the high panjandrum chews his chewing gum and gets on with other business, instead of addressing the House. The House should reject the motion.

Bob Spink: It is difficult to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd), who speaks with such eloquence and passion—more than almost any other Member in the Chamber. We should respect what he says and how he says it.
	Let me say in my own words that politicians and the House have never in my memory been held in such great contempt by the public. We see one of the root causes of that before us today—the railroading of a confused, incoherent and deeply flawed Bill, without adequate time for consideration of the 100 pages of amendments. That typifies the root cause of the political malaise and the Executive's contempt for the House.
	Issues such as self-defence, the repatriation of prisoners, blasphemy and incitement to hatred, pornography and sex offenders, and violent offender orders will be rushed through with little or no consideration today. We could spend all the available time on each of the 14 main groups of amendments that we have to consider. With the timetable before us, it is patently impossible to do our job as Members of Parliament, representing our unique group of constituents and legislating properly in the important area of criminal law. That is why I intend to oppose the programme motion.

Fiona Mactaggart: I have never opposed a programme motion before, because I know that Governments need to get their business through, but I am extremely concerned about this motion. I understand the urgency of some of the matters before us. There is a timing issue in relation to the prison officers' dispute, but there are other matters, such as self-defence, which were not debated in Committee, but which have arrived at this point and will be debated. As a result, matters that were originally in the Bill, such as prostitution, which the House so rarely has the opportunity to debate, will probably not be debated today. That is why timetable motions should not be employed.
	The Government have noticed the problem, which is why the business is not scheduled to end at the usual time. That is not good enough. I feel pretty sure that the new clause that I tabled on prostitution, which is a significant proposal, will not be discussed for years to come, if legislative opportunities follow the usual path. That is not right for the House, and the House has not been treated with sufficient respect.
	The problem with the speech by the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) is that he always says that, doesn't he? On this occasion, however, he has a better point than usual. The Government's approach is better than it might have been, but it is not good enough. It is not right that matters such as self-defence, which the House has debated before, should not be considered in Committee. It just is not right.

Crispin Blunt: I entirely agree with the hon. Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart). On any reasonable assessment of the House's consideration of the Bill, the arguments made particularly well by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) when he set out the case against the programme motion are overwhelming. It is almost certain that the hon. Lady's amendment will not be reached for debate. It would be a great surprise if it were.
	As my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) said, on 27 June we were promised a new beginning for the House, which was to be treated with respect. If the Government intend to insist on the disgraceful programme motion and their disgraceful treatment of the House of Commons, will the Prime Minister at least come to the House, less than an hour after he was here to answer questions on his own account, and vote for the motion?

Roger Gale: When the Minister moved the motion, he suggested that the Government had to terminate their business today in order to get such an important Bill through. All the arguments that have been deployed suggest that the Bill is a mess, that it has been and will further be severely amended, and that it is being railroaded through.
	When the Minister responds, will he deal with this question? Tomorrow's business in the House is a debate on the Adjournment. There is no vote. It would have been perfectly possible to reschedule that important debate in order to debate the Bill tomorrow. It would have been equally possible to suspend the 7 o'clock rule, as we shall in fact do, and to sit, if necessary, later into the night in order to debate these matters properly. Why are the Government not prepared to do that?

Nick Hurd: I, too, wish to place on record my extreme disquiet about the programme motion. All the other speakers have been experienced Members of the House, but I speak as someone who was elected only at the last election. I came to this place to play whatever part I could in effective scrutiny of legislation, to make sure that laws came out of this place as good as they could be. I find this process utterly demoralising, and a disgrace. When the Minister winds up, will he tell us what possible reason there is for not suspending the increasingly irrelevant gimmick of a topical debate tomorrow to make room for a proper debate on some of the measures before the House?

David Winnick: As my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) said, all Governments have programme motions, and there is nothing unique about this one. We saw that when we were in opposition. Usually, rightly or wrongly, I vote for programme motions, but I have the greatest hesitation in doing so today. The debate on industrial action by prison officers must end at 2.43, and whatever view one takes on whether the Government's proposal should be pursued, surely there should be more time. If there is a Division on the programme motion, there will be less than one hour to debate that important issue. The Government are wrong on this matter. There are many other important issues, as my hon. Friend and others have mentioned, and not to provide anywhere near adequate time to debate them shows a lack of sensitivity towards the House of Commons. For that reason, I will not be able to support the programme motion.

Oliver Heald: I add my voice to those that have already been raised against the programme motion. It is particularly important on Report that all hon. Members have an opportunity to debate some of the detail of the Bill, and—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I know that the hon. Member does not mean to be discourteous, but I have already prevented an hon. Member from entering the debate because she was not here for the opening speeches, and it has been brought to my attention that that is also the case with the hon. Gentleman.

Oliver Heald: I apologise.

Mark Durkan: I was here at the start of the debate, Mr. Speaker, and I simply wish to make the brief point that, as legislators, we will be voting ourselves into disrepute if we vote for this programme motion. Whatever the requirements and pressures of government, we as legislators are charged specifically with care and consideration for the law of the land. The Bill contains wide-ranging and deep-reaching changes to the criminal law that affects so many aspects of individual life and community and national life. Under the programme motion, new clauses and amendments will be microwaved on to the statute book, undebated, untested and unread by many hon. Members, and that is a democratic scandal. When many parties are competing as to who will tell people who are not working that they must work, we as a democratically elected Chamber should not be shirking our work and leaving it to unelected people in another place to give more care and consideration to what goes into the law of the land. We as legislators should pass only that which we, according to our conscience and consideration, deem fit to be in the law of the land. More consideration and care has been given to who stays in various celebrity television reality shows than hon. Members are prepared to give to what should be in the law of the land. I appeal to hon. Members to vote not according to party but as conscientious legislators, and to reject this programme motion.

David Hanson: With the leave of the House, Mr. Speaker, I shall respond to the debate. I said at the start that I understood that there would be concerns on the part of the official Opposition and other hon. Members about the nature of the programme motion, but I also said that I agreed wholeheartedly with my right hon. Friends the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Whip that every effort has been made to give sufficient time today to debate these matters. We will continue beyond the normal time of interruption, to 8.45.
	I have been in the House only 16 years, which is not as long as some hon. Members who have spoken, but I can recall five years of opposition with guillotine motions from the Conservative Government, and there has been no discussion by the Conservative party about repealing the ability to table programme motions. Any Conservative Government, if there ever were one in the future, would have the same regard to getting legislation through this House and the other place within time, as we seek to do today. We have had 47 hours in Committee, when we sat late into the night, and the House has eight hours today for consideration—

Richard Shepherd: This is a question not of programme motions but of rationality. Everyone who has spoken on the matter has criticised the rationality of the process of dealing with the matter before us today. The Minister referred to the Chief Whip, who is not present, and the lord high panjandrum, but neither has spoken on this matter and we know nothing about their arrangements; that is the essence of the indignation and anger that some of us feel, particularly after all the promises made by the new Prime Minister. It is a question of trust.

David Hanson: As has been said, the hon. Gentleman makes the same speech on such matters on every occasion—occasionally with some justification. But we had 47 hours in Committee and we will have eight hours today. We have had trailed before the House in statements by my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor the measures that we are bringing forward today on the Prison Service, on imprisonment for public protection and on the Carter reforms. On Monday, my right hon. Friend made a statement to the House giving hon. Members an opportunity to comment—unheard of in normal practice.

Edward Garnier: I do not want the right hon. Gentleman to lose his rag, because he contained himself admirably in Committee. As I said, we had a happy Committee, although we had a very unhappy Bill to deal with. But it will not do for him to pray in aid the amount of time that we spent in Committee, because we were dealing with matters that are completely outside the ambit of today's debate. Regardless of the merits of the measure on prison officers' right to strike, we are debating today a wholly new addition to the Bill. There are hundreds of new clauses and amendments, and if he cannot get that into his head we are in trouble.

Mr. Speaker: Order. Interventions should be brief.

David Hanson: On Monday my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor, in an unprecedented way, made a statement to the House telling hon. Members that he was introducing the clauses that are before us today. We have an opportunity today to debate those clauses and the points brought before the House, and I repeat that we had 47 hours in Committee, with late nights—which as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough said, it was a very friendly Committee, and—

Nick Hurd: Did the right hon. Gentleman, or the Lord High Chancellor, ask for more time than the Chief Whip has given?

David Hanson: These matters are for discussion and agreement, and the Chief Whip, my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Mr. Hoon), and my right hon. Friend the Lord High Chancellor, and I, as the Minister responsible, are content with the motion before the House today. If we were not content, I would not be standing at the Dispatch Box proposing that motion.
	The question before the House today is whether it supports the motion. I contend that we have had considerable time in Committee, and we have today opportunities to debate the key issues: indeed, we have until 8.45 to complete our proceedings on the Bill. I commend the motion to the House.
	 Question put:—
	 The House proceeded to a Division.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.

The House having divided: Ayes 279, Noes 224.

Question accordingly agreed to .

Orders of the Day

Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill

As amended in the Public Bill Committee, considered.
	[ Relevant documents: Letter from the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, of 29( th) October 2007; and the Department's replies to the Chairman of the Committee of 25( th) November and 10( th) December 2007.]

New Clause 36
	 — 
	Amendment of section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

'(1) Section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) (inducements to prison officers to withhold services or breach discipline) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1), for paragraph (a) substitute—
	"(a) to take (or continue to take) any industrial action;".
	(3) After subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) In subsection (1) "industrial action" includes the withholding of services as a prison officer and any other action likely to affect the normal working of a prison."
	(4) In subsection (4), after paragraph (a) insert—
	"(aa) holds any post, other than as a chaplain or assistant chaplain, to which he has been appointed for the purposes of section 7 of the Prison Act 1952 (appointment of prison staff),".'.— [Mr. Straw.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Jack Straw: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment (a) to the proposed new clause, in subsection (3), leave out from 'officer' to end of subsection.
	Government new clause 37— Power to suspend the operation of section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.
	Government amendments Nos. 169 and 170.

David Winnick: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Could you confirm that the series of debates that we are about to have on these amendments must be concluded by 2.43 pm?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: That is absolutely correct, and any time that we take up now will be taken out of that time, so I suggest to the House that we get on with it.

Jack Straw: On Monday, for an hour, I gave a statement, in the course of which I obviously took questions, to set out why the Government have reluctantly felt compelled to come forward with these amendments to the law, which are to be included in the Bill. Let me now set out some of the background. I am of course ready to take interventions from either side of the House, as I always do.
	In the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, there was, for a variety of reasons, serious industrial action—often not direct strike action but other kinds of industrial action—within the Prison Service, which made the management of the Prison Service extremely difficult and placed public safety at risk, as well as placing the welfare of prisoners in serious jeopardy. The Government of the day did two things. In 1993, they went to court to seek an injunction restraining prison officers under the existing law, which they succeeded in obtaining. Then, in what became the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, they moved amendments, which became sections 127 and 128 of that Act, to prohibit industrial action by prison officers. At that time, as we were reminded yesterday—and it has been a point that the Prison Officers Association has raised—the Labour Opposition spoke and voted against those amendments. However, I want to make it clear that in doing so, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael) did not give an undertaking to repeal section 127 and made it clear that there could be circumstances in which we would accept that such a restriction on industrial action in the Prison Service should be on the statute book. He said:
	"It could be argued that when there are people who have special responsibilities—the police are in such a category and it may be argued that prison officers are as well—and therefore there are difficulties about taking specific forms of...industrial action, there should be a guarantee against that. If that is desired, such people should be given something in return—for example, a right that guarantees fairness in any negotiations."—[ Official Report, 13 April 1994; Vol. 241, c. 335.]
	He referred to agreements that existed at the time in respect of the fire service. It is also the case that our former Prime Minister, when he was Leader of the Opposition, gave undertakings in general terms about what was regarded as anti-trade union legislation in that Bill and elsewhere. I have to say to my hon. Friends that there were particular things in the measure as originally proposed by the Conservative Government that were plainly totally unacceptable and raised the temperature. They included measures that would have resulted in the certification officer being able to certify the Prison Officers Association as an independent trade union. It was only under pressure from the Labour Opposition that those matters were sorted out.
	I also want to make it clear that when I became shadow Home Secretary in the summer of 1994 and considered, in full consultation with the shadow Cabinet of the day, whether we should repeal that legislation, I decided that, without more such legislation, we should not, because of the very special circumstances that apply in respect of the running of a prison, which, I suggest, are similar to those of the services to the state and to the community provided by the police and the armed forces. I say to the House, and remind my colleagues, that at no stage did anybody, be it the then Leader of the Opposition, me or anybody else, ever give undertakings that section 127 would be repealed, nor was it in any manifesto, either in 1997 or 2001. Indeed, on three occasions I had to make use of the injunctive power under section 127 to avoid a very serious situation within the Prison Service. I have no recollection of that ever being the subject of complaint from anyone in the House. However, we were concerned to do what my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said, by ensuring that reciprocal arrangements were put in place to balance the fact that prison officers were not able to take industrial action. First, we sought to bring into force part of the 1994 Act, which could easily have been brought into force by the Conservative Administration, but was not, to set up an independent pay review body in place of the previous ramshackle arrangements for settling prison officers' pay.

John McDonnell: My right hon. Friend has suggested that in the summer of 1994, he took a decision on behalf of the Opposition, and the Labour party, that there would be no abolition of section 127. However, a letter of 6 July from Mr. Tony Blair MP to the Prison Officers Association says clearly:
	"An incoming Labour Government will want to put this situation right"—
	that is, the issue of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill—
	"and ensure, once again, that prison officers are treated in the same way and with the same working rights as other public servants, and recognises the status of the Prison Officers Association as an independent Trade Union".
	I believe that the POA and the labour and trade union movement generally interpreted that accurately as a Government commitment to restore the trade union rights of the POA, which means the right to withdraw one's labour.

Jack Straw: I understand what my hon. Friend says, but the simple fact is that I made the judgment during the period between summer 1994 and 1997. I do not recall any pressure—except from the Prison Officers Association, which I explained I could not accept—to include a specific commitment to repeal section 127, and no such commitment went into the manifesto. I do not recall any suggestion at the so-called clause 5 meetings that take place with the national executive, or at meetings of the shadow Cabinet of the day, that we should have such a specific commitment, nor was one made.
	Winding forward, I have set out—as did Paul Boateng on my behalf in 2000—how we have sought to negotiate a voluntary agreement and a comprehensive package of reforms of industrial relations in the Prison Service to obviate the need for reliance on section 127. That is what Paul Boateng told the House on my behalf in summer 2000. We introduced the pay review body and the then Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett), took the matter forward with the then Prisons Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins). There was then a series of intensive negotiations with the POA about establishing a new, comprehensive voluntary agreement in return for a suspension and/or repeal of section 127.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East, who led those negotiations, has authorised me to say that throughout the negotiations with the POA it was made clear at every stage that the voluntary agreement to which we could assent had to include a comprehensive and legally binding undertaking by the association not to take industrial action. It was only in respect of that that the Government moved, by an order under the Regulatory Reform Act 2001, to repeal section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. When that repeal occurred, it was made clear—initially in the other place because that was where it was dealt with, and subsequently in this House—by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Sutcliffe), who had taken over as Prisons Minister, that
	"If the POA gives notice to terminate the agreement with no alternative arrangements being in place, the Secretary of State would ask Parliament to reintroduce statutory constraints such as existed prior to disapplication of Section 127."—[ Official Report, 4 September 2006; Vol. 449, c. 1897W.]
	That is absolutely fundamental to this part of the story, which is why I ask all my right hon. and hon. Friends, as well as the House more generally, to support the introduction of what will be a reserve power in the event that we cannot reach a further voluntary agreement.
	By the time that the POA had signed up to the 2005 joint industrial relations procedural agreement, or JIRPA, it had voluntarily accepted that whatever else happened in the Prison Service, there could not be industrial action because of the risk to public safety and, I have to say, to the welfare of prisoners. We saw on 29 August the serious risk to prisoners if there is industrial action or a strike: they are literally locked in their cells with no idea when the next meal or exercise is coming, and the quite large number of prisoners with health needs have no idea when their medication will next turn up.
	The POA accepted that, but now in a round robin to MPs it says that it signed up to the agreement only under duress—its exact words. But that is not the case. It did not sign up to it under duress, but voluntarily. Indeed, I think that the matter went to a delegate conference. The association examined every single word in that agreement. It signed it and accepted the case voluntarily that I am now making to the House, which is that we have to have arrangements for dealing with industrial disputes in the Prison Service other than the possibility of industrial action because of the risk to the public and the dangers to the welfare of prisoners.

Douglas Hogg: May I remind the right hon. Gentleman that I was the Prisons Minister at the time of the Wandsworth strike? I therefore approach this matter as one who had to deal with a strike by prison officers. I agree with the analogy made between prison officers and police officers, but I fail to see why we should ever have contemplated relying on a voluntary agreement with the POA. Either now or in the future, there needs to be a statutory prohibition in force that is in no way the subject of a voluntary agreement.

Jack Straw: I understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman's point of view. However, the POA came along and said—I paraphrase and summarise, but entirely accurately—that it was ready for a voluntary agreement. It accepted that the voluntary agreement would be comprehensive. It accepted the terms of the voluntary agreement, which I shall read out in a second, and it also knew all the way through the negotiations that the deal it had signed up to consisted of clear, legally binding and enforceable undertakings not to take industrial action of almost all kinds, and that we would only seek the repeal or suspension of section 127 on that basis. When we sought that repeal, absolutely categorical undertakings were given to the other place, and to this House, in the terms I have read out, that should notice of termination of the agreement be given over a period of a year, as it has now been, we would bring back those powers.
	We were given notice of termination last May, which runs out on 8 May this year. I was asked why I have introduced this legislation now. In practice, because of the time it takes a large Bill to go through the Lords, this is the last possible moment, more or less, for legislation to go through in normal time. The only alternative would have been to wait until 8 May and then introduce emergency legislation. In such circumstances, I would have been asked by the Opposition what the emergency was, given that we had known about this possibility for a year. My view was that it would be quite false to suggest at that stage that there was some kind of emergency when there was not.
	Moreover, I also had to take into account the following. On 29 August, at 45 minutes' notice, the POA decided to take 24-hour strike action to protest against the phasing of its pay award. I understand its anger. However, in doing what it did, it broke the undertakings that it had already given, because the agreement was current at that time.
	I appreciate that the matter is difficult, especially for our side. However, we have accepted that the police and the armed forces cannot go on strike. Anyone who had to deal with the strike, as I did, on 29 August, would have had any doubts that they may have harboured about the need for restrictions on industrial action by prison officers removed by what happened. Only as a result of obtaining an injunction and talking matters through with Colin Moses and with great help from third parties did we manage to persuade the prison officers to call off their strike during that afternoon.
	Notwithstanding that, there was a total breakdown of order in Lancaster Farms' Buttermere wing, which houses unstable and potentially violent young offenders, aged 15 to 18. They had been locked in their cells, with only a dozen governor-grade officers on duty to cover the whole youth offender institution, which has a total of 500 young prisoners. It became very clear that those young prisoners were rioting in their cells. I saw the damage and spoke to the staff who had to try to deal with it. The prisoners had completely wrecked their cells, pulled out all the sanitary ware, started fires and so on. Members of the POA outside the gates were asked to come back to help to restore order and they failed to do so. I have to take that into account.
	Notwithstanding all that, the moment we had notice from the POA that it would terminate the agreement in May, my right hon. Friend the Minister with responsibility for prisons got in touch with the Trades Union Congress and asked it to appoint someone to be an intermediary to help us to resolve the matter and facilitate negotiations for a new joint industrial procedure agreement. That is an important point, especially for my hon. Friends, but I hope for all hon. Members. Ed Sweeney, who is well known from Amicus to many people, and is now the chairman of ACAS, was appointed to undertake the work.
	Ed Sweeney reported on the matter. I decided that I should wait until he had reported to both sides before coming to the House. Copies of his report are available on the website and I know that many colleagues have read it. He lays down a road map for far better industrial relations in the Prison Service. He does not propose at this stage to have no statutory protection against industrial action. Paragraph 4.16 of the report says that, of course, he is aware of the POA's rights and its position. It states:
	"This is a clear policy position from POA. However, given the state of employment relations in the Prison Service, I do not believe at this point in time it will be possible to meet this policy position of the POA. Employment relations in the Prison Service actually mitigate against meeting this policy consideration as does the absence of any form of minimum cover arrangements."
	He goes on to say that there are minimum cover arrangements in, for example, the fire service and the ambulance service, and that they have worked satisfactorily. He suggests that, after a successful agreement and two years of stability, discussion should take place between the Prison Service and the POA with a view to establishing minimum cover arrangements instead of a statutory ban. I committed myself to that in the House on Monday.

John McDonnell: I apologise to my right hon. Friend for not being able to remain for the rest of the debate, but I have an Adjournment debate in Westminster Hall on police pay—another uncontentious issue.
	The whole House will understand the circumstances in which my right hon. Friend found himself in August. That is why mediation by the TUC, with Ed Sweeney bringing all sides together and developing a process through agreement, was welcomed by all parties. However, we now have the memorandum, dated 4 January, from Ed Sweeney. It reads:
	"Dear All,
	As you know, a couple of weeks ago I sent you a draft copy of my proposals"—
	we have now seen the report—
	"arising from the review that I have been undertaking over the past few months and we are due to meet on January 24."
	The parties have only just seen the proposals. A meeting will take place on 24 January, yet we are now souring the process by precipitate action in introducing the new clause, which builds on the distrust that already existed before September in the POA and the Prison Service generally about the Government's intentions. Does my right hon. Friend believe that it was wise to introduce the new clause now? Would it not have been better, if necessary with the agreement of all parties in the House, to introduce emergency legislation if no resolution was found through discussion?

Jack Straw: The action is not precipitate—far from it. The parties had the draft, which is exactly the same as the final version, of the Ed Sweeney report before Christmas. The POA has been left in no doubt about the Government's intentions. Its members knew the position when it negotiated the agreement. They knew what my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South had said. They heard exactly what I said before the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 9 October, when I made it clear that reintroduction of section 127 was under active consideration. I have also discussed the matter with them and I am due to meet them next Monday. There is no reason for the new clause to sour relations.

Peter Bone: On the August strike, was not one of the problems with the voluntary agreement the fact that the union expected the Government to honour their side of the bargain? When they clearly did not, by phasing in the pay review, it believed that the Government had broken the agreement and that is why it took strike action. Do the Government not bear some responsibility for what happened?

Jack Straw: I understand that that is the POA's case. I do not want to make points about the matter, but it has always been clear that pay review body reports would be accepted apart from in exceptional economic circumstances. However, the POA made the point that the hon. Gentleman raised.

Michael Penning: I thank the Secretary of State for being so generous in giving way.
	We are considering a serious issue. As a trade unionist, I am worried about the speed at which the Secretary of State is trying to push the new clause through. We have 58 minutes to debate the union rights of the prison workers of this country. Surely there must be another mechanism. Loads of Members from all parties wanted to discuss the matter. Is not 58 minutes an insult to prison officers?

Jack Straw: I do not believe that it is an insult. Were we starting from scratch, the hon. Gentleman's point might be justified, but the new clause is no surprise.

Elfyn Llwyd: First, I want to emphasise the point that breaching the agreement angered the POA. At no time was there an agreement about phasing awards from the board.
	Secondly, with respect to the Secretary of State, he was serially unavailable to speak to the POA in the months after August— [Interruption.] That is what Colin Moses told me. If I am wrong, I withdraw the remark. However, we are taking precipitate action, which is unlikely to assist matters. We are all concerned about that.

Several hon. Members: rose —

Jack Straw: I shall give way again, but I want to make one point before concluding. I happened to be on holiday in August. The day I got back—the day before the strike—I asked my then diary secretary to phone the POA because we needed a meeting with its representatives. They were telephoned and they will admit that they failed to get the message, but I have always made myself available to the POA.

Several hon. Members: rose —

Jack Straw: My last substantive point before giving way is that the new clause provides for reserve powers, which can be introduced by order. If we do not have an agreement by 8 May, they would come into force in any event. However, subject to that, they would be introduced and turned off by order.  [Interruption.] I have just been reminded that I had a telephone call with Colin Moses on 9 July and saw him informally before that, as well as holding a meeting at the end of August. There has never been an issue about his access to me. The POA accepts that.
	I emphasise to my hon. Friends that the new clause provides for a reserve power. I said on Monday that I would prefer it if we never had to use it, and that remains my intention. We will work with Mr. Sweeney, the Trades Union Congress and other facilitators to do everything that we can to gain a new agreement. When people both inside and outside the House know the history, they will accept that what we have said has been entirely consistent and honourable. What we propose is the minimum required to protect the public and the welfare of prisoners.

David Winnick: Everyone will recognise that my right hon. Friend would not ask for such powers lightly. Obviously, industrial action taken by prison officers could cause a great deal of difficulties and worse. But does he also recognise the concern that if such powers are agreed to, another Government might use that as an excuse and a justification for taking away the right of people in the emergency services—firefighters, ambulance workers and the rest—to take such action? That is the reason for my hesitation about being able to support him.

Jack Straw: I understand my hon. Friend's concern, but the wording is very specific. In relation to the fire and ambulance services, these days no Government would be justified in doing what he fears, because there are proper minimum cover arrangements, and in practice there are no strikes or serious industrial disputes in those areas. That is the truth of it. He and I were in opposition for 18 years against the Conservative Government, and if and when the Conservatives come to power they will do what they want to do, regardless of what we do.

David Anderson: The Secretary of State mentioned Ed Sweeney's plan as being a road map. In the view of the prison officers and many Labour Members, however, the wording of the second part of new clause 36(3) is actually a road block. The reference to
	"any other action likely to affect the normal working of a prison"
	would be a catch-all, whereby people would be guilty of a criminal offence for any simple thing, if such action is defined by the management. Will he remove that provision, alter it, or define clearly what it means?

Jack Straw: That phraseology picks up the phrasing of paragraph 6 of the annexe to the current agreement.

David Anderson: That is why it did not work.

Jack Straw: It is not why it did not work, with great respect. In the hope of being helpful, while I cannot give an undertaking now as to the terms I am certainly ready to sit down and consider ways in which that provision can be tightened, with a view to bringing forward amendments in the other place.

Geraldine Smith: The prison officers at Lancaster Farms were grateful to the Secretary of State for visiting them, talking to them and listening to their concerns, but morale is very low at both Lancaster Farms and Lancaster Castle. Staff are losing the right to strike and to industrial action, but what are they getting in return? The solution must be to recognise the difficult and dangerous job that they do, to give them our full support, and to give them adequate financial compensation.

Jack Straw: I accept the concerns expressed, and I was pleased to meet prison officers, who are dedicated staff, as I have spelled out on many occasions—and I mean it. But they are not losing the right to strike—the POA voluntarily signed up to legally binding undertakings not to take industrial action; it accepted the case that I am now making. It did not have to sign up to it; it did sign up to it.

Geraldine Smith: But it is withdrawing from it.

Jack Straw: It is withdrawing from it, but it knew precisely what the arrangement was if it withdrew from it—we would have no alternative but to reinstate the equivalent of section 127.

Richard Burden: For all the reasons that my right hon. Friend has given, I am sure that we all want a successful reintroduction of the voluntary agreement. As has been pointed out, however, the new clause relates to all industrial action, not simply that affecting the safety, welfare, security or health of prisoners. Given that other Governments could use that provision, will he guarantee that in the event of the reserve powers being taken, there would be a specific vote in the House before they were ever exercised?

Jack Straw: I am ready to give this very clear undertaking. If the powers have to be brought in on Royal Assent, the issue of the affirmative procedure would not arise, because it would have been the subject of considerable debate backwards and forwards in any case. But if, as I hope that we can achieve, they start off as reserve powers, I am ready to ensure that amendments are made to this part of the Bill in the other place, whereby the reintroduction of those powers could take place only through the affirmative procedure. I am happy to consider the reverse situation, whereby they would be turned off, but I do not think that anyone would want that. Once they exist as reserve powers, or have been turned off, their reintroduction could only take place through the affirmative procedure.
	I am grateful to the House for listening to me. I have taken a lot of interventions, which I hope has been helpful. I commend the new clause to the House.

Nick Herbert: I shall try to take as little time as possible because I suspect that other hon. Members might wish to contribute to the debate.
	The Secretary of State seemed to show little understanding of why the Prison Officers Association is so angry about his statement on Monday. It was taken by surprise by his statement, in the same way that he claims to have been taken by surprise by its wildcat action last year. Far from the Government being entirely consistent, as he claimed, part of that anger arises because the Government's explanation of the history of the legislation and the action that they are now taking has not been straightforward.
	On Monday, and again today, the Secretary of State denied that the Labour party had fought tooth and nail against the legislation that outlawed strike action. He took umbrage at the suggestion. We have already heard about the letter from Tony Blair when he was shadow Home Secretary, shortly before he became leader, to the Prison Officers Association. Mr. Blair made it clear in that letter that
	"we have strongly opposed the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill on a number of Clauses which represented a wholly unwarranted attack on the working rights of prison officers".
	What is the difference between fighting tooth and nail against such measures and strong opposition? As has been admitted, the Labour party originally opposed the legislation.
	On Monday, the Secretary of State also said, and he has repeated, that no undertakings were given to repeal section 127. Again, Tony Blair's letter is explicit. In 1994, he told the Prison Officers Association:
	"An incoming Labour Government will want to put this situation right".
	It was not just Tony Blair as shadow Home Secretary who was making those promises; Labour Opposition spokesmen were going around the country making such undertakings, giving the impression to members of the POA that section 127 was not only being resisted but would be repealed. The right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott), when he was shadow Employment Secretary in 1994, won great applause, as the record shows, at what was no doubt a Labour party conference, when he talked about the Labour party's decency agenda. He said:
	"we will revert and give Prison Officers the right as employees in an employment situation doing a decent and responsible job".
	Is it not absolutely clear that the unions were given the impression that section 127 would go? It does the Justice Secretary no good at all to seek to suggest otherwise now.
	It is surprising that the Prison Officers Association should have been moved to issue a note yesterday saying:
	"It seems to us that despite repeated guarantees, the Labour Party in Government cannot be trusted to honour their promises".
	Of course, the Opposition have known that for some time, but it comes to something when a union is forced to issue such a statement.
	The fact is that whatever the subsequent justifications, the Labour party opposed the legislation originally, and promised to repeal it. It did not do so fully until three years ago, when it replaced it with a voluntary agreement, which the country was assured would deliver the same protection for prisons as had been delivered by the no-strike provisions. Now, three years later, the Secretary of State is forced into the humiliating position of having to come back and reintroduce provisionally that same legislation.

Jack Straw: I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman, but does he accept that at the time of the repeal, a little less than three years ago, the clearest undertakings were given that if we faced the circumstances that we do today, we would reinstate section 217 or its equivalent?

Nick Herbert: The question I put to the Justice Secretary on Monday, which he did not answer, is why the Government repealed the legislation in the first place. Is it not clear that it was a mistake to do so? If it was not a mistake, why are the Government now coming before the House, after giving 48 hours' notice, to reinstate legislation that they had previously removed? The Government have not yet satisfactorily explained why they took that action in the first place.
	The scrutiny committee was clear that the protection afforded was not to the same standard as a no-strike agreement. The unions thought that they had a deal. The quid pro quo for having a no-strike agreement was that there would be a pay review and that any award would be honoured. Today, the Secretary of State justified the staging of the review—in part, the cause of this grievance—by saying that there were "exceptional economic circumstances", which is why the award could not be honoured in full. Conservative Members have been constantly told that we are living through a golden economic age with successive years of economic growth. Now it appears, in the words of the Justice Secretary, that there are "exceptional economic circumstances", which means that this award and that of the police cannot be paid. We are apparently living in such dire economic straits that the awards cannot be honoured. That breach of the deal that the Prison Officers Association believed it had has driven its anger about current arrangements. As I said on Monday, the POA is also concerned about the conditions in prisons over which the Government have presided.

Douglas Hogg: While I accept my hon. Friend's analysis, does he agree that it simply reinforces the proposition that we should never allow a voluntary agreement and that there should always be a statutory prohibition on prison officers taking industrial action—simply because they cannot be relied on to keep to voluntary agreements?

Nick Herbert: Indeed, as my right hon. and learned Friend says, the statutory ban would have afforded greater protection for the public and the wildcat action could not have taken place. Presumably, the fact that the Government have come before the House to reinstate the ban demonstrates that they agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that it is indeed necessary to have statutory protection.
	On Monday, the Justice Secretary said, and I agree with him, that
	"it cannot be acceptable for prisoners to be locked in their cells for an indeterminate period"—[ Official Report, 7 January 2008; Vol. 470, c. 40.]
	Anyone who has visited prisons will know of the great difficulties that prison governors have in dealing with inmates locked up for whole days with only a few staff on account of the wildcat action. Prisons must be places of safety; there is no place in them for such industrial action.
	We are aware that locking up prisoners for long periods is rumoured to be about to happen this summer on account of the budgetary situation in the Prison Service. I would be happy if the right hon. Gentleman were to correct me, but I understand that there are proposals to have lockdowns in prisons for entire weekends, during which prisoners will be confined to their cells as there are insufficient staff to look after them. I thus find it surprising to hear the Justice Secretary talking about the unacceptability of locking prisoners up for long periods.
	We will support the Government in the reintroduction of this power—

David Winnick: No surprise at all.

Nick Herbert: Of course it is no surprise, as we introduced the power and it was clearly a mistake to rescind it in the first place. I would like to congratulate the Secretary of State on his conversion to Thatcherite trade union reforms and on his recognition of the protections they afford the country. When the Prime Minister invited Lady Thatcher to Downing street for tea just a few months ago, we could hardly have thought that it would yield such impressive results. I suggest that the Justice Secretary invite my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) in for a cup of tea in order to advise him further on how to introduce more of such legislation.
	The fact is that the proposed reserve power actually goes further than section 127. The new clause does not just make industrial action by prison officers unlawful, as it applies to
	"any other action likely to affect the normal working of a prison".
	We have now reached a position of future uncertainty because of how the Government have reneged on the pay award. They have mishandled the situation in prisons and allowed them to become overcrowded, so damaging relations with the POA that it is necessary for them to assume this power again. Being forced into that situation is an indictment of the Government's handling of this matter, so I am not surprised that the Secretary of State looked so sheepish about it both on Monday and today.

Neil Gerrard: Any doubts about my view of the new clause have been reinforced by the reminder that this is Thatcherite legislation. In fact, some of what it does goes beyond Thatcherism.
	We all recognise that operating a prison is exceptional and that it is not like running a factory. There have to be differences in how the trade unions can operate because we cannot allow prisons to be left unstaffed. Prisons have dangerous and violent people within them as well as people with all sorts of mental health problems. There are also many vulnerable people, particularly in some of the young offender institutions. We expect prison officers to keep those people secure, keep them safe and ensure that they are fed, receive appropriate medication and so on.
	If we are to achieve that as efficiently as possible, we need good industrial relations within prisons, as the Secretary of State has acknowledged. We need the Prison Officers Association and other unions in the prison system to feel that they can act as trade unions, which is part of having good industrial relations. Recent history, however, has been exactly the opposite, as prisons have had very poor industrial relations. That is one of the reasons why Ed Sweeney's report was undertaken and why both the Government and the POA signed up to it. That report, however, was published only on Monday this week. I realise that my right hon. Friend said that drafts have been seen, but the report was published only on Monday, as I say, and at exactly the same time that he made his statement announcing the amendments to this Bill.
	The Sweeney report was set up in the context of poor industrial relations and the need to secure a new voluntary arrangement to replace JIRPA—the joint industrial relations procedural agreement—from which the POA had given notice that it was withdrawing. We can argue about how good JIRPA was and how well it worked. The fact is, though, that it did not work; otherwise, there would not have been any withdrawal from it. The Sweeney report points to some of the issues that the POA raised about JIRPA and how far it allowed the union to raise relevant industrial relations issues as opposed to allowing management to rule them out. Irrespective of arguments about JIRPA, everyone accepts that we need a new and better agreement.
	My right hon. Friend says that he does not want to use the powers in the new clauses, but—because of the timing as much as anything else—the POA now undoubtedly sees the new clauses as having been designed to hold a gun to their head in negotiations that have not begun. I know that that is not my right hon. Friend's view, but having spoken to its representatives yesterday afternoon I can assure him that it is the POA's view, and I think that that will make it much more difficult for us to reach the sort of agreement that we want to reach.
	A particular problem is the wording of the new clause, which is why I tabled amendment (a). As has already been pointed out, it does more than just reinstate section 127 of the 1994 Act. My right hon. Friend says that the wording of the definition of industrial relations in the new clause is the same as that in the JIRPA, but I consider that there is a distinct difference between putting that wording in a voluntary agreement and putting it in the law.

David Anderson: Is not the obvious difference the fact that while under the JIRPA people who took action that was slightly out of order would be guilty of a disciplinary offence, under the new clause they would be guilty of a criminal offence? Those to whom we look to lock up criminals would become criminals themselves.

Neil Gerrard: That is quite possible. Another possibility is that the wording will become the subject of interpretation by courts. I do not think any of us can be certain what the consequences of that will be: what it might mean in terms of a new definition of industrial action and, once it has happened in this context, into what other contexts it might spill.

Jack Straw: As I said to our hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon (Mr. Anderson), although I will not give an undertaking on the precise wording until we have reached an agreement, I am prepared to consider points that are raised, and I understand the point that has been raised so powerfully by both my hon. Friends.

Neil Gerrard: That is helpful. I think that the wording should be examined and, hopefully, changed before it is put into law. Anyone who has read Sweeney's report will know that he had many good points to make about changes to the arbitration system allowing both sides to raise issues, and about binding arbitration. It is very important for the arbitration to be binding on both sides.

Douglas Hogg: The hon. Gentleman says that we need to be sensitive about the rights of prison officers, and I understand that, but we also need to be sensitive about the rights of prisoners. Will the hon. Gentleman cast his mind back to what happened at Strangeways in the early 1990s, when a number of prisoners on rule 43 were effectively attacked in the prison? That is what happens when order in prisons breaks down. We must bear it in mind that prisoners are very vulnerable, and are at risk from other prisoners. We cannot tolerate circumstances in which order in prisons cannot be maintained.

Neil Gerrard: We all appreciate that order in prisons must be maintained. The issue for me is the timing as much as anything. If we had reached a point at which negotiations were breaking down and it was clear that no voluntary agreement would be reached, I would understand the Government's saying that something must be done; but doing it at this moment and in this form will make it far more difficult to reach the sensible agreement that we want to be reached between the Department and the prison officers.
	I do not think that new clause 37 helps. My hon. Friend says that the power will be introduced by order, but my reading of the new clause suggests that it would come into force on Royal Assent. The new clause concerns the ability to suspend the provisions, and my right hon. Friend has said that he will consider allowing that to be done by means of an affirmative resolution. Some of us would be rather happier if the implementation took place by means of an affirmative resolution in the first place, rather than on Royal Assent with the suspension being implemented by means of a negative resolution.
	I think that we are in danger of shooting ourselves in the foot by passing a measure that will make it far more difficult to reach the voluntary agreement that we all need. I hope that my right hon. Friend will think again, because I cannot support the new clause in its present form.

David Heath: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), who talked a great deal of common sense. He spoke of the danger of our shooting ourselves in the foot. I suspect that the foot is well and truly shot already by the actions that have been taken, and in particular by the circumstances that have led to what the Lord Chancellor has done today.
	The problem is not, in fact, what is proposed. We would all prefer a voluntary agreement to a statutory agreement if it could be made to work, but wildcat action took place, and that cannot be ignored. As I said on Monday and am happy to repeat, I do not believe that strike action is ever proper in a prison environment, and that is the end of it. The other side of the coin is that avoiding industrial action, and ensuring that we have an environment in which it is inconceivable, requires proper negotiating machinery and proper, binding arbitration on issues of grievance, and it requires management and Government who listen to what the people in the service are saying. It is transparently obvious that that has not been the case for a good many years.
	The hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) spoke of a cosy little teatime chat between the Lord Chancellor and the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard). The two of them could reminisce for a long time about the various deficiencies of the prison system under their respective stewardships, although it might be a rather one-sided conversation. I seem to remember that the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe was somewhat reticent when asked questions about the system, and famously found it difficult to give a response. The fact is, however, that we have had a significant problem with industrial relations in our prisons for a long time—in England and Wales. I made that point on Monday. Ed Sweeney's report makes it absolutely clear that the same does not apply in Scotland. We must ask ourselves in all humility what the Liberal Democrat-Labour Administration in Scotland were able to do— [Interruption.] It was a Liberal Democrat Minister of Justice, as the hon. Member for Hemsworth (Jon Trickett) may recall. We must ask ourselves what that Administration were able to do that eluded Ministers in this House with the same responsibilities, because we have clearly reached a point at which there has been a breakdown in trust.
	I said on Monday, and I say again now, that I believe that the staging of the pay award was a key component. If we do not treat the public services fairly by providing an independent assessment of pay, we must clearly expect a degree of resentment. All I have said to date is that I wish we were not starting from here. But we are starting from here, and I recognise the Lord Chancellor's difficulty. He must deal with a prison system in which there is recent experience of strike action, and that is not acceptable. However, the timing is most unfortunate. The fact that we are legislating today when the Sweeney report was published only on Monday, containing very positive proposals for improving the situation, is extremely regrettable. My fear is that it will poison the well in terms of future negotiations, and we will not secure the successful outcome that we all want.
	I am concerned to hear the Lord Chancellor tell his hon. Friends that he did not really mean what the new clauses and amendments say, and that he will rewrite them before the Bill goes to another place. That is yet another example of why it is wrong to legislate on Report on important matters of this kind, and expect us to rubber-stamp the legislation in the context of a very abbreviated time scale when it should be subjected to proper reflection, consideration and scrutiny before moving to the other place. It seems, however, that we must wait until the Government have done their work in the other place and brought the Bill back to us with revised wording which we hope will deal with some of the issues of scope identified by the hon. Member for Walthamstow, and perhaps with the issue of the commencement on Royal Assent—which may or may not be helpful, depending on the circumstances that apply when the Bill reaches its final stages in both Houses.
	However, I have to say to the Lord Chancellor that, if there were an affirmative procedure, that would not be a problem in any case. In those circumstances, we would not need to make commencement automatic on Royal Assent. We could bring forward the affirmative procedure at that point in order to bring it into action if it is considered to be necessary to do so.
	Although I am prepared to accept for the purposes of today that the Lord Chancellor has to bring forward these proposals, I think that it is intensely regrettable that they are here. It speaks of failure of management and failure of the negotiating machinery between the Government, the management of the Prison Service and the work force. It suggests that industrial relations are at an unacceptable level in a key public service. My message to the Government is: they really must do better.

Frank Doran: We are very short of time so I will make some quick points. This is an industrial relations issue. Of course, it is necessary for the Secretary of State for Justice to see it in the context of the security of the Prison Service. He rightly talks about the statutory position. My recollection is that the Prison Act 1952 makes the prison officer a constable, but the real position is that the Prison Officers Association is different from the trade unions for the police and the Army. The trade unions for the police and Army have always been subject to limitation on their actions and in relation to strikes. For most of its existence over 70 years, the POA has been a normal trade union with all the normal trade union rights.
	In the early 1990s, there were a lot of industrial difficulties. There are still industrial difficulties in the prison system, but it was the courts that decided that prison officer trade unions were not to be allowed to operate as normal trade unions. It is an irony that the 1994 Act, introduced by the then Conservative Government, restored some of the rights that they had lost.
	There was another event, as well as that legislation and the court case. That was the inquiry into the Strangeways disaster. It is important to put on the record a couple of the decisions made by the report produced by Lord Justice Woolf and Judge Stephen Tumim. They decided that there was no need to abolish the trade union status of the prison officers. They said:
	"We take the view that industrial action by prison officers should not be made unlawful at this stage.
	Conditions in prisons have significantly contributed to the present hostile state of industrial relations, just as they have contributed to souring relations between staff and prisoners."
	That is important at a time when prisons are full and getting fuller. The report went on to say:
	"We are encouraged to take this view because we found from the Inquiry's visits to establishments that those places with satisfactory conditions and constructive regimes appeared more likely than other, less well endowed prisons, to have satisfactory industrial relations."
	Therefore, the message from that report is, "If you sort out the prisons, you will sort out the industrial relations." I know it is not quite as easy as that, but I have a strong view, which is shared by most of my colleagues on the Labour Benches—
	 It being two hours after commencement of proceedings on the  programme  motion, Mr. Deputy Speaker  put forthwith the Question s necessary for the disposal of business to be concluded at that hour,  pursuant to Order [this day].
	 The House proceeded to a Division—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.

The House divided: Ayes 481, Noes 46.

Question accordingly agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 37
	 — 
	Power to suspend the operation of section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

After section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c. 33) insert—
	"127A Power to suspend the operation of section 127
	(1) The Secretary of State may make orders suspending, or later reviving, the operation of section 127.
	(2) An order under this section may make different provision in relation to different descriptions of prison officer.
	(3) The power to make orders under this section is exercisable by statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."— [Mr. Straw.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 175
	 — 
	Commencement

Amendment made: No. 169, in page 120, line 31 [Clause 175], at end insert—
	'( ) sections (Amendment of section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994) and (Power to suspend the operation of section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994).'— [Mr. Straw.]
	 Amendment made: No. 170, in title, line 9, after 'criminality;' insert
	'to amend section 127 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and confer power to suspend the operation of that section;'.— [Mr. Straw.]

New Clause 6
	 — 
	Reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.

'(1) This section applies where in proceedings for an offence—
	(a) an issue arises as to whether a person charged with the offence ("D") is entitled to rely on a defence within subsection (2), and
	(b) the question arises whether the degree of force used by D against a person ("V") was reasonable in the circumstances.
	(2) The defences are—
	(a) the common law defence of self-defence; and
	(b) the defences provided by section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (c. 58) or section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 (c. 18 (N.I.)) (use of force in prevention of crime or making arrest).
	(3) The question whether the degree of force used by D was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as D believed them to be, and subsections (4) and (5) also apply in connection with deciding that question.
	(4) The degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in those circumstances if it was disproportionate in those circumstances.
	(5) In deciding the question the following considerations are to be taken into account (so far as relevant in the circumstances of the case)—
	(a) that a person acting for a legitimate purpose may not be able to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action; and
	(b) that evidence of a person's having only done what the person honestly and instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong evidence that only reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose.
	(6) Subsection (5) is not to be read as preventing other matters from being taken into account where they are relevant to deciding the question mentioned in subsection (3).
	(7) This section is intended to clarify the operation of the existing defences mentioned in subsection (2).
	(8) For the purposes of references in this section to what D believed, it is immaterial whether—
	(a) any belief of D's was mistaken, or
	(b) (if it was mistaken) the mistake was reasonable.
	(9) But subsection (3) does not enable D to rely on any mistaken belief attributable to intoxication that was voluntarily induced.
	(10) In this section—
	(a) "legitimate purpose" means—
	(i) the purpose of self-defence under the common law, or
	(ii) the prevention of crime or effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of persons mentioned in the provisions referred to in subsection (2)(b);
	(b) references to self-defence include acting in defence of another person; and
	(c) references to the degree of force used are to the type and amount of force used.'.— [Mr. Straw.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Jack Straw: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment (a) to the proposed new clause, in subsection (8)(a), leave out from 'mistaken' to end of that paragraph.
	New clause 8— Amendment of the Criminal Law Act 1967 —
	'(1) The Criminal Law Act 1967 (c. 58) is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 3 (use of force in making arrest, etc.), after subsection (1), insert—
	"(1A) Where a person uses force in the prevention of crime or in the defence of persons or property on another who is in any building or part of a building having entered as a trespasser or is attempting so to enter, that person shall not be guilty of any offence in respect of the use of that force unless—
	(a) the degree of force used was grossly disproportionate, and
	(b) this was or ought to have been apparent to the person using such force.
	(1B) No prosecution shall be brought against a person subject to subsection (1A) without the leave of the Attorney General.
	(1C) In this section "building or part of a building" shall have the same meaning as in section 9 of the Theft Act 1968 (c. 60) (burglary).".'.
	New clause 9— Amendment of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 —
	'(1) The Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967 (c. 18 NI)) is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 3 (use of force in making arrest, etc.), after subsection (1), insert—
	"(1A) Where a person uses force in the prevention of crime or in the defence of persons or property on another who is in any building or part of a building having entered as a trespasser or is attempting so to enter, that person shall not be guilty of any offence in respect of the use of that force unless—
	(a) the degree of force used was grossly disproportionate, and
	(b) this was or ought to have been apparent to the person using such force.
	(1B) No prosecution shall be brought against a person subject to subsection (1A) without the leave of the Attorney General.
	(1C) In this section "building or part of a building" shall have the same meaning as in section 9 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 (c. 16 NI)) (burglary).".'.
	Government amendment No. 102.
	Amendment No. 125, in page 120, line 2, clause 174, at end insert—
	'(aa) section [Amendment of the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967];'.
	Government amendments No. 103 and 113.

Jack Straw: The purpose of our provisions is to amend and clarify for the better the law on self-defence. This is a matter of considerable public concern. The House will know of my experiences on four separate occasions of seeking to apprehend someone—there was one burglar and three street robbers. Anyone who has been involved in such circumstances, or who knows of someone who has, will know that on such occasions there is no time to make a careful, fine judgment about the balance of the law. One does these things instinctively. Where people act reasonably, in good faith, the law should clearly be on their side.
	I hope and believe that there is general support for new clause 6. I know that there will be a debate about the proposed changes involving something being deemed wholly "disproportionate", but I am afraid that we cannot accept them.

Anne McIntosh: rose—

Jack Straw: Before I give way to the hon. Lady and to other Conservative Members, I want to place on record my appreciation of the way in which they have brought this matter forward. We are dealing with an issue of considerable public concern. My judgment has always been that, interestingly, it is very rare for a case to become a decision for a court—normally it would be for the jury—where any reasonable person would regard it as unfair. The number of such cases that go to court are very few. In an informal trawl in 2004, the Crown Prosecution Service found 11 cases in the previous 15 where people had been prosecuted for attacking intruders, and seven of them related to household burglaries.

Anne McIntosh: rose—

Ann Widdecombe: rose—

Jack Straw: I shall give way in a moment, first to the hon. Lady and then to the right hon. Lady.
	Something that worries me, hon. Members on both sides of the House and members of the police force is that there have been more occasions when someone has acted reasonably, in good faith and on the spur of the moment, but a police investigation has none the less taken place. Such an investigation may drag on for months, with all the anxiety that that involves. Two years ago, the CPS and the Association of Chief Police Officers produced an excellent joint leaflet that gave guidance about that.

Anne McIntosh: rose—

Edward Vaizey: rose—

Jack Straw: I shall give way in a moment. Although such guidance is helpful, it is not the law. The purpose of our proposed changes is to draw on the best and most positive of case law, and to clarify the law.

Anne McIntosh: I am grateful for the Secretary of State's openness in meeting to discuss the text. The leaflet to which he referred weakly states that if the intruder dies, the victim of the crime could be accused of
	"acting with very excessive and gratuitous force and could be prosecuted."
	Let us consider the wording in new clause 6, in particular subsection (1)(b) and subsection (4). There is general agreement on both sides of the House that we need enhanced legal protection and greater clarity in the wording of the law. I submit to him, given that the wording is the same as it was in my private Member's Bill, that our new clauses 8 and 9 are much clearer in that regard.

Jack Straw: This has been the subject of considerable debate, but it ultimately comes down to a matter of judgment.
	May I just deal with the issue of "grossly disproportionate" force, which I have thought about a lot? I am sure that the hon. Lady and other Conservative Members will say, "Hang on a second". They will do so because as a result of Brendon Fearon seeking compensation over the Tony Martin case, the Labour Government introduced amendments in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to create a test in respect of any claim by a criminal against a victim who had assaulted or damaged them in some way. Such a claim could be sustained only if the force used against the criminal was grossly disproportionate. The issue is whether that part of the civil law can be imported into the criminal law. I have been clearly advised, and I accept, that that is not possible, not least because of the European convention on human rights—not because of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Dominic Grieve: rose—

Jack Straw: I say as gently as possible to the hon. Gentleman that I have three interventions to take first, but I look forward to his contribution. The advice that I have received, which I accept, is that such a move would be outwith the ECHR, and I remind Conservative Members that whatever views they have about the Human Rights Act, they have accepted that we should remain subject to the ECHR.

Patrick Mercer: rose—

Jack Straw: I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman.

Patrick Mercer: I am most grateful that the Justice Secretary has brought up the name of my constituent, Brendon Fearon, who was involved in the Tony Martin case. It might be apposite to remind the House that when I introduced a private Member's Bill on this matter, which was taken up ably by my hon. Friends the Member for Vale of York (Miss McIntosh) and for North-West Cambridgeshire (Mr. Vara), Brendon Fearon said how very useful he believed the proposed changes would be, and that if what is currently enshrined in civil law were to be enshrined in criminal law, he, as a professional criminal and a recidivist, would find it deeply deterring.

Jack Straw: I am not grateful to Mr. Fearon —[Interruption.] I was Home Secretary when the Tony Martin case arose. It was a difficult one, although I think that few people argue with the jury's verdict in those exceptional circumstances. I do not regard Mr. Fearon on an equal footing with the judicial Committee of the House of Lords or even with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. I shall now give way to the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe).

Ann Widdecombe: Get on with the speech, Jack.

Jack Straw: I shall give way to the Front-Bench spokesman.

Dominic Grieve: The Lord Chancellor has to accept that his new clause is a restatement of the existing law. As the law envisages that there are perfectly clear cases in which disproportionate force may be legitimate, surely by saying that only in cases of "grossly disproportionate" force should prosecutions lie we are well within the scope of article 2 of the European convention on human rights. I find it difficult to see how we would fall foul of the convention if new clauses 8 or 9 were to be adopted, particularly in the restricted circumstances to which they apply, which concern householders and closed premises when a victim is under a particular difficulty because they are unable to get away, temporise or disengage.

Jack Straw: To some degree, we may end up arguing about the size of the head of a pin. In the rare cases where such a prosecution reached court, it would be for a jury to decide behind closed doors whether it thought that the force used was acceptable. I put on the record the advice that I have received, which I accept. That is an issue between us.
	The new clause seeks to clarify the law in a positive way. It is drawn from the best of existing case law, but everyone knows that not even good lawyers can always access that with ease. We have sought to put on the face of the Bill the circumstances that should be taken into account by the court not only when it decides guilt or innocence, but earlier down the track when it decides whether to initiate an investigation. Proposed new subsection (5) states that in deciding whether someone is guilty of an offence,
	"the following considerations are to be taken into account...that a person acting for a legitimate purpose"—
	that is, to prevent a crime or apprehend a criminal—
	"may not be able to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of any necessary action; and...that evidence of a person's having done only what the person honestly and instinctively thought was necessary for a legitimate purpose constitutes strong evidence that only reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose."
	In other words, if that person honestly and instinctively thought that their action was reasonable, that would weigh heavily with the court, leaving aside the issue of whether it was proportionate or grossly disproportionate.
	My final point is that proposed new subsection (8) means that in terms of what the defendant believed it is immaterial whether the belief was mistaken and, if it was mistaken, whether the belief was reasonable. I commend the proposals to the House.

Edward Vaizey: rose—

Jack Straw: I want to allow the House time to debate what is proposed, so if I may, on this occasion I shall sit down early and invite the Opposition spokesmen to speak.

Nick Herbert: In accepting Government new clause 6, I want to explain why we do not believe that it goes far enough and why new clauses 8 and 9 remain the approach that the House should adopt.
	The private Members' Bills introduced over the past few years by my hon. Friends the Members for Vale of York (Miss McIntosh), for Newark (Patrick Mercer) and for North-West Cambridgeshire (Mr. Vara), all of whom are present today, sought, as we do, to give greater clarity to the law not by introducing the concept of people acting reasonably but by permitting them, when protecting themselves or their property against a trespasser, to use a degree of force provided that that force was not grossly disproportionate and as long as it should not have been apparent to the person that such force was grossly disproportionate.
	The Secretary of State spoke about cases in which victims of crime had their premises, homes or commercial premises entered, which led to their being in fear and using force—sometimes lethal force. The consequence of that use of force was not only an initial police arrest but a subsequent investigation and often a prosecution. The fact that the jury usually acquits the defendant does not remove the great stress that any such actions cause. It is common ground between the Opposition and the Secretary of State, who has recognised that the law inadequately protects the interests of the householder or shopkeeper, that some restatement is needed.

Henry Bellingham: My hon. Friend has hit on an important point. The Lord Chancellor said a moment ago that it is up to the jury to decide. My hon. Friend is right that many such cases should never go to court. How can someone, in the middle of the night and on the spur of the moment, make a judgment in seconds when the law is so complicated? New clause 6 is very complicated. The great virtue of my hon. Friend's proposed alternative is that it simplifies and clarifies the law, and that is why it should be accepted.

Nick Herbert: My hon. Friend is right. The point at issue is that when someone enters a premises—a home or a shop—they cross a physical line. Historically, we have regarded our homes as our castles. People who respond to burglars, fearful of the situation, might feel the need, on the spur of the moment, to use some force in repelling that individual. They make a split-second decision. No codification will help them in making a judgment about the correct level of force to use in those circumstances.

Shailesh Vara: In his speech to the Labour party conference, the Justice Secretary said that he would like to
	"review the balance of the law"
	in this area. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government's new clause does not amend or review the balance of the law? It simply tinkers with the existing state of affairs. The Opposition new clauses would achieve what the Secretary of State said he would achieve and would amend the balance of the law.

Nick Herbert: I agree. As my hon. Friend the shadow Attorney-General pointed out, the Secretary of State's amendments merely restate case law. It is important that Parliament sends out a clear and unambiguous signal to the owners of homes and premises that the law will be on their side should they have to use force where they are fearful of the actions that a trespasser might take. I do not see how restating existing case law will send out a clear and unambiguous signal from this House.

Edward Vaizey: Will my hon. Friend confirm that the Secretary of State has opposed changing the law for the past decade? He decided that the law should be changed only when he needed an eye-catching announcement for his Labour conference speech in the run-up to the bottled election. Does not that explain why new clause 6 does not change the law at all? Is not Parliament being taken for a patsy when it is asked to debate new clause 6? Should we not pass new clauses 8 and 9 instead, as they will change the law in the way we have sought for the past decade?

Nick Herbert: I am in a dilemma about how generous to be to the Lord Chancellor. Today he has repented of many sins, such as the Government's repeal of the legislation forbidding strikes in the Prison Service and his opposition to our constant demands that the law in this area be restated. However, my hon. Friend is right to say that the right hon. Gentleman made his party conference pledge precisely because he felt that it would be an eye-catching initiative. I think that he has had great difficulty in persuading his Department that there should be any change in the law to match that pledge.
	We have been here before. Precisely the same thing happened with the previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who stood at the Dispatch Box and agreed with us that the law needed to be changed. A few months later, however, after a review had been conducted, he said that we needed only a codification, but by then the signal had been sent out and the press headlines obtained. In fact, no real change was made to the law.

Jack Straw: indicated dissent.

John Gummer: The Justice Secretary shakes his head in disapproval. Before my hon. Friend is too kind to the right hon. Gentleman, will he agree that two audiences are being addressed? At the Labour party conference, the right hon. Gentleman was addressing the press, whereas today he is talking to his Back Benchers. [Hon. Members: "Where are they?"] If they were here, and as he well knows, they would oppose any change that gave people the right to protect themselves in the circumstances that have been described.

Nick Herbert: I note that Labour Back Benchers are giving the Justice Secretary no protection at all today. He may need greater assistance from them.
	Parliament must send a clear and unambiguous signal on these matters, and that is why we have suggested that the wording of the law should be changed so that a degree of force would be permitted, provided it was not "grossly disproportionate".

David Howarth: The hon. Gentleman has not mentioned proposed new section (1A)(b) of new clause 8, which uses the phrase
	"this was or ought to have been apparent to the person using such force."
	Does he agree that the problem is that that leaves in place the very problem that arose from the Martin case? The central problem with the Court of Appeal judgment was that it said that a mistaken belief that danger was threatened could be judged subjectively, but that the degree of danger had to be assessed objectively, using the criterion of reasonableness. New clause 8 does not deal with that problem at all.

Nick Herbert: The purpose of the phrase
	"ought to have been apparent to the person using such force",
	which is used in new clauses 8 and 9, is to make it clear that we believe that there needs to be an objective test. The matter cannot be left to a test that is entirely subjective. No one who has taken part in the House's deliberations on these matters has suggested that the law should have protected Tony Martin from the consequences of the action that he took. Our new clauses would not do that either, but the Government appear to believe that putting into statute a codification of existing case law will somehow assist people faced with a threat in their homes.
	Whether such a codification would be of any use to people in the heat of the moment is open to question. The present Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills was asked about that in March 2003, and he said:
	"Some sort of codification of what level of force is permissible is likely to be of only academic interest to people who suddenly find themselves under attack. Such a code is not likely to be the sort of thing one carries around in one's mind in case it is needed."—[ Official Report, Westminster Hall, 4 March 2003; Vol. 400, c. 211WH.]
	That underlines the point that no codification is needed. We have had guidance from the Home Office, but no sort of codification will help people suddenly faced with an attack in their home.

Patrick Mercer: Does my hon. Friend agree that the law is so unambiguous that the Government were forced—three years ago, when the matter came up in deliberations on a private Member's Bill that I was taking through the House—to issue a wholly risible document that contained illustrations to show how it would work? Now it seems that we need another clarification. Would not the simplest thing be for them to accept new clauses 8 and 9 and use the phrase "grossly disproportionate"? That would clear the whole thing up.

Nick Herbert: I completely agree. What good do the Government think that the proposed clarification will do? Indeed, the Secretary of State did not suggest in his speech to the Labour party conference that there would just be a clarification. He said:
	"The law on self-defence works much better than most people think, but not as well as it could or should."
	Surely that is a direct admission that the current law is not working, yet he says that he merely wants to restate it.

Jack Straw: The hon. Gentleman quotes me very accurately, and that is the burden of my position. All hon. Members accept that the number of such cases going to court is tiny, and that there have been only a handful over the past 15 years. The problem that we face has to do with unnecessary and gratuitous investigations at a much earlier stage.
	I believe that we need to clarify the law, but that we must choose the best case law, rather than a compendium thereof. Highlighting that case law, as proposed in new clause 6, will be very effective. It will lead to a change in the way the law works, and that is precisely what I was seeking when I made my party conference speech.
	I should like to make two other brief points. First, the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) must be aware that the Joint Committee on Human Rights—one of whose members is a Conservative peer—has said that, in the criminal law, the "grossly disproportionate" use of force is outwith the EU convention on human rights. Secondly, he needs to deal with the very important point raised by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth). That hon. Gentleman has suggested—rightly, I think—that new clause 8 would give a court less flexibility in defending a victim of crime than would our new clause 6, under which the relevant tests are subjective.

Nick Herbert: First, I believe that the Joint Committee on Human Rights was looking at the Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Mr. Gale). It contained a different test, and did not use the wording employed in our new clause 8 or in the earlier private Member's Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), the shadow Attorney-General, has dealt already with the human rights arguments. At the Labour party conference, the Secretary of State wanted to do more than merely suggest that the law would just be clarified. His words make it clear that the law would be rebalanced, but that is not happening with this Bill. If merely restating case law would amount to greater protection for householders, engender greater confidence or prevent police from arresting and investigating people when they should not, why has not the existing guidance—which the Government introduced after the last review, instituted by Tony Blair—succeeded in achieving that? The Secretary of State apparently accepted the burden of those arguments just a few months ago, but what he now proposes is simply inadequate to send the clear and unambiguous signal, which the Opposition have consistently requested, to the country as a whole that the law is on their side.

Shailesh Vara: Does my hon. Friend agree that Ian Blair, the present Metropolitan Police Commissioner, got it right when he said on this issue:
	"I thought reasonableness was quite a difficult concept at 4 o'clock in the morning in your kitchen, whereas something as stark as gross disproportionality did seem to me to be clearer."?

Nick Herbert: On that occasion, Sir Ian did get it right and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reminding us of that.
	I refer the House to the Library research paper on the new offence as it was introduced in the private Member's Bill. It stated:
	"The Bill's new test of force which is not grossly disproportionate is likely to be more generous to defendants than the test of reasonable force."
	Therein lies the difference between us. The Government are merely seeking to restate existing law in the belief that somehow that will be of comfort or assistance to people under attack in their own homes. We wish to send the clear and unambiguous signal that the law is on the side of the defendants, and that is why, if we have the opportunity, we wish to press the issue to a Division.
	The Secretary of State has not delivered on the promise that he made at the Labour party conference, and it is important that the country understands that.

Jack Straw: Will the hon. Gentleman deal briefly with the point made by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth)? Does he not accept that the objective test in new clause 8 is more flexible and more restrictive for a defendant than our subjective test in new clause 6?

Nick Herbert: No, I do not accept that and I am happy to rely on the advice of the Library, which says that the new test is likely to be more generous to defendants. If one uses the words "grossly disproportionate", an objective test is the right approach.
	The Government are now advancing a different argument and suggesting that the Opposition seek a lower level of protection than the one that they propose. That is plainly nonsense.

David Howarth: The hon. Gentleman is confusing two different aspects of the problem. One is the test of reasonableness or disproportion, including the word "gross"; the other is the mistaken beliefs of the defendant, and whether the court accepts them and does not investigate them, which is what the Government's new clause would appear to propose. Or should the court investigate the reasonableness of the beliefs, which is what the Conservatives' amendment would appear to propose? That is why the Secretary of State is correct in what he says.

Nick Herbert: We think that the balance that we have achieved between the two components of the offence is right, and we are happy with it. I am also happy with the assessment of the Library that our test would be more generous to defendants. The right test is an objective one. I do not think that it is credible that the Liberal Democrats and the Government should rest their opposition to our proposal on the new argument that somehow it would provide less protection than is currently the case under the law. The Library is clear that that is not the case and we have consistently been clear that it is not.
	The Secretary of State advanced an entirely different argument earlier, when he said that our provision would somehow be struck down by the human rights legislation. The suggestion was that it would provide protection that was somehow outwith the law, but that argument will not wash. He has been caught out. He undertook a grandstanding exercise at the Labour party conference in search of headlines. It served him well, but he has not subsequently been able to deliver, and we will continue to point that out.

David Heath: I am sorry that the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) seems incapable of understanding the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth); it was not answered by the Library note, which was on a totally different matter.
	The Conservatives do, however, have a genuine sense of grievance that the fox of which they have long been in pursuit has been comprehensively shot by the Lord Chancellor. I have been party to the many debates that we have had on the subject, courtesy of the hon. Members for Newark (Patrick Mercer) and for Vale of York (Miss McIntosh) and others, and I have heard the stonewalling from the Government, who said that in no circumstances were they prepared to accept that a change in the law was necessary. For them now to reverse that position takes some brass neck. However, I am prepared to accept that the Lord Chancellor is making the change for the best of reasons.
	Let us start with our shared perceptions. All parties have always shared the view that there is a problem with the way in which people in the circumstances that we are discussing are investigated and, occasionally, prosecuted. We also agree that it would be a completely inappropriate interpretation of the law, or of the duties of the police, if a person who had defended themselves, or their family, friends or property, came under suspicion, unless they had behaved entirely improperly in defending what was theirs. There have been too many occasions, although not a great number of them have come before a court, on which people have felt that when they took perfectly proper action to defend themselves against criminal offences, they came under suspicion and were investigated by the investigating and prosecuting authorities. They should have been getting the support of those authorities, rather than finding themselves in difficulties with them.

David Davies: I am delighted that a Liberal Democrat is taking such a line. If the hon. Gentleman believes that people should have the right to use force when they are being burgled, does he agree that if the intruder is armed with a weapon, the householder should, reasonably, be able to retaliate with some form of weapon?

David Heath: I think that the hon. Gentleman has just explained what proportionality means; I thought that we understood that. I do not know why he is surprised at the line that I take, as I have taken it consistently for 10 years in the House, but perhaps he has not yet had the opportunity to study  Hansard with sufficient care.
	The Government are reversing from their previous position, and are saying that there is an issue to address. I do not think that the defect lay in the law in the first place. I still believe that, with one exception, which I shall come to, and which concerns the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge, the law is perfectly competent to deal with the circumstances that we are discussing; it is, on occasion, the investigating and prosecuting authorities who are incompetent, and who misdirect themselves. I have no objection to restating and reinvigorating the law on that point to prevent mischief from occurring, if that is sensible, and that is the line that I have consistently taken when dealing with private Members' Bills on the subject.

Henry Bellingham: The hon. Gentleman is something of an expert on the subject, given his experience with private Members' Bills. He wants to remove the current prevalence of investigations, and prevent every single case from being taken to court. Surely basing the law on the concept of "grossly disproportionate" will send a strong signal to the police as regards the Association of Chief Police Officers guidelines, and surely that will mean that very few such cases—only the most extreme ones—will go to court. That, surely, is what we are trying to achieve.

David Heath: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but it is a fact that very few such cases go to court. The problem is not the number of cases that go to court; it is the number that are investigated, and the cases in which there is a fear on the part of the householder, or whoever is involved, that they will be prosecuted. That is what is unacceptable in the eyes of Members of all parties.
	I wish that the Conservatives would accept that they have won the argument. The Lord Chancellor has come round to their point of view and has come forward with a formulation that I think actually works. However, if they will persist with new clause 8, I have to say that I think that there are two problems with it. The first is that it would replace one test, that of reasonableness, with another, the test of what is "grossly disproportionate". Both are still subjective, in the sense that interpretation is required—in the first case by the investigation and prosecution authorities, who have to decide whether to bring the case, and in the second by the jury, who have to interpret the word "grossly".
	That does not take us much further. Of course there is a difference in mood between the two, in the sense that, in common parlance, one would expect "grossly disproportionate" to constitute a higher test than what is reasonable, but in reality it leaves a blurring of the edges, which is not acceptable. Where I part company with the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham), with whom I often agree on such matters, is that, as I have said repeatedly, I do not believe that the purpose of statute law is to send signals. We do not use this place as a means of semaphore; we use it as a means of providing workable law. The problem with new clause 8 is that it replaces a test that is subjective in the eyes of the prosecution and the court with another test that is subjective in the eyes of the prosecution and the court. That is what worries me.

Edward Vaizey: The hon. Gentleman has just contradicted himself. He said earlier that he was minded to support new clause 6 precisely because it sends a signal to the police not to conduct prosecutions. Now he is saying that he will not support new clause 8 because it is being used to send a signal. Does he not understand that new clause 6 simply sends a signal, whereas new clause 8 would genuinely change the law to protect the householder? The hon. Gentleman should therefore support new clause 8, as it represents a change of the law, not a signal.

David Heath: Quite the reverse. That is the difficulty that I have with the Conservatives' position. I do not think that they have read new clause 6 properly and compared it with their own new clause 8. My view is that new clause 6 provides a more stringent safeguard for the householder than does new clause 8.
	That brings me to my second objection, which is the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge. Let us go back to the Tony Martin case. Let us set aside for the moment the person of Tony Martin and the circumstances of that case, and consider the point of law that was exposed by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal distinguished between an error made by that person as to whether he was under attack, and an error made about the danger that was posed by that attack. In the first instance, the statement is subjective.

David Howarth: My hon. Friend is on the right lines. The Court of Appeal said that if the question were simply whether the defendant believed that he was under attack, what the defendant believed would be accepted. But when the question was whether the danger posed by the attack was serious, the question would become a matter of reasonableness for the jury to decide, which is quite different.

David Heath: I wish I had not allowed my hon. Friend to intervene. That is what I was saying. The point is exactly as he makes it. The first test is whether the defendant believed he was under attack. The answer is yes or no. The second test as to the gravity of the attack, and therefore the response, must be tested objectively in terms of reasonableness. That is still the situation under new clause 8, but under the Government's proposals in new clause 6, let us consider subsections (5) and (8).
	Subsection (8) is crucial. It states:
	"For the purposes of references in this section to what D believed, it is immaterial whether—
	(a) any belief if D's was mistaken, or
	(b) (if it was mistaken) the mistake was reasonable."
	In other words, where a person meets an intruder in his house in the middle of the night and may be entirely mistaken about what the intruder is about to do to him, provided that he reacts in an appropriate way, even if it is not reasonable in the cold light of day, he is protected by the law. Under the Conservative amendment, he would not be protected by the law. That is the distinction that I am trying to make.

Dominic Grieve: I do not want to get involved in an exercise in semantics, but subsection (4) of new clause 6, which states:
	"The degree of force used by D is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in those circumstances if it was disproportionate in those circumstances",
	qualifies subsection (3). As a result, the suggestion that in some way the Government have magicked in a wholly subjective test, is wrong. I would have been surprised and rather shattered if the Government had gone that far, and I would have suggested that it was far too far to go.
	New clause 8 is far more simply worded and clearly provides that
	"this was or ought to have been apparent to the person using such force."
	It focuses on the degree of force used, and whether it was grossly disproportionate. That is a much simpler and more straightforward way of viewing it than the convolutions that, the more the interventions have gone on, seem to be coming from those on the Liberal Democrat Benches.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman says that he does not want to get involved in semantics. I am sorry, but in that case he is in the wrong place. This is what we are about. We are about trying to construe a new piece of legislation here. While he continues in his present position, he will have to grin and bear it, and go through the process of deconstruction of clauses.
	I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. I look at subsection (4) and I see that it is qualified by subsections (5) and (8), which gives that latitude in terms of the state of mind of the person under attack at the time, and allows them to believe something that is wholly wrong, provided that they genuinely believed it at the time and can show that to the court. I look at new clause 8 and I see a quite different test—that it should have been apparent to the person that he was using "grossly disproportionate force", a term that is undefined. So the householder is still left in the quandary: "Is what I am doing grossly disproportionate? Will a court find at the end of the day that what I did was grossly disproportionate? I don't know. It's the middle of the night, I have a golf club in my hand, do I give him a thwack or not?" That is the real problem.
	On that basis, I prefer new clause 6. It is a better formulation. It provides that latitude in law, but at the same time better defines the law. I do not accept that this is a signal, because it goes further than that and changes the ground rules for the legislation that applies. That will be of benefit to householders. New clause 8 may be of benefit, but not as much benefit as the Conservative party appears to think. Its determination to press the new clause to a vote in competition is absurd under the circumstances—grossly disproportionate, I might say.

Anne McIntosh: I congratulate the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) on his sterling performance, but I disagree with most of what he said. I hope that the House welcomes this debate, and I am trying to find the head of the pin on which the Secretary of State for Justice was dancing so that I can join him there.
	I hope that the Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen will press new clauses 8 and 9 to a vote. In supporting the Opposition's arguments, I want briefly to show why new clause 6 is defective. As the shadow Attorney-General has said, the law should be simple, precise and easy to apply, and that is why the Secretary of State has had the hindsight to come forward with the new clause, which I welcome. However, as the shadow Justice Secretary has said, it simply does not go far enough.
	I want to focus on the two tests. One is the test of force—we are arguing about whether force is grossly disproportionate or disproportionate, so it is a matter of semantics—and the other is reasonableness. The main reason why new clause 6 is defective is that it does not give enough guidance. It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify for the House how the joint Association of Chief Police Officers/Crown Prosecution Service statement is to be amended.
	I believe that new clause 8, in particular, is clearer and would make it easier for a jury or court to reach a decision. New clause 6(1)(b) contains the phrase "reasonable in the circumstances", but what would those circumstances be and who would judge? Would the reasonable man on the jury decide, or would the reasonable prosecutor decide whether a prosecution would be brought? Furthermore, subsection (4) states:
	"The degree of force...is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in those circumstances".
	Again, the Secretary of State's argument is flimsy and unconvincing in that regard.
	The right hon. Gentleman is such a nice person; perhaps that is why he chose the word "nicety" for subsection (5)(a). However, "nicety" is not even as clear as the current joint statement, one of whose sentences starts:
	"So long as you only do what you honestly and instinctively believe is necessary in the heat of the moment".
	I do not believe that new clause 6 brings anything extra to that. Subsection 5(b) states:
	"only reasonable action was taken by that person for that purpose"—
	presumably, self-defence. New clause 6 is simply too weak.

Jack Straw: I shall reflect on what the hon. Lady has said, but this has been the subject of a huge amount of work. There is an honest argument about whether new clause 6 or new clause 8 is more effective. A point was missed by Conservative Front-Bench Members as they sought to undermine new clause 6. There seems to be an agreement across the House that that new clause should be the basis of the law for the apprehension of a criminal in all circumstances, save in respect of the apprehension of a burglar. On three occasions I have been involved in the arrest of a street robber; in such circumstances, new clause 6, not new clause 8, would apply. I advise the hon. Lady not to be too destructive of new clause 6, because it seems that she accepts it as well.

Anne McIntosh: With the greatest respect, the right hon. Gentleman has to accept that a robbery in an open space, in a public place on a street, is completely different from being attacked in the privacy of one's own home or business.

Jack Straw: I do not think that we should have a competition, but I speak from direct experience. Another guy—an elderly gentleman—and I were rolling around in the middle of a carriageway holding a robber whom I had luckily knocked down. He was shouting and screaming for other people of a like mind to join in. I do not think that that was necessarily either a less good or a safer situation than some circumstances—although not all circumstances—in which someone apprehends a burglar. It depends entirely on the precise circumstances of the case. However, no one who has been in the situation that I have described would think that it is easy.

Anne McIntosh: I simply conclude by saying that I rest my case. I commend new clauses 8 and 9 to the House. The prospect of seeing the Secretary of State for Justice embracing or mauling a street robber is too graphic to consider. However, I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will take on board the basis and wording of new clauses 8 and 9 and marry them together with clause 6. Our clauses are clearer, simpler and easier to interpret.

Henry Bellingham: Members might well believe that I come to this issue entirely on the basis of the Tony Martin case. Tony Martin is a constituent of mine and the case was nearly 10 years ago, when the current Lord Chancellor was Home Secretary. Although I have every sympathy for Tony Martin, I should make it clear that one single case is not a good basis for changing the law. However, the case triggered an unprecedented public debate on householders' rights and the conclusion was that the law was a complete muddle. There were too many investigations taking place and too many cases going to court. In the heat of the moment, when a householder has to react and take a split-second decision, he needs to know that the law is broadly on his side. The vast majority of the public who have been commenting on this issue feel strongly that burglars and intruders should leave the vast majority of their rights outside the building that they break into or intrude on.
	Of course, there will be exceptions to that rule. That is why, in essence, the three private Members' Bills on this subject were based on the concept of gross disproportionality. The first of those Bills was introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for North Thanet (Mr. Gale), the second by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), and the third by my hon. Friend the Member for Vale of York (Miss McIntosh)—not forgetting my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Cambridgeshire (Mr. Vara), who tried to bring in a Bill but found that there was no time for it. I sat through many of those debates, and in each and every case the Government were incredibly negative, although they had plenty of time to respond positively. Sadly, they are taking action only after a great deal of persuasion and public debate, having eventually realised that the public mood was running against them.
	I accept that new clause 6 is a small improvement, but it is incredibly complicated and convoluted. One has to read it about 10 times to make sense of it. As a lawyer, I find it difficult to understand how intelligent lawyers in the Department have come up with a clause that is quite so verbose and complicated. New clauses 8 and 9 have the great virtue of simplicity. The law needs clarifying and changing, and I urge the House to support our new clause. I look forward to hearing what my hon. Friend the Member for Newark has to say.

Patrick Mercer: rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am sorry to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but I am going to call Mr. Ed Vaizey.

Edward Vaizey: It is unprecedented, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that I should take precedence over my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), so I will keep my remarks extremely brief.
	We are debating new clause 6 because the Secretary of State for Justice, who has always opposed changing the law in this area, sought an eye-catching initiative at the last Labour party conference, when we were gearing up for a general election. He sat down with his advisers and said, "What can we do to get ourselves on the front page of the newspapers?" They said, "Why not bring forward this policy, which you have always opposed?" The new clause simply restates the law. That is made explicit in subsection (2), which has the gall to cite
	"the common law defence of self-defence",
	to remind people that there is such a thing, and then to restate the defences in existing legislation. Subsection (5) merely adds into what is already a matter of precedent factors that the courts can take into account. The key difference between new clause 6, which does not change the law at all—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order—with apologies to the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer).
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
	 It being three and a quarter hours after the commencement of proceedings on the programme motion, Mr. Deputy Speaker  proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of business to be concluded at that hour, pursuant to Order [this day] .

Clause 174
	 — 
	Extent

Amendments made: No. 102, page 119, line 46, at end insert—
	'(da) section (Reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.);'.
	No. 103, page 120, line 22, at end insert—
	'(10) Nothing in this section restricts the operation of section (Reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) and paragraph 20A of Schedule 33 in their application in relation to service offences (within the meaning of that paragraph).'.— [Mr. Hanson.]

Schedule 33
	 — 
	Transitory, transitional and saving provisions

Amendment made: No. 113, page 299, line 17, at end insert—
	 'Reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.
	20A (1) Section (Reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) applies whether the alleged offence took place before, or on or after, the date on which that section comes into force.
	(2) But that section does not apply in relation to—
	(a) any trial on indictment where the arraignment took place before that date, or
	(b) any summary trial which began before that date,
	or in relation to any proceedings in respect of any trial within paragraph (a) or (b).
	(3) Where the alleged offence is a service offence, that section similarly does not apply in relation to—
	(a) any proceedings before a court where the arraignment took place before that date, or
	(b) any summary proceedings which began before that date,
	or in relation to any proceedings in respect of any proceedings within paragraph (a) or (b).
	(4) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3) summary proceedings are to be regarded as beginning when the hearing of the charge, or (as the case may be) the summary trial of the charge, begins.
	(5) In this paragraph—
	"service offence" means—
	(a) any offence against any provision of Part 2 of the Army Act 1955 (3 & 4 Eliz. 2 c. 18), Part 2 of the Air Force Act 1955 (3 & 4 Eliz. 2 c. 19) or Part 1 of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (c. 53); or(b) any offence under Part 1 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52);
	"summary proceedings" means summary proceedings conducted by a commanding officer or appropriate superior authority.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]

New Clause 25
	 — 
	Bail conditions: electronic monitoring

'Schedule (Electronic monitoring of persons released on bail subject to conditions) makes provision in connection with the electronic monitoring of persons released on bail subject to conditions.'— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

David Hanson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	Government new clause 26— Credit for period of remand on bail: terms of imprisonment and detention.
	Government new clause 27— Credit for period of remand on bail: other cases.
	Government new clause 28— Credit for period of remand on bail: transitional provisions.
	Government new clause 29— Sentences of imprisonment for public protection.
	Government new clause 30— Sentences of detention for public protection.
	Government new clause 31— Extended sentences for certain violent or sexual offences: persons 18 or over.
	Government new clause 32— Extended sentences for certain violent or sexual offences: persons under 18.
	Government new clause 33— The assessment of dangerousness.
	Government new clause 34— Further amendments relating to sentences for public protection.
	Government new clause 35— Release on licence of prisoners serving extended sentences.
	Government new clause 45— Restriction on power to make a community order.
	Government new clause 46— Bail for summary offences and certain other offences to be tried summarily.
	Government new clause 47— Release of fine defaulters and contemnors under Criminal Justice Act 1991.
	Government new clause 48— Early release of certain long-term prisoners under Criminal Justice Act 1991.
	Government new clause 49— Recall of certain prisoners released under Criminal Justice Act 1991.
	Government new schedule 3— 'Electronic monitoring of persons released on bail subject to conditions.
	Government new schedule 5— 'Offences specified for the purposes of sections 225(3A) and 227(2A) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
	Government new schedule 6— 'Credit for period of remand on bail: transitional provisions.
	Government new schedule 7— 'Bail for summary offences and certain other offences to be tried summarily.
	Government amendments Nos. 156 to 158, 219, 159, 161, 162, 220 to 221, 163, 222, 164 to 166, 223 to 225, 227, 167, 168 and 160.

David Hanson: This group of amendments gives effect to recommendations made by my noble Friend Lord Carter of Coles in his review of prisons published in December, as hon. Members will know. My noble Friend recommended a package of measures to increase the capacity of the prison estate and to develop a more sustainable approach to the use of custody. As the House will recognise, we will always ensure that there are sufficient prison places for serious, dangerous and violent offenders whom the courts judge necessary to commit to custody. In response to Lord Carter's review, my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor announced in his statement of 5 December plans to increase prison capacity by 15,000 places by 2012.
	The need to provide prison places is paramount, but we also need to ensure that both prison and probation resources are properly focused on where they are most needed. My noble Friend Lord Carter put forward five particular measures to help to manage the use of custody. In summary, they are: the reform of public protection sentences to allow greater flexibility in the use of those sentences; the reform of bail legislation to ensure that remand in custody is reserved for serious and dangerous defendants; allowing defendants who comply with the terms of their curfew while on bail to be credited for doing so when sentenced; aligning the release arrangements for prisoners serving sentences under the Criminal Justice Acts of 1991 and 2003; and restricting the availability of community sentences for those convicted of non-imprisonable offences.
	I hope that I may briefly detain the House with a little detail about each of the provisions. With regard to imprisonment for public protection, new clauses 29 to 35 and new schedule 5 reform public protection sentences as provided for in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. I hope that I can assure the House that those sentences remain a major plank of the Government's public protection policy. However, while those sentences have met their objectives, they have given rise to a number of issues. In particular, the way in which they currently operate means that a very high number of offenders are being channelled into the IPP sentence, many of whom have short tariffs. Indeed, around 30 per cent. of tariffs are less than two years. In visits to prisons during the past few months, I and other colleagues have met many people in the prison system who believe that a difficulty exists when the concept of an indeterminate sentence is coupled with a short tariff. Sentences with such short tariffs are very difficult for the Prison Service to manage. They often put an unprecedented strain on the service, and on the Parole Board, and its workload.
	The statute must be reformed, and I am grateful to my noble Friend for bringing forward suggestions to that effect. Indeed, Anne Owers, the chief inspector of prisons, has said that the sentences are not targeted on the right offenders. The chairman of the Parole Board has also said that there is a case for review. The changes we propose will not affect availability of IPPs for serious dangerous offenders. The courts will still be able to give IPPs where they are needed, but the current legislation is too prescriptive.

Douglas Hogg: I see that the minimum notional sentence is two years. That suggests to me that the IPP, under these provisions, can be imposed in respect of relatively trivial trigger offences. Would it not be better to have a higher notional minimum period, so that the IPP is imposed only on offenders who have committed quite substantive, serious offences?

David Hanson: There will be a two-year custodial sentence, which might mean a four-year sentence in due course. I hope that helps to assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman on that point.
	The changes we propose will increase judicial discretion as well as imposing a seriousness threshold on public protection sentences. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned, the provisions on the seriousness threshold will ensure that the threshold will be that the offence must justify a minimum of two years' custodial time. We shall also remove the rebuttable presumption of risk where there is a previous conviction for violent or sexual crime.
	Courts will obviously regard previous records as highly important in determining the risk presented by the offender, and we are ensuring that the legislation clarifies that the court is not being asked to ignore previous convictions. It is also important, as my noble Friend Lord Carter of Coles said, to allow courts greater discretion so that where conditions for an IPP are met, the court may impose an IPP, extended sentence for public protection or other sentence that it finds appropriate. We are also changing the structure of extended sentences so that offenders will be subject to automatic release halfway through the custodial part, rather than leaving such halfway release to the discretion of the Parole Board, as happens currently.
	New clause 46 examines the reform of the Bail Act 1976 and would change the law on bail for offenders charged with the least serious imprisonable offences. As the law stands, the grounds for refusing bail differ according to whether the offence is imprisonable. If it is imprisonable, the court will deal with an application for bail in accordance with part 1 of the schedule. If that is not possible, part 2 applies. The amendment would insert a new part 1A into the schedule to set out the grounds on which bail may be withheld when the offence is imprisonable but summary only.

Phil Wilson: How can we trust the Opposition parties on criminal justice when, in Committee, the Liberal Democrats voted to remove the punishment of offenders from the Bill and the Tories abstained?

David Hanson: My hon. Friend, who loyally served on the Committee, draws attention to the fact that we had a debate on the purposes of sentencing and the involvement of punishment. I appreciate the reminder of those debates in Committee, but I would like to continue considering the Bail Reform Act because I do not want to spark debate with the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) on those matters.
	The new part in the schedule will also apply to some cases that involve criminal damage when the court is clear that the value involved is less than £5,000. The court treats such offences as if they are summary only. The effect of the new clause is that some of those charged with offences to which the regime in part 1 currently applies would become subject to a new regime. That would result in bail being granted unless the offender posed certain clear risks.
	Broadly, offenders charged with less serious imprisonable offences would be treated in the context of bail more like those charged with non-imprisonable offences. However, the amendments contain important safeguards, which allow the court to refuse bail if it believes that, if released on bail, the defendant would commit an offence through conduct likely to result in physical or mental injury to any person, or in any person fearing such injury.

Philip Davies: How many more people will be released on bail as a result of the Bill?

David Hanson: Approximately 200, if the measure is passed.
	The broad definition will allow the courts to remand a defendant to protect the public from violence when it is clear that the circumstances of the offence or the defendant's history make it necessary or appropriate.
	New clauses 26 and 27 and new schedule 6 would enable the sentencing court to direct that up to half the time spent on bail under an electronically monitored curfew could be credited against a subsequent custodial sentence in a similar way to that in which remands in custody are already credited. That could also give us approximately 200 places.
	In those circumstances, prisoners would need to spend at least nine hours a day subject to electronically monitored curfew to qualify for the credit and would not receive full credit for each day of the curfew. Sentences would also be required to take account of the defendant's compliance with the curfew condition and have discretion to direct that all parts or none of the available time would be credited against the sentence.
	In new clause 25 and new schedule 3, we have taken the opportunity to clarify the legislative framework for applying electronic monitoring to support bail conditions imposed by the courts on adults and those aged 17.
	New clause 48 would equalise parole arrangements. It amends the early release provisions in part II of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 for prisoners sentenced to four years and more for any offence other than a sexual or violent offence. It is intended that such prisoners will be subject to release arrangements identical to those for fixed-term prisoners who are currently sentenced under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
	Under new clause 48, prisoners who are convicted of offences other than sexual or violent offences would be released automatically on licence at the halfway point of their sentence. They would no longer be required to apply to the Parole Board for discretionary release at the halfway point or wait until the two-thirds point before becoming eligible for automatic release. They will be on licence and liable to recall until the point at which their sentence expires, which compares with existing arrangements whereby the licence expires at the three-quarter point of the sentence.

Philip Davies: Does the Minister not understand the outrage among members of the public at prisoners being automatically released halfway through their sentence, and then going out to commit more and more offences? Most of the public whom I survey and speak to in Shipley want prisoners to serve their sentence in full, not to have their sentence commuted to half. Does he not understand that basic objection that most people have to the proposals? Will he confirm that, under the proposals, people will be released however poorly they behave in prison?

David Hanson: The hon. Gentleman indicates that he is against the principles of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The policy that he advocates would ensure that many more people were in prison, that many more people were serving longer sentences, and that many more prison places would have to be found, over and above the number already planned. I am not sure that the official Opposition Front-Bench team share his view.
	We are ensuring that we bring into line the Criminal Justice Act 1991 with the sentencing provisions of the 2003 Act. That will strengthen the provisions, as it will ensure that people are on licence to the end of their sentence, not just up to the three-quarter point. That gives the public additional protection. The new arrangements will enhance public protection, because placing all such prisoners on licence, and making them subject to probation supervision for the whole of the second part of their sentence, will make them liable to recall at any time if their behaviour gives cause for concern.
	New clause 45 will restrict the use of community orders to imprisonable offences. Courts increasingly use a community order, instead of a fine, for lower-level offending, which diverts probation resources from dealing with more serious offenders, where they are most needed. The option of a community order would no longer be available for all low-level, non-imprisonable offences, removing some 6,000 community orders per year. That would restore the position that obtained before the Criminal Justice Act 2003 for some types of community penalty.
	Taken together, the changes that I propose will ensure additional capacity in our prisons for serious, dangerous and violent offenders. Along with the steps being undertaken following my noble Friend Lord Carter of Coles's report on prison building capacity, including the extra places to 2012, and the three new titan prisons of 2,500 places each, those changes will contribute to building a sustainable, modern prison and criminal justice system that both protects the public from dangerous offenders and ensures fairness in our operations. I commend the new clause to the House.

Edward Garnier: The Minister, in his characteristically disarming way, advances some propositions that, had we the time, deserve rather better scrutiny. Discussion on this group of amendments will have to be concluded by, I think, 5.13 pm. There is not therefore much time to discuss the merits or demerits of Lord Carter's recommendations, which have been—I was going to say—spatchcocked into the Bill at this late stage. Whichever expression one cares to use, the detail of the new clauses and Government amendments betrays a worrying pattern.
	The genesis of the new clauses and amendments is the Government's mismanagement, which is not only of the prison estate. It is no longer controversial to say that the prison estate is woefully, and I would suggest, dangerously and inhumanely overcrowded, and that all the promises made by the Prime Minister, Secretary of State and Minister of State about a new building programme for prisons will not deal with the issues faced. The prison overcrowding is easy to see, because we can see that there are two or even three people in one-man cells, and because the Government introduced the end of custody licence programme last June to release 25,500 people over a 12-month period. What one has not been able to see—it is difficult to assess—is the equivalent overcrowding or overstretching of the probation and community punishment system. It is clear—the Minister confirmed it in a written answer last year—that each qualified probation officer now has to supervise between 20 and 80 individual offenders. If that is not the equivalent of overcrowding, I do not know what is.

Douglas Hogg: It is not just a matter of supervision. Because they are responsible for so many people, probation officers cannot ensure proper compliance with the original order, so enforcement is not taking place either.

Edward Garnier: That is also true. The two issues—prison overcrowding and overstretching of the probation service—come together very neatly in the ECL system. Prisoners who have not been adequately rehabilitated or made ready for resettlement out of prison are being released early. Some might say, "So what? It is only 18 days", but with short sentences, it is during the last 18 days that the most important work takes place—drug rehabilitation, introduction to job centres, housing associations and other sources of accommodation, introduction to the national health service and so on. If that does not happen, the probation service is then required to catch these people, who are essentially being thrown out of the back of the aeroplane without a parachute, and look after them.

John Bercow: Will my hon. and learned Friend allow me?

Edward Garnier: Yes, of course.

John Bercow: I am extremely grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, who I would not want to understate his case. I think he would agree that a further problem of massive overcrowding is that it exacerbates the phenomenon of the churn, whereby prisoners are shunted from one institution to another, often prematurely, or out of prison altogether, before they have had the opportunity to complete the training or education programme on which they have rightly embarked.

Edward Garnier: My hon. Friend is quite right. Churning, or the constant movement of prisoners from prison to prison, is one of the fundamental problems that we have to face up to at the moment. The Government are responsible because they have so mismanaged our prison estate that prisons are woefully overcrowded. Roughly, the prison population now stands at about 81,500— [Interruption.] I hear 79,000 being mentioned from a sedentary position. I hope that the Minister can tell us that that population is the result of planned sentencing and sentencing progression rather than panic measures. In fact, there are some panic measures in this group of amendments.
	In the brief period that remains, let me return to the new clauses and amendments in the group. New clause 26—I leave aside new clause 25, which simply introduces one of the Government's many new schedules—deals with the courts' requirement to give credit for periods of remand on bail. It affects the way in which a court comes to consider the appropriate custodial sentence. One of the greatest concerns of the public is that the current system leads to dishonesty in sentencing. People do not seem to understand that when a person is sentenced to two years in prison, that actually means that he will be in custody only for one year. It provides yet another example of how the Government, in order to overcome the difficulties of prison overcrowding, are guilty of promoting an untruth.
	Subject to some exceptions, provided for in subsections (8), (9), (10) and (11), the court will be required to act in this way. When a man has been convicted—I say a man because it usually is a man—the court will place him on remand and on a tag, pending sentence. The Minister says that some people spend up to nine hours on curfew, supervised by means of a tag. That may be true, but as a recorder who has made orders relating to curfews I can tell him that most curfews last from, say, 6 or 7 pm until 6 or 7 am the following day. They are adjusted to allow people to go to and return from work, for instance, but they are designed to prevent people from wandering around the streets at night causing trouble.
	For most or at least a good part of that time, the individual concerned may well be in bed. He will certainly be at home, or at an address of which the court has been notified. That cannot be considered the equivalent of having spent time in prison awaiting sentence, but the new clause directs the court to take all that time—described as "the credit period"—into account in reducing the custodial sentence. I am afraid that the public will find that rather difficult to understand. If someone has committed an offence that crosses the custody threshold—an offence that is serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence—it will cause a great deal of scepticism, undermine public confidence in the justice system and make the Government look increasingly ridiculous if the court is then required to say, "By the way, all the time that you have spent at home in bed is time that can be taken away from your custodial sentence."

Douglas Hogg: May I reinforce what my hon. and learned Friend is saying? He will know that under the sentencing guidelines, which are contained in statute, the court must impose a period of imprisonment only if it is the only appropriate sentence in view of the gravity of the offence. The new clause undermines that statutory guideline.

Edward Garnier: I am afraid that the Government have completely lost touch with their earlier legislation. They have completely lost touch with the philosophy behind the Sentencing Guidelines Council, they have completely lost touch with the Court of Criminal Appeal—if they ever were in touch with it—and they are now making things up as they go along. New clause 26 is an example of that.
	I have made the points that I wished to make about the new clause to the best of my ability. Plenty more could be made, but time does not permit me to make them. Sentencing is probably the most difficult aspect of criminal justice practice: it is difficult enough without the Government fiddling around in this way.

Philip Davies: I entirely agree with my hon. and learned Friend. I think that my constituents will find it unacceptable for time spent on bail to be taken off sentences. Does he agree that measures of this kind are basically an admission of failure from the Government? They are casting around for ways of clearing spaces in prisons, simply because they refused to accept—although everyone warned them—that we needed more prison places. These measures have nothing to do with logic, what is right or what will protect the public. The Government are simply thrashing around looking for some means of ending the mess that they have got themselves into.

Edward Garnier: My hon. Friend is quite right. I have made the point repeatedly for the last two years, since I started doing this job. Other members of the Opposition justice and home affairs team have made the same point, and I know that my hon. Friend has as well, as a constituency Member and as someone who takes an interest in issues of this kind. However, it seems to have no effect on the Government's thinking. We might just as well talk to the air for all the good that it does to the public.
	The trump card that the Government think they can play is "Lord Coles suggested it"—I mean Lord Carter of Coles.

John Bercow: Coles or Carter, what is the difference?  [Laughter.]

Edward Garnier: I apologise to Lord Carter of Coles for getting his title wrong. I know that we all enjoy a joke from time to time, but we are now debating hugely serious issues that are being rattled through without proper consideration.
	Let me now deal with new clause 29, which I shall seek to use as a symbolic issue on which to divide the House. This whole group of new clauses troubles us, and contains issues that we think should be the subject of far more scrutiny and consideration. We trust that the other place will be able to give those issues that scrutiny and consideration.
	New clause 29 deals with sentences of imprisonment for public protection. I have visited, I think, 31 or 32 prisons since my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition appointed me to this job just before Christmas in 2005. The category of prisoner that causes prison governors, managers of prisons and prison officers the greatest difficulty is adult prisoners who are on indeterminate sentences for public protection and who have got beyond their tariff. They are extremely difficult to manage. Their expectation when they were sentenced—most people do not listen to the sentence that they are being given—was that they would be released at or shortly after the minimum tariff.
	The problem is that, because of the Government's mismanagement of the system, the overcrowding in the system and the churning that my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) spoke about, the individuals on IPP sentences cannot get on to the relevant courses to demonstrate to the Parole Board or the licensing system that they have reached a state of behaviour that allows them to be released back into the community.

David Hanson: I respect the hon. and learned Gentleman's judgment on that issue. I have indicated in my comments today and during discussions with prison governors and others that I share the points that he has made. That is the very reason we are making the changes today. Our aim is to ensure that we have a minimum tariff in due course, rather than a low tariff—in some cases, it is as low as 28 days.

Edward Garnier: I know that that is precisely what the Minister has said, but he is looking down the wrong end of the telescope. He fundamentally misunderstands the problem that he has got himself into. The answer is not to dilute the IPP system, but to ensure that that system works. If one overcrowds the prison system, one is required to do what the Government are doing, which is to require courts to increase the minimum tariff for IPPs. The better answer, and the answer that the Government could have come up with if they had not messed up the prison system, is to make available sufficient course places, rehabilitation places, and places on anger management and other necessary courses that IPP prisoners need to go on in order that they can demonstrate to the assessors that they are safe to be released. However, they are stuck because of the mismanagement and the consequent overcrowding. In order to relieve overcrowding, the Government will have to take these measures, which I believe are viewed from the wrong end of the telescope.
	The condition that the Government set in new clause 29 is that the minimum tariff of two years, which is the equivalent of a determinate sentence of four years, should be the hurdle below which a sentencing court cannot go. We are going to be left with people who may continue to represent a danger to the public being given determinate sentences of two or three years because the actual offence that they committed does not warrant more than that. They will be releasable after the 50 per cent. point, or even at some stage between the 50 per cent. and the 100 per cent. point; they will get released.
	The advantage of the indeterminate prison sentence system is that, even if prisoners have a low tariff, as long as they have demonstrated themselves to be unfit to be released because they still represent a danger to the public, they can be kept in. The court will, of course, take account of the nature of the original sentence, but it will also have in mind public protection by looking at the character of the information surrounding that individual. The Government are doing away with that. Therefore, people who have committed what I would loosely call, putting it in quotes—I do not want to be misunderstood—"less serious" sexual offences and "less serious" offences of serious violence, if it is possible to have such things, will be given determinate sentences of under four years and they will be released at the end of that period. They will then be free to go out into the public and to repeat—

David Heath: I am listening carefully to what the hon. and learned Gentleman has to say; of course, he has a lot more experience than most of us of how this works in practice. Does he not believe that if new clause 29 were brought into effect, sentencers would make this adjustment: if they felt that there was a danger of someone being released inappropriately, they would increase the tariff in order to compensate for what the Government had put in place?

Edward Garnier: Would that that were possible. Someone might, for example, commit a non-invasive sexual offence against a child—grossly inappropriate sexual behaviour against a child, short of some invasion of his or her body—and that might be a first offence. In looking at that offence alone, the court might take the view that a custodial sentence of under two years is appropriate. However, whereas a court might currently be able to give an IPP for that one offence, it would not be able to do so under the new regime that this Government wish to push forward in order to cope with overcrowding. That is the danger we face, and that is the problem that the Government have given us, the public, and themselves as managers and legislators.
	It is a pleasure to turn and look at you again, Mr. Deputy Speaker—rudely, I was looking in the other direction. I cannot stress too highly how important it is that those convicted of such offences should be susceptible to IPPs even if the original offence is subject to a relatively low tariff. The same applies to new clause 30 and, to some extent, to new clauses 31 and 32, which address extended sentences for both those under 18 and those over 18. Under new clauses 31 and 32, if a court goes for an extended sentence of imprisonment the term has to be at least four years. We are causing too great a limit to be placed on the discretion of the sentencer in dealing with such serious cases. It gets worse, because under proposed subsections (6) of both those new clauses we would give the Secretary of State the power by order to amend proposed new subsections (2A) and (2B) of section 227 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
	"so as to substitute a different period for the period for the time being specified in"
	those subsections. Therefore, whereas the Government want at present to say that the custodial term would be at least four years, it will be open to a Secretary of State to come to a different conclusion.
	We will not have a proper opportunity to debate this provision on the Floor of the House; it will go through as a statutory instrument. That is, I gather, the modern way of dealing with criminal justice legislation. Not only did we not have any time to debate the Bill, but we are not even permitted to have a serious debate about any amendments to the Government's provisions.
	On new clause 33, what the Minister did not make at all clear to me the necessity for proposed new paragraph (aa) to section 229(2) of the 2003 Act, as specified in subsection (2)(b) of the new clause. Why is the information about the dangerousness of the individual concerned to be restricted to activities relating to a conviction
	"in any part of the United Kingdom"?
	A foreign national defendant might have led an entirely blameless life in the United Kingdom until his conviction, but he might have a string of convictions for dangerous behaviour in other parts of the world, which the court ought to be entitled to take account of. The Government must explain why they think that provision is necessary.
	I will not be able to deal with all the amendments and new clauses in this group, as my doing so would be unfair on other Members who have things to say. However, I also point out that new clause 35 has huge hidden implications. It blithely deletes subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6) of section 247 of the 2003 Act. I remind Members that the Bill that led to that Act was the flagship Bill of the 2001 Parliament, which was going to solve all our criminal justice ills. Huge sections of that Act have yet to be brought into force, and many sections have been repealed before being brought into force, but this is yet another example where matters relating to the release on licence of prisoners serving an extended sentences are to be addressed.
	The title of new clause 45 is:
	"Restriction on power to make a community order".
	I do not understand the logic behind the proposal, and nothing that the Minister said made it easier to understand the Government's case. Clearly, it is not possible to give a community sentence to someone who has committed an offence where the penalty is fixed by law, for example, murder or some of the firearms offences, which I believe carry minimum periods of imprisonment of five years. I am looking at my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) here. Clearly, someone cannot be given a community sentence in such circumstances.
	Again, this issue goes back to overstretching the probation service. The reason the Minister says that he is pushing this proposal is that people have been given community sentences when they ought to have been given fines and because people are in some way being placed in a position where the probation service would be further overstretched. Why do the Government not manage the criminal justice system properly, plan and have a strategic vision, instead of looking down the wrong end of the telescope?
	New clause 47 deals with the release of fine defaulters and contemnors under the Criminal Justice Act 1991, and is clearly designed to alleviate prison overcrowding. That is the wrong way to look at the development of the criminal justice system. The Government should work out the appropriate thing to do with particular sorts of offences and offender. They should not empty the prisons because they have failed to plan for the consequences of their sentencing policies since 1997.
	New clauses 48 and 49 are interesting. New clause 48(2)(1A) states:
	"As soon as a long-term prisoner has served one-half of his sentence, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence."
	I am surprised that the Secretary of State thinks that that is an appropriate duty for him to have. One surely ought to have some regard to the details of the character and offence of the individual prisoner in question.
	New schedules 3, 5 and 7 are very lengthy additions to the Bill. They were introduced this week, and although they are, to some extent, dependent on the new clauses that we have just been rushing through, they deserve greater attention than it is appropriate for me to give them this afternoon, given the time constraints. Thus, I shall say no more about them, save to invite Members of the other place to give them a thorough grilling when the Bill reaches there.
	I hope that the sceptical view that I have brought to the discussion of these new clauses and new schedules gives the House not only an indication of my deep concern at the way in which the Government have brought the Bill and these new aspects of it to this place, but an understanding of my concern about the substantive underlying nature of these provisions. I regret to say that the Justice Secretary and his Ministers are diluting a pledge to be "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime", and are doing so in a wholly incomprehensive and illogical fashion. I could get cross about this. I could scream and shout, but it does not do my ulcers any good and it certainly does not do the attention of the House any favours. I shall stop now, and invite those hon. Members who are as concerned as I am to consider carefully the new clauses and amendments. I trust that if the opportunity is there, they will vote with the official Opposition against new clause 29, which I have picked as a useful symbol of our expression of deep concern about the mishandling of the Bill and of this aspect of it.

David Heath: Nothing better illustrates some of the arguments that we attempted to put forward when we discussed the programme motion in the initial stages of the debate than this group of new clauses and amendments. A large number of Government changes have been tabled for consideration on Report. In little more than half an hour's time, we will be required to divide on them. It is quite impossible to scrutinise such serious matters in this way. We are effectively giving a licence to the unelected House to do the job that we are elected to do—to deal with matters of life, liberty and criminal justice. That is all a result of the intransigence, it would appear, of the Government Whips in not providing sufficient time for us to do the job properly. It is a disgrace, and we cannot repeat that often enough. There is no possibility of going through the new clauses methodically, as we would have done had they been before us in Committee. We could have dissected them line by line and had the opportunity to produce amendments.

Douglas Hogg: Another disadvantage in the process is that there has been no consultation, so far as I am aware, with authorities, institutions and persons outside the House.

David Heath: That is entirely right. I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for making that point. This is not a good way of making law. It is not the way in which the House is supposed to operate. I hope that we have emphasised that point sufficiently this afternoon.
	Let me come to the general tenor of the new clauses and amendments, as I cannot deal with the detail. They contain a number of constructs that are intended to remove people from the overcrowded prison system. The Minister knows perfectly well that I agree that we have too many people in our prisons. My argument, which I have made many times, is that if we ran our penal system properly a great many people who are in the prison estate would not be there taking up places that ought to be used for those who need to be in prison for protection of the public. Sadly, the amendments do not for one moment answer the needs of the service by taking out those with mental illness, who need secure accommodation that enables them to be treated properly. It is a national disgrace that such people are kept in prison cells. The amendments do not deal with alcoholics or drug addicts who find themselves in prison and do not get the proper treatment that they need. The amendments do not deal with the children in our prisons—it is a most inappropriate way of disposing of them—who do not get the developmental help that they deserve. All those factors mean that the system is not capable of providing the basic elements of rehabilitation that we ought to expect the Prison Service to achieve.
	We are dealing with a dysfunctional system. The Government are attempting to paper over the cracks by introducing an array of manoeuvres to get people out of the estate almost randomly. They are not based on any real, assessed need, but purely on various mechanistic bases that enable the prison population to be reduced. For that reason alone, I do not think that that is the right way to manage the service.
	There is a second element to the problem. What is the effect of releasing prisoners—I mean the ones who should be in prison, rather than the ones who should not—into the care of the probation service? The hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) is right to draw attention to the deficiencies that exist at present. The probation service is under-resourced and overstretched, just as the Prison Service is. It struggles to cope with its current work load, and it will certainly struggle with the additional burden that the proposals being considered today will impose on it.

Douglas Hogg: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that a consequential problem is that the probation service is no longer able to supervise community service orders? As a result, the public have lost trust in them, and want custodial penalties to be imposed instead. The greater the burden loaded on to the probation service, therefore, the less attractive to the public the CSO option will become.

David Heath: Again I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, as he has touched on a very important point. Both elements of the National Offender Management Service are overstretched at present. As a result, prisons do not do the job in terms of rehabilitation and deterrence that people fondly imagine that they do, and the probation service is unable to provide a satisfactory alternative that enjoys the public confidence.
	I am full of admiration for the work that probation officers do, but I recognise the constraints under which they work. Those constraints are extreme, and they are getting worse. The Government have hugely underestimated what is needed to provide an adequate service. Even if the probation service had sufficient resources to do the job that the Government expect it to do, the problem of how to manage offenders in the system would remain. That management task will be made immeasurably more difficult by the proposals that we are considering at present. The complexities presented by the movement of prisoners out of the prison estate, or their recall back into it, will be made much worse by the announcement that the Justice Secretary slipped out in a ministerial statement yesterday. In that statement, he made it clear that he is effectively abandoning the National Offender Management Service IT system that was supposed to provide the co-ordination between the prison and probation services.
	The NOMS system was supposed to track movements around the prison estate and ensure that absurdities such as prisoners getting lost or ending up in the wrong place would not overtake the probation service as well. The Justice Secretary has decided, however, that the original IT specifications were much too ambitious, were escalating beyond his Department's control and could no longer be afforded. He has therefore determined that the system will work only in prisons and that it will not extend to the probation service.
	The Justice Secretary did not in the first instance ask the probation service what it needed to fulfil its task. In fact, it needs a very sophisticated IT system, because in some ways, probation work is more difficult than prison work. For example, prison staff can at least hope that a prisoner's location—that is, his or her cell—is known, whereas probation officers cannot know as much about their charges. As a result, we have an inadequate system that will not now be improved. When NOMS was set up, we were given a set of high expectations that have been shown to be entirely imaginary, and I fear that we will end up with a system that is grossly under-resourced.
	I regret that the Secretary of State was not able to make a verbal statement to the House on these matters, as I suspect that many people will not have read his written statement. Even if they have read it, I doubt that they will have understood it. I heard the right hon. Gentleman speak on the radio last night about his proposals, and he was finding it very difficult to answer some simple questions about how NOMS would develop. If he gets the opportunity to speak again—and the time constraints under which we are working mean that our expectations on that front must remain limited—I hope that he will set out how he intends to put right the difficulties that he has created by his decisions.
	We are right to question the Government's judgment on this issue, not on the basis of reducing the prison population—they are right about that—but in respect of how they are choosing to do it, the lack of resources they are prepared to put into it and in the arbitrary nature of many of the proposals before us today.
	The hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) focused on new clause 29, and I will carefully consider the points that he made. However, I do not want to see circumstances in which IPPs are artificially extended beyond the normal tariff for an offence simply in order to address the points that he made. I fully understand his point about the lack of opportunities within the prison system to satisfy the Parole Board and others of suitability for release and the need to arrange such matters much more satisfactorily. I am not sure that knocking the provision out would help that process; it may indeed hinder it. That is why I shall consider carefully before advising my hon. Friends on which way to vote if the hon. and learned Gentleman divides the House on the matter. However, I agree with the principle that he set out. We have a chaotic system that is dishonest in its treatment of offenders and the public reaction to that. We should and must do very much better in future.

Douglas Hogg: I support strongly what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) said about the difficulties of sentencing in the criminal courts. I entirely agree that sentencing is one of the most difficult tasks of the trial judge, and it has become enormously more complicated in recent years. That makes the process on which we are embarking today thoroughly undesirable, because these amendments, which we are having to discuss in a sharply compressed period, make very substantial changes. They should not have been tabled on Report. For a start, they place Mr. Speaker in an impossible position, in that a variety of difficult issues are grouped together in such a way that the House cannot seriously discuss them. As they were tabled on Report and not in Committee, they have not been the subject of extensive external consultation—at least, not of which I am aware—or, put differently, the result of any such consultation has not come to the attention of right hon. and hon. Members.

John Gummer: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is precisely on such subjects that the House should have the most extensive debate, because they affect people in the courts and in the carrying out of the laws that we pass in this House?

Douglas Hogg: Absolutely. When we deal with sentencing it is very important that we consult with interests outside this House, not least those who are responsible for the imposition of sentences, so that we may hear the professional view of the likely consequences of our actions as legislators. I am against the process on which we are embarking, and I hope that the other place treats this group of amendments with gravity and does not hesitate to send it back to this House for further consideration.
	That said, I have only three points to make, because—as others have said—there is no way in which we can subject the individual amendments to proper consideration today.
	On new clause 26, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough is right to say that it is bizarre that we will allow credit to be given for time when the person is asleep against the period that the court thinks he should be serving in prison. The statutory requirements in the relevant sentencing legislation are quite plain: sentences of imprisonment must be imposed only when they are absolutely necessary. It is absurd to dilute that requirement by saying that if the person is asleep at the material time, they are entitled to have that taken into account when a reduction of the period of imprisonment is considered. It is absurd.

John Bercow: Is not that the concept of unconscious remission?

Douglas Hogg: That is one of the better descriptions of it that I have heard. I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who always has a felicitous choice of phrase.
	I strongly suspect that I might not be entirely in agreement with all my right hon. and hon. Friends on new clause 29. I hasten to say that that causes me no disquiet. I am referring to sentences of indeterminate imprisonment, or imprisonment for public protection. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough is entirely right to say that those who are serving IPPs at the termination of the tariff period are the most difficult group of prisoners to manage.
	IPPs are inherently unjust, because they do not give any kind of certainty about the term that a person should serve. I am well aware of the rationale behind such sentences, which is that they are for the protection of the public, in that a person will not be released until the responsible authorities think that they are safe to release, but it is difficult to judge when a person is safe to release. In the current climate, I suspect that many of the relevant authorities are guarding their back, and are not releasing people because of the uncertainty that necessarily arises. A lot of people are serving, or are likely to serve, terms of imprisonment that are excessive, given what they have done.

Edward Garnier: I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend about the defensive decisions that—

Jack Straw: Face the Chamber.

Edward Garnier: It is good of the Justice Secretary even to condescend to come into the Chamber, let alone to interrupt me when I was addressing the Chair. May I say what a pleasure it is to see the Secretary of State? As I was saying, Mr. Deputy Speaker, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) is entirely right that the Parole Board is making increasingly defensive decisions, particularly on the occasions on which it simply does not have the opportunity to examine the applicant for the licence release in life sentences. The problem with IPPs is that the individual concerned cannot even get in front of an examiner to persuade them that he is fit to be released.

Douglas Hogg: Yes. That is a slightly different point, but it is an important one. Partly because of overcrowding— [Interruption.]

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I must say to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) that that is not the way we should behave in the House.

Edward Garnier: I apologise, but I think that the Secretary of State understood precisely what I was about.

Douglas Hogg: May I just follow up what my hon. and learned Friend said with regard to courses? There is a serious issue to address. Because of overcrowding and strained resources, many prisoners who have been given an IPP are not able to get on, or to complete, the training course that would enable them to be considered for release. In the prison system, unless individuals have gone through the training period, the question of their release at the end of the notional period cannot arise. That is a serious injustice, and it has actually taken place. It has given rise to decisions by the divisional court with regard to prisoners who have not had such training periods. If IPPs are to continue—and I have serious doubts about whether they should—they should be imposed only for those offences that can truly be categorised as serious.
	In the past, the classes of offence have been set out in schedules. The problem is that within the class there are many offences that sound serious but which, in truth, in a particular case are not serious. The only way in which one can determine whether an offence is truly serious in a particular case is with reference to the notional term of imprisonment imposed as the tariff. For that reason, I find the two-year notional term—the minimum term—far too low. That sentence can be imposed in respect of fairly minor offences, and I do not want to see someone who is convicted of a fairly minor offence facing an IPP. If I have to contemplate the system at all, I would want to drive up the threshold so that only those people who have committed serious offences are subject to an IPP.
	The last point that I want to make, which was made in part by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome and by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough, relates to the probation service. Any of us who practise in the criminal courts—I have practised for many years in the criminal courts and I still do; I make no attempt to conceal that—know well that many prisoners should not, in general terms, be in prison. One of the reasons for that is that the public have no real confidence in the alternatives. My hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) would probably never have any confidence in the alternatives, but that is by the bye.
	The public need to have confidence in the alternatives, particularly in what I used to refer to as community service orders. They have no confidence now partly because community service orders are not seen to be sufficiently vigorous, and partly because in many cases they are not enforced at all, so there is no proper compliance. One of the reasons for that is that the probation service is grossly overwhelmed. It has too many people to supervise.
	One of the consequences of some of the amendments in this grouping is that the probation service will be even more overwhelmed. The bizarre effect of that will be that it is unable to perform what it needs to perform in respect of people ordered to serve a community sentence order, there will be yet less public confidence in community service orders, and there will be greater public demand for people to be sent to prison for periods of custody.

John Bercow: May I put it to my right hon. and learned Friend that the problem with some community service orders is not merely that they are, as he rightly puts it, insufficiently rigorous, but that they are insufficiently rehabilitative in their character? Does he agree that one of the problems that bedevils in particular our young offender institutions is that there are about 12,000 young people in them, the great majority of whom go into them uneducated, untrained, unqualified, unemployed and unwell, and come out uneducated, unqualified, untrained, unemployed and unwell?

Douglas Hogg: My hon. Friend is entirely right. One of the great tragedies of the whole penal system is that an extraordinarily high proportion of prisoners are educationally or otherwise inadequate. One of the purposes—not the only purpose—of prison is to rehabilitate, by providing basic training in this and that. That is largely frustrated by overcrowding. Although I am a strong proponent of education and training in prison, it must be acknowledged that it is not being provided. My hon. Friend is right when he says that rehabilitative programmes, which would be extraordinarily useful, are not being incorporated in community service orders.
	I return to my general theme. I am extremely uneasy that we should be contemplating such a raft of very serious changes on Report, without proper discussion, without a Committee stage and without external consultation. This is precisely the sort of thing that the House should not be doing. I would be very surprised if the higher judiciary and others did not say in due course, when these matters come to the Court of Appeal, that this place has been failing in its duty.

David Hanson: I welcome you to the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker, for our interesting but short debate within the time available before the programme motion kicks in .
	A number of points have been made, many of which go wider than the amendments, but which are obviously still related to them. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) have contributed in their usual helpful way to some of the issues.
	There has been some consultation on the changes proposed by my noble Friend Lord Carter, for which we are legislating today. The previous Lord Chancellor, the noble Lord Falconer, commissioned Lord Carter to consider the whole question of prison population and pressure issues in May 2007. Between then and my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor producing the report on 5 December, Lord Carter engaged in significant consultation with the judiciary, with interested parties, with the Prison Service and the National Offender Management Service, and with my right hon. Friend and me.
	The package of measures, which the legislative proposals before the House today deal with in part, was about not just some of the measures relating to IPPs, bail credits and sentencing in the amendments and new clauses, but a much wider set of proposals that cover some of the points raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. They will be aware that Lord Carter has not just dealt with the new clauses before us today but has announced recommendations, which we have accepted, to build additional prison capacity, so that by the end of 2012-13 we will have some 96,000 net places in the prison system in England and Wales, three titan prisons of 2,500 in London, the midlands and the north-west and emergency accommodation in Norfolk, for example, at the RAF base at Coltishall.
	We will consider the possibility of a prison ship following Lord Carter's recommendations, and, importantly, in reply to the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, we will consider improving and extending community-based sentences, and tackling some of the confidence issues in those sentences. Under the youth provision orders in the earlier clauses of the Bill, we are looking at increasing confidence in such sentences by putting together a generic youth order that deals with drug and alcohol treatment, learning and the matters that the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) mentioned in his helpful interventions. So the Carter package considers a range of measures, including new build and those before the House today.
	I will reflect on the matters that have been raised today, but I want to make a couple of particular points. The hon. and learned Member for Harborough referred to bail credit and said that it was not like for like with the potential for remand in prison, because the loss of liberty was not the same as having time for credit on curfew at home. As I said in my opening remarks, the offender gets credit for only half the time spent on curfew, rather than the full time. We recognise that there is a difference between remand and curfew, but it is important to ensure that individuals can maintain their life. It is important that we consider the use of sentences in the community on curfew before potential sentencing in full.
	The hon. and learned Member for Harborough and I must have an honest disagreement about IPPs. I thought he would welcome our proposals. In Committee and elsewhere we recognised that the provisions, however well meaning they were in the past, do not serve a proper purpose now, for the very reasons that he mentioned, including the availability of courses and prisoners' ability to be helpfully trained to come to terms with some of the offending behaviour that has led them to be sentenced in the first place. We need to address that properly; it is an important measure to bring before the House. The hon. and learned Gentleman has argued that we look at the issue through different ends of the telescope, but the Government's end of the telescope—a minimum period for IPPs—allows for planning and proper investment, for offending behaviour to be addressed and for the assessment to be made. That is why I support the minimum tariff that we proposed in the amendments.

Edward Garnier: There are 3,100 prisoners on IPPs; the proposal will have absolutely no bearing on them. How will the Government deal with the sclerosis that they are suffering from in the rehabilitation and release-from-IPP system?

David Hanson: I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will know that we have put in extra resources to provide courses so that those who are now at minimum tariff or post-minimum tariff get the support to ensure that they get through the courses required to assess their suitability for release. If the proposals are passed by both Houses, that will have an impact of well over 1,000 places in respect of IPP. It is important that we introduce the measure.
	The hon. and learned Gentleman mentioned concerns about those who do not meet the tariff threshold. In the legislation and elsewhere, a number of measures such as violent offender orders, sex offender orders and the multi-agency public protection arrangements framework, will look at the impact of individuals who do not meet the tariff threshold proposed in the Bill.
	The hon. and learned Gentleman also mentioned sub-paragraph (aa) that would be inserted by new clause 33(2)(b). It reads as follows:
	"may take into account all such information as is available to it about the nature and circumstances of any other offences of which the offender has been convicted in any part of the United Kingdom".
	Its purpose is to enable the courts to examine previous convictions, and not be debarred from looking at them just because the statutory presumption of risk was removed.
	The hon. and learned Gentleman also made a valid point about overseas convictions. The courts are not prevented from considering foreign convictions if there is proper evidence of them. I shall consider the point after this debate to see whether there is merit in considering it further.
	A number of points in the Carter proposals are valid and important. They will help the prison population and make much more efficient use of resources for probation and prison.
	Finally, I refute suggestions that the probation service remains underfunded. We have increased funding dramatically and support the service strongly. I hope that this year we will increase for next year the budget figures by more than 2 to 3 per cent.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
	 It being four and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the programme motion, Madam Deputy Speaker  proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of business to be concluded at that hour, pursuant to Order [this day] .

Edward Garnier: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am probably interrupting you wholly unnecessarily. Earlier in the debate—I am not sure whether you were in the Chair at the time—I said that the Opposition wish to test the opinion of the House on new clause 29, which is grouped with new clauses 26 to 35. Could that clause please be separated from the other new clauses?

Madam Deputy Speaker: I was informed by the previous occupant of the Chair of the hon. and learned Gentleman's wish to divide the House on that. However, Standing Orders require that when the time is reached I put the Question that was being debated—new clause 25. This is now a single question relating to the whole group of Government new clauses and schedules.

New Clause 26
	 — 
	Credit for period of remand on bail: terms of imprisonment and detention

'(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 237 (meaning of "fixed term prisoner"), in subsection (1B), after "Armed Forces Act 2006)" insert "or section 240A".
	(3) In the italic heading before section 240, after "custody" insert "or on bail subject to certain types of condition".
	(4) After section 240 insert—
	"240A Crediting periods of remand on bail: terms of imprisonment and detention
	(1) This section applies where—
	(a) a court sentences an offender to imprisonment for a term in respect of an offence committed on or after 4th April 2005,
	(b) the offender was remanded on bail by a court in course of or in connection with proceedings for the offence, or any related offence, after the coming into force of section (Credit for period of remand on bail: terms of imprisonment and detention) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, and
	(c) the offender's bail was subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition ("the relevant conditions").
	(2) Subject to subsection (4), the court must direct that the credit period is to count as time served by the offender as part of the sentence.
	(3) The "credit period" is the number of days represented by half of the sum of—
	(a) the day on which the offender's bail was first subject to conditions that, had they applied throughout the day in question, would have been relevant conditions, and
	(b) the number of other days on which the offender's bail was subject to those conditions (excluding the last day on which it was so subject),
	rounded up to the nearest whole number.
	(4) Subsection (2) does not apply if and to the extent that—
	(a) rules made by the Secretary of State so provide, or
	(b) it is in the opinion of the court just in all the circumstances not to give a direction under that subsection.
	(5) Where as a result of paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (4) the court does not give a direction under subsection (2), it may give a direction in accordance with either of those paragraphs to the effect that a period of days which is less than the credit period is to count as time served by the offender as part of the sentence.
	(6) Rules made under subsection (4)(a) may, in particular, make provision in relation to—
	(a) sentences of imprisonment for consecutive terms;
	(b) sentences of imprisonment for terms which are wholly or partly concurrent;
	(c) periods during which a person granted bail subject to the relevant conditions is also subject to electronic monitoring required by an order made by a court or the Secretary of State.
	(7) In considering whether it is of the opinion mentioned in subsection (4)(b) the court must, in particular, take into account whether or not the offender has, at any time whilst on bail subject to the relevant conditions, broken either or both of them.
	(8) Where the court gives a direction under subsection (2) or (5) it shall state in open court—
	(a) the number of days on which the offender was subject to the relevant conditions, and
	(b) the number of days in relation to which the direction is given.
	(9) Subsection (10) applies where the court—
	(a) does not give a direction under subsection (2) but gives a direction under subsection (5), or
	(b) decides not to give a direction under this section.
	(10) The court shall state in open court—
	(a) that its decision is in accordance with rules made under paragraph (a) of subsection (4), or
	(b) that it is of the opinion mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection and what the circumstances are.
	(11) Subsections (7) to (10) of section 240 apply for the purposes of this section as they apply for the purposes of that section but as if—
	(a) in subsection (7)—
	(i) the reference to a suspended sentence is to be read as including a reference to a sentence to which an order under section 118(1) of the Sentencing Act relates;
	(ii) in paragraph (a) after "Schedule 12" there were inserted "or section 119(1)(a) or (b) of the Sentencing Act"; and
	(b) in subsection (8) the reference to subsection (3) of section 240 is to be read as a reference to subsection (2) of this section and, in paragraph (b), after "Chapter" there were inserted "or Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991".
	(12) In this section—
	"electronic monitoring condition" means any electronic monitoring requirements imposed under section 3(6ZAA) of the Bail Act 1976 for the purpose of securing the electronic monitoring of a person's compliance with a qualifying curfew condition;
	"qualifying curfew condition" means a condition of bail which requires the person granted bail to remain at one or more specified places for a total of not less than 9 hours in any given day; and
	"related offence" means an offence, other than the offence for which the sentence is imposed ("offence A"), with which the offender was charged and the charge for which was founded on the same facts or evidence as offence A."
	(5) In section 241 (effect of direction under section 240 of that Act) after the words "section 240", in each place where they occur (including in the title), insert "or 240A".
	(6) In section 242 (interpretation of sections 240 and 241), in the title and in subsection (1), after "sections 240" insert ", 240A".
	(7) In section 330 (Parliamentary procedure for subordinate legislation made under that Act), in subsection (5)(d), after "section 240(4)(a)" insert "or 240A(4)(a)".'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.
	 Question proposed, That the clause be read a Second time.
	 The House proceeded to a Division.

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.

The House having divided: Ayes 309, Noes 236.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New Clause 27
	 — 
	Credit for period of remand on bail: other cases

'(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
	(2) In section 246(4) (exceptions to power to release prisoner on licence before required to do so), in paragraph (i), after "section 240" insert "or 240A".
	(3) In section 269(3) (part of mandatory life prisoner's sentence to be specified for purposes of early release provisions), in paragraph (b), before "if" insert "or under section 240A (crediting periods of remand on bail spent subject to certain types of condition)".
	(4) In paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (c. 19) (sentence on conviction at retrial), in sub-paragraph (4), for the words from the beginning to "custody:" substitute "Sections 240 and 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (crediting of periods of remand in custody or on bail subject to certain types of condition:".
	(5) In section 82A(3) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6) (part of discretionary life prisoner's sentence to be specified for purposes of early release provisions), in paragraph (b), before "if" insert "or under section 240A of that Act of 2003 (crediting periods of remand on bail subject to certain types of condition)".
	(6) In section 101 of that Act (detention and training orders: taking account of remand etc.)—
	(a) in subsection (8) for "in custody" substitute "—
	(a) in custody, or
	(b) on bail subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition (within the meaning of section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003),"; and
	(b) in subsection (9) for "in custody" substitute "as mentioned in that subsection".
	(7) In paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 7 to the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17) (provisions of law of England and Wales affecting length of sentence which are not applicable to ICC prisoners), for paragraph (d) substitute—
	"(d) sections 240 and 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (crediting of periods spent on remand in custody or on bail subject to certain types of condition: terms of imprisonment and detention)."'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 28
	 — 
	Credit for period of remand on bail: transitional provisions

'Schedule (Credit for period of remand on bail: transitional provisions) (which, for the purposes of certain repealed provisions which continue to have effect in relation to persons convicted of certain offences, makes provision similar to that made by sections (Credit for period of remand on bail: terms of imprisonment and detention) and (Credit for period of remand on bail: other cases)) has effect.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 29
	 — 
	Sentences of imprisonment for public protection

'(1) In section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (life sentence or imprisonment for public protection), for subsection (3) substitute—
	"(3) In a case not falling within subsection (2), the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for public protection if the condition in subsection (3A) or the condition in subsection (3B) is met.
	(3A) The condition in this subsection is that, at the time when the offence was committed, the offender had been convicted in any part of the United Kingdom of an offence specified in Schedule 15A.
	(3B) The condition in this subsection is that the notional minimum term is at least two years.
	(3C) The notional minimum term is the part of the sentence that the court would specify under section 82A(2) of the Sentencing Act (determination of tariff) if it imposed a sentence of imprisonment for public protection but was required to disregard the matter mentioned in section 82A(3)(b) of that Act (crediting periods of remand)."
	(2) After Schedule 15 to that Act, insert the Schedule set out in Schedule (Offences specified for the purposes of sections 225(3A) and 227(2A) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) to this Act.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 30
	 — 
	Sentences of detention for public protection

'In section 226 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (detention for life or detention for public protection), for subsection (3) substitute—
	"(3) In a case not falling within subsection (2), the court may impose a sentence of detention for public protection if the notional minimum term is at least two years.
	(3A) The notional minimum term is the part of the sentence that the court would specify under section 82A(2) of the Sentencing Act (determination of tariff) if it imposed a sentence of detention for public protection but was required to disregard the matter mentioned in section 82A(3)(b) of that Act (crediting periods of remand)." '.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31
	 — 
	Extended sentences for certain violent or sexual offences: persons 18 or over

'(1) Section 227 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (extended sentence for certain violent or sexual offences: persons 18 or over) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1)—
	(a) in paragraph (a) the words ", other than a serious offence," are omitted, and
	(b) after paragraph (b) insert ", but
	(c) the court is not required by section 225(2) to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life."
	(3) In subsection (2) —
	(a) for "The court must" substitute "The court may", and
	(b) for the words from "that is to say" to the end substitute "if the condition in subsection (2A) or the condition in subsection (2B) is met."
	(4) After subsection (2) insert—
	"(2A) The condition in this subsection is that, at the time the offence was committed, the offender had previously been convicted in any part of the United Kingdom of an offence specified in Schedule 15A.
	(2B) The condition in this subsection is that, if the court were to impose an extended sentence of imprisonment, the term that it would specify as the appropriate custodial term would be at least 4 years.
	(2C) An extended sentence of imprisonment is a sentence of imprisonment the term of which is equal to the aggregate of—
	(a) the appropriate custodial term, and
	(b) a further period ("the extension period") for which the offender is to be subject to a licence and which is of such length as the court considers necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of further specified offences."
	(5) In subsection (3) for "subsection (2)" substitute "subsections (2B) and (2C)".
	(6) After subsection (5) insert—
	"(6) The Secretary of State may by order amend subsection (2B) so as to substitute a different period for the period for the time being specified in that subsection." '.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 32
	 — 
	Extended sentences for certain violent or sexual offences: persons under 18

'(1) Section 228 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (extended sentence for certain violent or sexual offences: persons under 18) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1)(b)(ii) the words from "or by section 226(3)" to the end are omitted.
	(3) In subsection (2) —
	(a) for "The court must" substitute "The court may", and
	(b) for the words from ", that is to say" to the end substitute "if the condition in subsection (2A) is met."
	(4) After subsection (2) insert—
	"(2A) The condition in this subsection is that, if the court were to impose an extended sentence of detention, the term that it would specify as the appropriate custodial term would be at least 4 years.
	(2B) An extended sentence of detention is a sentence of detention the term of which is equal to the aggregate of—
	(a) the appropriate custodial term, and
	(b) a further period ("the extension period") for which the offender is to be subject to a licence and which is of such length as the court considers necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from serious harm occasioned by the commission by him of further specified offences."
	(5) In subsection (3)—
	(a) for "subsection (2)" substitute "subsections (2A) and (2B)", and
	(b) paragraph (a) is omitted.
	(6) After subsection (6) insert—
	"(7) The Secretary of State may by order amend subsection (2A) so as to substitute a different period for the period for the time being specified in that subsection." '.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 33
	 — 
	The assessment of dangerousness

'(1) Section 229 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (the assessment of dangerousness) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (2)—
	(a) the words from the beginning to "18" are omitted,
	(b) after paragraph (a) insert—
	"(aa) may take into account all such information as is available to it about the nature and circumstances of any other offences of which the offender has been convicted in any part of the United Kingdom,", and
	(c) in paragraph (b) for "the offence" substitute "any of the offences mentioned in paragraph (a) or (aa)".
	(3) Subsections (3) and (4) are omitted.
	(4) Schedules 16 and 17 of that Act are omitted.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 34
	 — 
	Further amendments relating to sentences for public protection

'(1) In section 231 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (appeals where previous convictions set aside), for subsection (1) substitute—
	"(1) This section applies where—
	(a) a sentence has been imposed on any person under section 225(3) or 227(2),
	(b) the condition in section 225(3A) or (as the case may be) 227(2A) was met but the condition in section 225(3B) or (as the case may be) 227(2B) was not, and
	(c) any previous conviction of his without which the condition in section 225(3A) or (as the case may be) 227(2A) would not have been met has been subsequently set aside on appeal."
	(2) In section 232 (certificates for purposes of section 229)—
	(a) in the heading for "section 229" substitute "sections 225 and 227",
	(b) in paragraph (a)—
	(i) for "the commencement of this section" substitute "the commencement of Schedule 15A", and
	(ii) for "a relevant offence" substitute "an offence specified in that Schedule", and
	(c) for "section 229" substitute "sections 225(3A) and 227(2A)".
	(3) Section 234 of that Act (determination of day when offence committed) is omitted.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 35
	 — 
	Release on licence of prisoners serving extended sentences

'(1) Section 247 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (release on licence of prisoner serving extended sentence) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (2)—
	(a) the word "and" at the end of paragraph (a) is omitted, and
	(b) paragraph (b) is omitted.
	(3) Subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6) are omitted.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 45
	 — 
	Restriction on power to make a community order

'(1) After section 150 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (community sentence not available where sentence fixed by law etc.) insert—
	"150A Community order available only for offences punishable with imprisonment or for persistent offenders previously fined
	(1) The power to make a community order is only exercisable in respect of an offence if—
	(a) the offence is punishable with imprisonment; or
	(b) in any other case, section 151(2) confers power to make such an order."
	(2) For the purposes of this section and section 151 an offence triable either way that was tried summarily is to be regarded as punishable with imprisonment only if it is so punishable by the sentencing court (and for this purpose section 148(1) is to be disregarded)."
	(2) Section 151 of that Act (community order for persistent offender previously fined) is amended as follows.
	(3) Before subsection (1) insert—
	"(A1) Subsection (2) provides for the making of a community order by the court in respect of an offence committed by a person aged 16 or over ("the current offence") in cases where—
	(a) the current offence is punishable with imprisonment, but the court would not otherwise form the opinion required by section 148(1); or
	(b) the current offence is not punishable with imprisonment."
	(4) In subsection (1)—
	(a) at the beginning insert "Where the current offence is punishable with imprisonment,".
	(b) for paragraph (a) substitute—
	"(a) the offender was aged 16 or over when he was convicted;";
	(c) in paragraph (b) for "he" substitute "the offender".
	(5) After subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) Where the current offence is not punishable with imprisonment, subsection (2) applies where—
	(a) the offender was aged 16 or over when he was convicted; and
	(b) on three or more previous occasions the offender has, on conviction by a court in the United Kingdom of any offence committed by him after attaining the age of 16, had passed on him a sentence consisting only of a fine."
	(6) In subsection (3)(a) after "(1)(b)" insert "or (1A)(b) (as the case may be)".
	(7) In subsections (4), (5) and (6), for "subsection (1)(b)" insert "subsections (1)(b) and (1A)(b)".
	(8) In section 166 of that Act (savings for powers to mitigate etc.), in subsection (1)(a), after "148" insert "or 151(2)".'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 46
	 — 
	Bail for summary offences and certain other offences to be tried summarily

'Schedule (Bail for summary offences and certain other offences to be tried summarily)—
	(a) imposes a duty on a magistrates' court considering whether to withhold or grant bail in relation to a person under 18 accused of an offence mentioned in Schedule 2 to the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c. 43) (offences for which the value involved is relevant to the mode of trial) to consider the value involved in the offence; and
	(b) amends Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions).'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 47
	 — 
	Release of fine defaulters and contemnors under Criminal Justice Act 1991

'(1) Section 45 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53) (fine defaulters and contemnors) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (2) after "(3)" insert ", (3A)".
	(3) In subsection (3)—
	(a) for "the following subsections" substitute "the following subsection", and
	(b) in the substituted text, subsection (2) is omitted.
	(4) After subsection (3) insert—
	"(3A) In section 36 above—
	(a) in subsection (1) for "on licence" there shall be substituted "unconditionally", and
	(b) subsection (2) shall be omitted.
	(5) Subsection (4) is omitted.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 48
	 — 
	Early release of certain long-term prisoners under Criminal Justice Act 1991

'(1) Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53) (early release of prisoners: offences committed before 4th April 2005) is amended as follows.
	(2) In section 33 (duty to release short-term and long-term prisoners), after subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) As soon as a long-term prisoner has served one-half of his sentence, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to release him on licence.
	(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply to a long-term prisoner if the offence or one of the offences in respect of which he is serving the sentence is specified in Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (specified violent offences and specified sexual offences)."
	(3) In that section, in subsection (2) after "a long-term prisoner" insert "to whom subsection (1A) does not apply".
	(4) In section 35 (power to release long-term prisoners etc.) after subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply to a long-term prisoner to whom section 33(1A) applies.".
	(5) In section 37 (duration and conditions of licences)—
	(a) in subsection (1), for "(1B) and (2)" substitute "(1B), (2) and (8)", and
	(b) after subsection (7) insert—
	"(8) This section does not apply in relation to a long-term prisoner to whom section 33(1A) applies (provision as to the duration and conditions of licences for such prisoners being made by section 37ZA)."
	(6) After section 37 insert—
	"37ZA Duration and conditions of licences under section 33(1A) etc.
	(1) Where a long-term prisoner is released on licence under section 33(1A), the licence shall (subject to any revocation under section 254 of the 2003 Act) remain in force for the remainder of the sentence.
	(2) Section 250(1), (4) and (8) of the 2003 Act apply in relation to a licence under section 33(1A) of this Act as they apply in relation to a licence under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the 2003 Act in respect of a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment for a term of twelve months or more.
	(3) A person subject to a licence under section 33(1A) must comply with such conditions as may for the time being be specified in the licence.
	(4) The reference in section 254(1) of the 2003 Act to a person who has been released on licence under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of that Act includes a reference to a person released on licence under section 33(1A).
	(5) In this section, "the 2003 Act" means the Criminal Justice Act 2003."— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 49
	 — 
	Recall of certain prisoners released under Criminal Justice Act 1991

'(1) Before section 51 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53) insert—
	"50A Prisoners recalled under section 254 of Criminal Justice Act 2003
	(1) This section applies to a person who is—
	(a) released on licence under any provision of this Part, and
	(b) recalled to prison under section 254(1) of the 2003 Act (recall of prisoners while on licence).
	(2) Nothing in the following provisions of this Part (which authorise or require the Secretary of State to release prisoners) applies in relation to the person—
	(a) section 33;
	(b) section 33A;
	(c) section 34A;
	(d) section 35;
	(e) section 43(4).
	(3) Sections 254(2) and (6) and 255A to 256A of the 2003 Act (which authorise release on licence etc) apply in relation to a person to whom this section applies.
	(4) The provisions of Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the 2003 Act specified in subsection (5) apply in relation to—
	(a) a licence under that Chapter granted to a person to whom this section applies, and
	(b) a licence under section 36 of this Act granted to such a person.
	(5) The provisions of the 2003 Act specified in this subsection are—
	(a) section 249 (duration of licence), as modified by subsection (6) below;
	(b) section 250(1), (4) and (8) (licence conditions), as modified by subsection (7) below;
	(c) section 252 (duty to comply with licence conditions).
	(6) Section 249 of the 2003 Act applies—
	(a) as if the reference in subsection (1) to a fixed-term prisoner were a reference to a person to whom this section applies, and
	(b) as if for subsection (3) there were substituted—
	"(3) Subsection (1) has effect subject to section 51(2) to (2D) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991."
	(7) Section 250(4) of the 2003 Act applies as if the reference to a prisoner serving a sentence mentioned in that subsection were a reference to a person to whom this section applies.
	(8) In relation to a person to whom this section applies, subsections (2) to (2D) of section 51 of this Act (treatment of consecutive and concurrent terms etc.) apply as if any reference in those subsections to this Part of this Act included the provisions of the 2003 Act mentioned in subsections (3) and (5).
	(9) Except as provided by subsections (6)(b) and (8), nothing in this Part applies in relation to the duration and conditions of—
	(a) a licence under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the 2003 Act granted to a person to whom this section applies, or
	(b) a licence under section 36 of this Act granted to such a person.
	(10) In this section, "the 2003 Act" means the Criminal Justice Act 2003."
	(2) The savings made by paragraph 19 of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Commencement No.8 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/950) in respect of sections 249 and 250 of the 2003 Act do not apply in relation to a licence granted under Chapter 6 of Part 12 of that Act, or under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53), to a person to whom section 50A of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53) applies.
	(3) In subsections (2) to (4), "the 2003 Act" means the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44).'. — [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 3
	 — 
	'Electronic monitoring of persons released on bail subject to conditions

21 The Bail Act 1976 (c. 63) has effect subject to the following amendments.
	22 In section 3 (general provisions) for subsection (6ZAA) substitute—
	"(6ZAA) The requirements which may be imposed under subsection (6) include electronic monitoring requirements.
	The imposition of electronic monitoring requirements is subject to section 3AA (in the case of a child or young person), section 3AB (in the case of other persons) and section 3AC (in all cases).
	(6ZAB) In this section and sections 3AA to 3AC "electronic monitoring requirements" means requirements imposed for the purpose of securing the electronic monitoring of a person's compliance with any other requirement imposed on him as a condition of bail."
	23 (1) Section 3AA (electronic monitoring of compliance with bail conditions) is amended as follows.
	(2) In the heading to the section, for "Electronic monitoring of compliance with bail conditions" substitute "Conditions for the imposition of electronic monitoring requirements: children and young persons".
	(3) For subsection (1) substitute—
	"(1) A court may not impose electronic monitoring requirements on a child or young person unless each of the following conditions is met."
	(4) For subsection (4) substitute—
	"(4) The third condition is that the court is satisfied that the necessary provision for dealing with the person concerned can be made under arrangements for the electronic monitoring of persons released on bail that are currently available in each local justice area which is a relevant area."'
	(5) In subsection (5), for "such a requirement" substitute "electronic monitoring requirements".
	(6) Subsections (6) to (10) and (12) (which are superseded by section 3AC) are omitted.
	24 After section 3AA insert—
	"3AB Conditions for the imposition of electronic monitoring requirements: other persons
	(1) A court may not impose electronic monitoring requirements on a person who has attained the age of seventeen unless each of the following conditions is met.
	(2) The first condition is that the court is satisfied that without the electronic monitoring requirements the person would not be granted bail.
	(3) The second condition is that the court is satisfied that the necessary provision for dealing with the person concerned can be made under arrangements for the electronic monitoring of persons released on bail that are currently available in each local justice area which is a relevant area.
	(4) If the person is aged seventeen, the third condition is that a youth offending team has informed the court that in its opinion the imposition of electronic monitoring requirements will be suitable in his case.
	3AC Electronic monitoring: general provisions
	(1) Where a court imposes electronic monitoring requirements as a condition of bail, the requirements must include provision for making a person responsible for the monitoring.
	(2) A person may not be made responsible for the electronic monitoring of a person on bail unless he is of a description specified in an order made by the Secretary of State.
	(3) The Secretary of State may make rules for regulating—
	(a) the electronic monitoring of persons on bail;
	(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), the functions of persons made responsible for such monitoring.
	(4) The rules may make different provision for different cases.
	(5) Any power of the Secretary of State to make an order or rules under this section is exercisable by statutory instrument.
	(6) A statutory instrument containing rules under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
	(7) For the purposes of section 3AA or 3AB a local justice area is a relevant area in relation to a proposed electronic monitoring requirement if the court considers that it will not be practicable to secure the electronic monitoring in question unless electronic monitoring arrangements are available in that area.
	(8) Nothing in sections 3, 3AA or 3AB is to be taken to require the Secretary of State to ensure that arrangements are made for the electronic monitoring of persons released on bail." '.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 5
	 — 
	'Offences specified for the purposes of sections 225(3A) and 227(2A) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
	 — 
	Offences specified for the purposes of sections 225(3A) and 227(2A)
	 — 
	Part 1
	 — 
	Offences under the law of England and Wales

1 An attempt to commit murder, a conspiracy to murder or an incitement to murder.
	2 Manslaughter.
	3 An offence under section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100) (soliciting murder).
	4 An offence under section 18 of that Act (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm).
	5 An offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (c. 69) (rape) or an attempt to commit such an offence.
	6 An offence under section 5 of that Act (intercourse with a girl under 13).
	7 An offence under section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27) (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life).
	8 An offence under section 17(1) of that Act (use of a firearm to resist arrest).
	9 An offence under section 18 of that Act (carrying a firearm with criminal intent).
	10 An offence of robbery under section 8 of the Theft Act 1968 (c. 60) where, at some time during the commission of the offence, the offender had in his possession a firearm or an imitation firearm within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27).
	11 An offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42) (rape) or an attempt to commit such an offence.
	12 An offence under section 2 of that Act (assault by penetration) or an attempt to commit such an offence.
	13 An offence under section 4 of that Act (causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent), or an attempt to commit such an offence, if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.
	14 An offence under section 5 of that Act (rape of a child under 13) or an attempt to commit such an offence.
	15 An offence under section 6 of that Act (assault of a child under 13 by penetration) or an attempt to commit such an offence.
	16 An offence under section 8 of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity), or an attempt to commit such an offence, if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.
	17 An offence under section 30 of that Act (sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice), or an attempt to commit such an offence, if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.
	18 An offence under section 31 of that Act (causing or inciting a person with a mental disorder to engage in sexual activity), or an attempt to commit such an offence, if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.
	19 An offence under section 34 of that Act (inducement, threat or deception to procure sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder), or an attempt to commit such an offence, if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.
	20 An offence under section 35 of that Act (causing a person with a mental disorder to engage in or agree to engage in sexual activity by inducement etc.), or an attempt to commit such an offence, if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.
	21 An offence under section 47 of that Act (paying for sexual services of a child), or an attempt to commit such an offence, if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.
	22 An offence under section 62 of that Act (committing an offence with intent to commit a sexual offence), or an attempt to commit such an offence if the offender, was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life.

Part 2
	 — 
	Offences under the law of Scotland

23 Culpable homicide.
	24 An attempt to commit murder, a conspiracy to murder or an incitement to murder.
	25 Rape or an attempt to commit rape.
	26 Assault where the assault—
	(a) is aggravated because it caused severe injury or endangered the victim's life, or
	(b) was carried out with intent to rape or ravish the victim.
	27 Sodomy, or an attempt to commit sodomy, where the person against whom the offence was committed did not consent.
	28 Lewd, indecent or libidinous behaviour or practices.
	29 Robbery, where, at some time during the commission of the offence, the offender had in his possession a firearm or an imitation firearm within the meaning of the Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27).
	30 An offence under section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27) (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life).
	31 An offence under section 17(1) of that Act (use of a firearm to resist arrest).
	32 An offence under section 18 of that Act (carrying a firearm with criminal intent).
	33 An offence under section 5(1) of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 (c. 39) (unlawful intercourse with a girl under 13).

Part 3
	 — 
	Offences under the law of Northern Ireland

34 An attempt to commit murder, a conspiracy to murder or an incitement to murder.
	35 Manslaughter.
	36 Rape or an attempt to commit rape.
	37 An offence under section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100) (soliciting murder).
	38 An offence under section 18 of that Act (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm).
	39 An offence under section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (c. 69) (intercourse with a girl under 14).
	40 An offence of robbery under section 8 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 (c. 16) where, at some time during the commission of the offence, the offender had in his possession a firearm or an imitation firearm within the meaning of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 1981.
	41 An offence under Article 17 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/155 (N.I.2)) (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life).
	42 An offence under Article 18(1) of that Order (use of a firearm to resist arrest).
	43 An offence under Article 19 of that Order (carrying a firearm with criminal intent).
	44 An offence under Article 58 of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/702 (N.I.3)) (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life).
	45 An offence under Article 59 of that Order (use of a firearm to resist arrest).
	46 An offence under Article 60 of that Order (carrying a firearm with criminal intent).
	47 An offence under section 47 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (paying for sexual services of a child) or an attempt to commit such an offence if the offender was liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life." '.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 6
	 — 
	'Credit for period of remand on bail: transitional provisions

1 A period specified under paragraph 2 is to be treated as being a relevant period within the meaning of section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c. 80).
	2 (1) This paragraph applies where—
	(a) a court sentences an offender to a term of imprisonment for an offence that was committed before 4th April 2005,
	(b) the offender was remanded on bail by a court in the course of or in connection with proceedings for the offence, or any related offence, after the coming into force of paragraph 1, and
	(c) the offender's bail was subject to a qualifying curfew condition and an electronic monitoring condition ("the relevant conditions").
	(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (4), the court must by order specify the credit period.
	(3) The "credit period" is the number days represented by half of the sum of—
	(a) the day on which the offender's bail was first subject to conditions that, had they applied throughout the day in question, would have been relevant conditions, and
	(b) the number of other days on which the offender's bail was subject to those conditions (excluding the last day on which it was so subject),
	rounded up to the nearest whole number.
	(4) Sub-paragraph (2) does not apply if and to the extent that—
	(a) rules made by the Secretary of State so provide, or
	(b) it is in the opinion of the court just in all the circumstances not to give a direction under that subsection.
	(5) Where as a result of paragraph (a) or (b) of sub-paragraph (4) the court does not specify the credit period under sub-paragraph (2), it may in accordance with either of those paragraphs by order specify a lesser period.
	(6) Rules under sub-paragraph (4)(a) may, in particular, make provision in relation to—
	(a) sentences of imprisonment for consecutive terms;
	(b) sentences of imprisonment for terms which are wholly or partly concurrent;
	(c) periods during which a person granted bail subject to the relevant conditions is also subject to electronic monitoring required by an order made by a court or the Secretary of State.
	(7) In considering whether it is of the opinion mentioned in sub-paragraph (4)(b) the court must, in particular, take into account whether or not the offender has, at any time whilst on bail subject to the relevant conditions, broken either or both of them.
	(8) Where the court specifies a period under sub-paragraph (2) or (5) it shall state in open court—
	(a) the number of days on which the offender was subject to the relevant conditions, and
	(b) the number of days in the period specified.
	(9) Sub-paragraph (10) applies where the court—
	(a) does not specify the credit period under sub-paragraph (2) but does specify a lesser period under sub-paragraph (5), or
	(b) does not specify a period under either sub-paragraph (2) or (5).
	(10) The court shall state in open court—
	(a) that its decision is in accordance with rules made under paragraph (a) of sub-paragraph (4), or
	(b) that it is of the opinion mentioned in paragraph (b) of that sub-paragraph and what the circumstances are.
	(11) In this paragraph—
	"electronic monitoring condition" means any electronic monitoring requirements imposed under section 3(6ZAA) of the Bail Act 1976 (c. 63) for the purpose of securing the electronic monitoring of a person's compliance with a qualifying curfew condition;
	"qualifying curfew condition" means a condition of bail which requires the person granted bail to remain at one or more specified places for a total of not less than 9 hours in any given day; and
	"related offence" means an offence, other than the offence for which the sentence is imposed ("offence A"), with which the offender was charged and the charge for which was founded on the same facts or evidence as offence A.'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 7
	 — 
	'Bail for summary offences and certain other offences to be tried summarily

1 The Bail Act 1976 (c. 63) is amended as follows.
	2 In section 3(6D)(a) (condition to be imposed on person in relation to whom paragraph 6B(1)(a) to (c) of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to that Act apply), after "apply" insert "(including where P is a person to whom the provisions of Part 1A of Schedule 1 apply)".
	3 After section 9 (offence of agreeing to indemnify sureties in criminal proceedings) insert—
	"9A Bail decisions relating to persons aged under 18 who are accused of offences mentioned in Schedule 2 to the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980
	(1) This section applies whenever—
	(a) a magistrates' court is considering whether to withhold or grant bail in relation to a person aged under 18 who is accused of a scheduled offence; and
	(b) the trial of that offence has not begun.
	(2) The court shall, before deciding whether to withhold or grant bail, consider whether, having regard to any representations made by the prosecutor or the accused person, the value involved does not exceed the relevant sum for the purposes of section 22.
	(3) The duty in subsection (2) does not apply in relation to an offence if—
	(a) a determination under subsection (4) has already been made in relation to that offence; or
	(b) the accused person is, in relation to any other offence of which he is accused which is not a scheduled offence, a person to whom Part 1 of Schedule 1 to this Act applies.
	(4) If where the duty in subsection (2) applies it appears to the court clear that, for the offence in question, the amount involved does not exceed the relevant sum, the court shall make a determination to that effect.
	(5) In this section—
	(a) "relevant sum" has the same meaning as in section 22(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (certain either way offences to be tried summarily if value involved is less than the relevant sum);
	(b) "scheduled offence" means an offence mentioned in Schedule 2 to that Act (offences for which the value involved is relevant to the mode of trial); and
	(c) "the value involved" is to be construed in accordance with section 22(10) to (12) of that Act."
	4 Schedule 1 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions) is amended as follows.
	5 (1) Paragraph 1 (defendants to whom Part 1 applies) becomes sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph.
	(2) In that sub-paragraph at the beginning insert "Subject to sub-paragraph (2),".
	(3) After that sub-paragraph insert—
	"(2) But those provisions do not apply by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(a) if the offence, or each of the offences punishable with imprisonment, is—
	(a) a summary offence; or
	(b) an offence mentioned in Schedule 2 to the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (offences for which the value involved is relevant to the mode of trial) in relation to which—
	(i) a determination has been made under section 22(2) of that Act (certain either way offences to be tried summarily if value involved is less than the relevant sum) that it is clear that the value does not exceed the relevant sum for the purposes of that section; or
	(ii) a determination has been made under section 9A(4) of this Act to the same effect."
	6 After Part 1 insert—

"Part 1A
	 — 
	Defendants Accused or Convicted of Imprisonable Offences to which Part 1 does not apply

Defendants to whom Part 1A applies
	1 The following provisions of this Part apply to the defendant if—
	(a) the offence or one of the offences of which he is accused or convicted is punishable with imprisonment, but
	(b) Part 1 does not apply to him by virtue of paragraph 1(2) of that Part.
	 Exceptions to right to bail
	2 The defendant need not be granted bail if—
	(a) it appears to the court that, having been previously granted bail in criminal proceedings, he has failed to surrender to custody in accordance with his obligations under the grant of bail; and
	(b) the court believes, in view of that failure, that the defendant, if released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not) would fail to surrender to custody.
	3 The defendant need not be granted bail if—
	(a) it appears to the court that the defendant was on bail in criminal proceedings on the date of the offence; and
	(b) the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, if released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not) would commit an offence while on bail.
	4 The defendant need not be granted bail if the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, if released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not), would commit an offence while on bail by engaging in conduct that would, or would be likely to, cause—
	(a) physical or mental injury to any person other than the defendant; or
	(b) any person other than the defendant to fear physical or mental injury.
	5 The defendant need not be granted bail if the court is satisfied that the defendant should be kept in custody for his own protection or, if he is a child or young person, for his own welfare.
	6 The defendant need not be granted bail if he is in custody in pursuance of a sentence of a court or a sentence imposed by an officer under the Armed Forces Act 2006.
	7 The defendant need not be granted bail if —
	(a) having been released on bail in or in connection with the proceedings for the offence, he has been arrested in pursuance of section 7 of this Act; and
	(b) the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, if released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not) would fail to surrender to custody, commit an offence while on bail or interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice (whether in relation to himself or any other person).
	8 The defendant need not be granted bail where the court is satisfied that it has not been practicable to obtain sufficient information for the purpose of taking the decisions required by this Part of this Schedule for want of time since the institution of the proceedings against him.
	 Application of paragraphs 6A to 6C of Part 1
	9 Paragraphs 6A to 6C of Part 1 (exception applicable to drug users in certain areas and related provisions) apply to a defendant to whom this Part applies as they apply to a defendant to whom that Part applies."'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 170
	 — 
	Orders and regulations

Amendments made: No. 156, page 117, line 5, after 'Orders' insert ', rules'.
	No. 157, page 117, line 30, leave out 'or'.
	No. 158, page 117, line 31, at end insert ', or
	(p) rules under paragraph 2(4)(a) of Schedule  (Credit for period of remand on bail: transitional provisions),'.— [Steve McCabe.]

Schedule 4
	 — 
	Youth rehabilitation orders: consequential and related amendments

Amendment made: No. 219, page 182, line 21, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
	'(3) In subsections (A1), (1)(a) and (1A)(a), for "16" substitute "18".
	(4) After subsection (2) insert—
	"(2A) Subsection (2B) applies where—
	(a) a person aged 16 or 17 is convicted of an offence ("the current offence");
	(b) on three or more previous occasions the offender has, on conviction by a court in the United Kingdom of any offence committed by him after attaining the age of 16, had passed on him a sentence consisting only of a fine; and
	(c) despite the effect of section 143(2), the court would not (apart from this section) regard the current offence, or the combination of the current offence and one or more offences associated with it, as being serious enough to warrant a youth rehabilitation order.
	(2B) The court may make a youth rehabilitation order in respect of the current offence instead of imposing a fine if it considers that, having regard to all the circumstances including the matters mentioned in subsection (3), it would be in the interests of justice to make such an order."
	(5) In subsection (3)—
	(a) after "(2)" insert "and (2B)"; and
	(b) in paragraph (a) for "or (1A)(b)" substitute "(1A)(b) or (2A)(b)".
	(6) In subsections (4), (5) and (6), for "and (1A)(b)" substitute "(1A)(b) and (2A)(b)".
	(7) In section 166 (savings for powers to mitigate etc.), in subsection (1)(a) after "151(2)" insert "or (2B)".'.— [Steve McCabe.]

Schedule 32
	 — 
	Minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: No. 159, page 286, line 33, at end insert—
	 'Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (c. 54)
	4B (8) Section 23AA of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (electronic monitoring of remand conditions) is amended as follows.
	(9) In subsection (4)—
	(a) paragraph (a) is omitted; and
	(b) in paragraph (b), for "those arrangements" substitute "arrangements currently available in each local justice area which is a relevant area".
	(10) In subsection (8) for "Subsections (8) to (10) of section 3AA" substitute "Subsections (4) to (7) of section 3AC".'.
	No. 161, page 287, line 8, at end insert—
	 Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20)
	6ZA In section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (powers of court to order hospital admission or guardianship), in subsection (1A)(c) for "any of sections 225 to 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".'.
	No. 162, page 287, line 26, leave out from beginning to '(offence' and insert—
	'7A The Criminal Justice Act 1988 has effect subject to the following amendments.
	7B In section 36 (reviews of sentencing), in subsection (2)(b)(iii) for "any of sections 225 to 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".
	8 In section 160(1)'.
	No. 220, page 288, line 4, at end insert—
	'( ) In section 43(5) (young offenders), for "under this Part" substitute "under any provision of this Part other than section 33(1A)". '.
	No. 221, page 288, line 9, at end insert—
	'( ) In section 46B(5) (re-entry into United Kingdom of offender removed early from prison), after "subsections (1)" insert ", (1A)".'.
	No. 163, page 289, line 38, at end insert—
	'19A In section 12 (absolute and conditional discharge), in subsection (1) for "section 225, 226, 227 or 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".'.
	No. 222, in page 290, line 2, after 'original sentence)' insert '—
	(a) in subsection (1)(b) for "under Part II of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (early release of prisoners)" substitute "under any provision of Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (early release of prisoners) other than section 33(1A)", and'.
	No. 164, page 290, line 4, at end insert—
	'22A In section 130 (compensation orders), in subsection (2) for "section 225, 226, 227 or 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".
	22B In section 146 (driving disqualification for any offence), in subsection (2) for "section 225, 226, 227 or 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".
	22C In section 164 (further interpretative provisions), in subsection (3)(c) for "any of sections 225 to 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".'.
	No. 165, page 291, line 32, at end insert—
	'32A In section 142 (purposes of sentencing), in subsection (2)(c) for "any of sections 225 to 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2) of this Act".
	32B In section 150 (circumstances in which community sentence not available), in paragraph (d) for "any of sections 225 to 228" to the end substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2) of this Act (requirement to impose sentence of imprisonment for life or detention for life)".
	32C In section 152 (general restrictions on imposing custodial sentences), in subsection (1)(b) for "any of sections 225 to 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".
	32E In section 153 (length of discretionary custodial sentences: general provision), in subsection (1), omit "or falling to be".
	32F In section 163 (general power of Crown Court to fine) for "any of sections 225 to 228" substitute "section 225(2) or 226(2)".
	32G In section 224 (meaning of "specified offence" etc), in subsection (3) the definition of relevant offence is omitted.
	32H In section 305 (interpretation of Part 12), in subsection (4)—
	(a) for paragraphs (c) and (d) substitute—
	"(c) a sentence falls to be imposed under subsection (2) of section 225 if the court is obliged to pass a sentence of imprisonment for life under that subsection;
	(d) a sentence falls to be imposed under subsection (2) of section 226 if the court is obliged to pass a sentence of detention for life under that subsection;", and
	(b) paragraph (e) is omitted.'.
	No. 166, page 291, line 40, at end insert—
	'34A In section 330(5) (orders subject to the affirmative procedure) after "section 223," insert—
	"section 227(6),
	section 228(7)".'.— [Steve McCabe.]

Schedule 33
	 — 
	Transitory, transitional and saving provisions

Amendments made: No. 223, page 296, line 8, at end insert—
	'9A Nothing in the amendments made by section (Early release of certain long-term prisoners under Criminal Justice Act 1991) affects the operation of Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53) in relation to a long-term prisoner within the meaning of that Part who (for the purposes of that Part) has served one-half of his sentence before the commencement of that section.'.
	No. 224, page 296, line 8, at end insert—
	'9B The amendments made by subsections (3) and (5) of section (Release of fine defaulters and contemnors under Criminal Justice Act 1991) do not apply in relation to any person who is released on licence under section 36(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53) before the commencement of section (Release of fine defaulters and contemnors under Criminal Justice Act 1991).'.
	No. 225, page 296, line 8, at end insert—
	'9C The amendment made by subsection (1) of section (Recall of certain prisoners released under Criminal Justice Act 1991) applies in relation to any person who is recalled under section 254(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) on or after the commencement of section (Recall of certain prisoners released under Criminal Justice Act 1991) but it is immaterial when the person was released on licence under Part 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (c. 53).'.— [Steve McCabe.]

Schedule 34
	 — 
	Repeals and revocations

Amendments made: No. 227, page 306, line 47, column 2 at beginning insert—
	
		
			  'In section 45— (a) in subsection (3), subsection (2) of the substituted text, and (b) subsection (4).'. 
		
	
	No. 167, page 307, line 21, at end insert—
	
		
			  'In section 153(1), the words "or falling to be". 
			  In section 224(3), the definition of "relevant offence". 
			  In section 227(1)(a), the words ", other than a serious offence, ". 
			  In section 228— (a) in subsection (1)(b)(ii), the words from "or by section 226(3)" to the end, and (b) subsection (3)(a) and the word "and" immediately following it. 
			  In section 229— (a) in subsection (2) the words from the beginning to "18", and (b) subsections (3) and (4). 
			  Section 234. 
			  In section 247— (a) in subsection (2), the word "and" (at the end of paragraph (a)) and paragraph (b), and (b) subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6).'. 
		
	
	No. 168, page 307, line 42, at end insert—
	
		
			  'Section 305(4)(e). 
			  Schedules 16 and 17.'. 
		
	
	No. 160, page 309, line 3, at end insert—
	
		
			 'Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (c. 54) Section 23AA(4)(a). 
			 Bail Act 1976 (c. 63) Section 3AA(6) to (10) and (12).'.— [Steve McCabe.]

New Clause 3
	 — 
	Amendments consequential on Part 5

'(1) In Schedule 3 to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (c. 13) (matters not subject to investigation) after paragraph 13 (as inserted by paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 10 to this Act) insert—
	"14 Any matter which falls within the complaints or deaths remit of the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison Complaints (within the meaning of Part 5 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008)."
	(2) Subsection (1) has no effect in relation to any matter which the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration has started to investigate before the commencement of that subsection.
	(3) In section 31(4) of the Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29) (exceptions to data protection requirements for ombudsmen), after paragraph (a)(vi) (but before the "or" immediately following it) insert—
	"(via) the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison Complaints;".
	(4) In section 76(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36) (disclosure of information between Information Commissioner and ombudsmen) in the Table at the appropriate place insert—
	
		
			 "The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison Complaints. Part 5 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008." 
		
	
	(5) In Part 7 of Schedule 1 to that Act (public authorities) at the appropriate place insert "The Northern Ireland Commissioner for Prison Complaints".'.— [Maria Eagle.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Maria Eagle: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 18 to 40, 87 to 89, 42 to 54, 218, 55, 141, 142, 56 to 64, 108, 65 to 70, 70A, 71 to 75, 109, 110 and 143.

Maria Eagle: I hope not to have to detain the House too long with this group of amendments and the new clause, given that all make minor technical and drafting amendments to the Bill. I am conscious that there are quite a number of them, and am happy to deal with any points that Members wish to make. I am also conscious, however, that later groups of amendments raise other issues on which many Members wish to speak. I hope that it will be understood that I am not showing any disrespect to the House by not going through the detail of every amendment, which I would be happy to do if Members encouraged me to. I assure Members on both sides of the House, however, that the amendments are minor, drafting, technical and consequential changes. I therefore hope that Members on both sides of the House will be pleased to see me sit down as swiftly as I stood up.

Edward Garnier: It is always a pleasure—indeed, a delight—to hear the hon. Lady speak in the Chamber. The disrespect to the House was done in the course of the timetable motion. She is wholly acquitted, and can leave this Chamber whenever she likes without a stain on her procedural character. What other problems she and her fellow Ministers suffer from I must leave for discussion with the Chief Whip, but it looks as if he is no longer in his place.
	The Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle) is, like the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr. Hanson), obliging and disarming as always. The sub-heading "Miscellaneous, minor and drafting" hides a multitude of sins. New clause 3 is not controversial, but I do not think that it can be described as a minor drafting amendment. Neither, if one goes through the several tens of Government provisions in the group, can any one of them be brushed under the carpet as though they were of no account, no importance and unworthy of adequate scrutiny.
	Having said that, I know that Governments make mistakes from time to time—and they sometimes even admit that they make them from time to time. The greatest mistake that the Government have made is to create this jumble of a Bill, which has forced them to come forward with these alleged "Miscellaneous, minor and drafting" provisions. It is not difficult to poke fun at the Government, as they are worthily the subject of ridicule— [Interruption.] I recognise that the Minister is intending to be helpful.
	I hope that the Government are satisfied with the shambolic way in which they created the Bill. If they had thought about it in a sensible, premeditated and planned way, as opposed to engaging in some sort of legislative doodle, we would not have needed the "Miscellaneous, minor and drafting" amendments and we could have had an organised progression towards Royal Assent. As it is, we have not been able to do that. Instead, we have 79 provisions to be dealt with under this procedure. It is a pity that any time has been taken up, but it is legitimate to comment that so chaotic are the Government that they have been forced to spend some time advancing these amending provisions. We will not oppose them, but we do not accept that they are unworthy of proper scrutiny at any stage. Clearly, however, arrangements this afternoon do not permit us the time to do anything more than signal our displeasure at the way in which the Bill has been constructed.

David Heath: The hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) is absolutely right. I counted 64 provisions, but he counted more, so we differ in our arithmetic; I am sure that he is right and I am wrong. Nevertheless, such a large group of drafting amendments bespeaks the fact that Governments nowadays are quite incapable of drafting Bills properly. They rush them through Committee and they rush them through Report, resulting in mistakes. We end up with criminal justice Bills being brought back time and again to be corrected, either through statutory instrument or by new primary legislation, yet they are presented to us as the acme of excellence, which they are most certainly not. I think that it is a poor way of running the country.

Maria Eagle: I shall resist the provocation to deal with Opposition Members' points by going through the details of every amendment, which would defeat the whole object of my attempting to deal quickly with this group. However, I want to take up the point of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) about new clause 3 and the substantive changes that it makes. I shall explain that alone, as the others are indeed minor technical and drafting amendments. Despite the annoyance expressed, I will not be provoked into going into all the details on this occasion.
	New clause 3 and Government amendments Nos. 18 to 40 and 61 to 64 contain minor drafting, technical and consequential changes to parts 4 and 5, which establish the offices of the commissioner for offender management and prisons and the Northern Ireland commissioner for prison complaints. They contain within them a few amendments that reflect a change of policy in respect of Scotland. Let me make it clear that these have been agreed with the Scottish Executive.
	In particular, the amendments extend the commissioner's remit for investigating deaths to immigration detention premises and immigration custody in Scotland, while safeguarding the roles of the Lord Advocate and procurator fiscal in relation to criminal investigations and the investigation of deaths. Given that the arrangements have been agreed with the Scottish Executive, we are not trying to do anything that would not be approved of in Scotland. The amendments will improve the coherence of the deaths remit—that awful phrase—that the new commissioner will have.
	That is the only substantive change made by any of the amendments in the group. I hope that, following my short explanation, Members will accept the amendments so that we can get on with discussing some of the other matters covered by amendments in other groups.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4
	 — 
	Referral orders: power to revoke a referral order

'(1) Part 3 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6) (mandatory and discretionary referral of young offenders) is amended as follows.
	(2) After section 27 insert—
	 "Referrals back to court in the interests of justice
	27A Revocation of referral order where offender making good progress etc.
	(1) This section applies where, having regard to circumstances which have arisen since a youth offender contract took effect under section 23 above, it appears to the youth offender panel to be in the interests of justice for the referral order (or each of the referral orders) to be revoked.
	(2) The panel may refer the offender back to the appropriate court requesting it—
	(a) to exercise only the power conferred by sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 to this Act to revoke the order (or each of the orders); or
	(b) to exercise both—
	(i) the power conferred by that sub-paragraph to revoke the order (or each of the orders); and
	(ii) the power conferred by sub-paragraph (4) of that paragraph to deal with the offender for the offence in respect of which the revoked order was made.
	(3) The circumstances in which the panel may make a referral under subsection (2) above include the offender's making good progress under the contract.
	(4) Where—
	(a) the panel makes a referral under subsection (2) above in relation to any offender and any youth offender contract, and
	(b) the appropriate court decides not to exercise the power conferred by paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 1 to this Act in consequence of that referral,
	the panel may not make a further referral under that subsection in relation to that offender and contract during the relevant period except with the consent of the appropriate court.
	(5) In subsection (4) above "the relevant period" means the period of 3 months beginning with the date on which the appropriate court made the decision mentioned in paragraph (b) of that subsection."
	(3) In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1 (youth offender panels: further court proceedings), for "or 27(4)" substitute ", 27(4) or 27A(2)".'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

David Hanson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	Government new clause 5— Referral orders: extension of period for which young offender contract has effect.
	New clause 10— Extension of a referral order—
	'(1) Schedule 1 to the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 is amended as follows.
	(2) In paragraph 5(1) for "power" substitute "powers".
	(3) For paragraph 5(2) substitute—
	"(2) Those powers are the powers to revoke the referral order (or each of the referral orders) or extend it by up to 3 months.".
	(4) In paragraph 5(5) for "so dealing with the offender" substitute "revoking an order for an offence specified in sub-paragraph (4).".
	(5) In paragraph 5(6) after "The appropriate court may not exercise the" insert "revocation".'.
	New clause 18— Anti-social behaviour orders (persons under 18)—
	'(1) Section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37) (anti-social behaviour orders) is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (5) insert—
	"(5A) The court may not make an anti-social behaviour order in respect of any person under the age of 18 years unless that person's anti-social acts were committed jointly with an adult.".'.
	New clause 40— Power of court to make a detention and training order—
	'In the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, after section 100(2)(b), insert—
	"(c) in relation to an offence committed after the commencement of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, unless he has previously received a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance under that paragraph.".'.
	New clause 42— Restrictions on custodial sentences for offenders aged under 18—
	'(1) This section applies where a person under the age of 18 years is convicted of an offence punishable with a custodial sentence other than one—
	(a) fixed by law, or
	(b) falling to be imposed under section 51A(2) of the Firearms Act 1968 or under sections 226 to 228 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
	(2) In the title of section 152 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (general restrictions on imposing discretionary custodial sentences), after "general restrictions on imposing discretionary custodial sentences" insert "on offenders aged 18 or above".
	(3) In section 152(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, after "where a person", insert "aged 18 or above".
	(4) After section 152 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, insert—
	(5)
	"152A Restrictions on custodial sentences for offenders aged under 18
	(1) A court shall only pass a sentence of custody on a person under the age of 18 as a measure of last resort and where—
	(a) the offence committed caused or could reasonably have been expected to cause serious physical or psychological harm to another or others, and
	(b) a custodial sentence is necessary to protect the public from the demonstrable and imminent risk of serious physical or psychological harm.
	(2) The court shall state in open session its reasons for passing any sentence of custody under this section."'.
	Government amendments Nos. 82 and 83.
	Amendment No. 173, page 8, line 34, clause 12, after 'below', insert
	'if the offender is over the age of 18 years'.
	Government amendment No. 86.
	Amendment No. 129, page 17, line 10, clause 21 leave out from 'occasion' to end of line 11 and insert '; or
	(iii) has previously been referred to a youth offender panel under section 16 above and a further referral has been recommended by—
	(a) a member of a youth offending team,(b) an officer of a local probation team, or(c) a social worker of a local authority.'.
	Amendment No. 176, page 54, line 36, clause 81, leave out 'offenders aged 16 and 17' and insert
	'children or young persons aged under 18 years'.
	Government amendment No. 104.
	Amendment No. 196, page 131, line 35, schedule 1, leave out 'local authority residence requirement or fostering requirement' and insert 'order under Part 1'.
	Amendment No. 197, page 131, line 36, leave out from 'not' to second 'in' in line 37 and insert 'make an order under Part 1'.
	Amendment No. 198, page 131, leave out line 40 and insert—
	'(b) the offender has waived his right to legal representation, having been advised that this may have a strongly negative impact upon the outcome of his case.'.
	Amendment No. 199, page 131, line 41, leave out sub-paragraph (2).
	Amendment No. 200, page 132, line 4, leave out sub-paragraph (3).
	Government amendments Nos. 105 to 107.
	Amendment No. 201, page 142, leave out lines 9 to 19.
	Amendment No. 116, page 143, line 18, schedule 2, leave out paragraphs 3 and 4.
	Amendment No. 202, page 144, leave out lines 27 to 30 and insert 'before the appropriate court.'.
	Amendment No. 203, page 144, line 40, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 145 and insert—
	'(4A) Where the offender does not appear in answer to a summons issued under this paragraph, the appropriate court may issue a warrant for his arrest.'.
	Amendment No. 117, page 145, line 5, at end insert—
	'(za) a youth rehabilitation order is still in force, and'.
	Amendment No. 118, page 145, line 12, leave out from 'ways' to end of line 13.
	Amendment No. 204, page 145, leave out lines 23 to 26 and insert—
	'(ba) if the youth rehabilitation order was made by a magistrates' court, by dealing with the offender, for the offence in respect of which the order was made, in any way in which the court could have dealt with the offender for that offence (had the offender been before the court to be dealt with for it); or
	(bb) if the youth rehabilitation order was made in the Crown Court, by committing the young offender in custody or releasing him on bail until he can be brought before, or appear before, the Crown Court.'.
	Amendment No. 115, page 145, line 26, at end insert—
	'(d) by placing the offender in custody for a period not exceeding 3 months.'.
	Amendment No. 205, page 145, line 26, at end insert—
	'(2A) Where the court deals with the offender under the previous subparagraph, it must send to the Crown Court—
	(a) a certificate signed by a justice of the peace certifying that the offender has failed to comply with the youth rehabilitation order in the respect certified, and such other particulars as may be desirable; and
	(b) such a certificate purporting to be so signed is admissible as evidence of the failure before the Crown Court.'.
	Amendment No. 206, page 146, line 21, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 147.
	Amendment No. 207, page 147, line 4, leave out paragraph 7.
	Amendment No. 119, page 147, line 23, at end insert—
	'(za) a youth rehabilitation order is still in force, and'.
	Amendment No. 120, page 147, line 30, leave out from 'ways' to end of line 31.
	Amendment No. 209, page 148, line 32, leave out from beginning to end of line 10 on page 149.
	Amendment No. 210, page 213, line 19, schedule 16, leave out 'offenders aged 16 or 17' and insert
	'children or young persons aged under 18 years'.
	Amendment No. 211, page 213, leave out line 33.
	Amendment No. 212, page 214, line 22, leave out '16' and insert 'under 17'.
	Amendment No. 213, page 218, line 10, leave out '16 or 17' and insert 'under 18 years'.
	Government amendments Nos. 111 and 112.

David Hanson: As was pointed out earlier during debate on the programme motion, we spent considerable time on these matters in Committee. Our new clauses and amendments have been tabled to prove that that was not a complete waste of time for everyone, and to address issues raised by members of the official Opposition, and other Members, in Committee.
	New clauses 4 and 5 deal with an issue raised by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr. Burrowes). New clause 4 empowers a court, on the recommendation of a youth offender panel, to revoke a referral order in the interests of justice. That will provide what I hope the hon. Gentleman was seeking—greater flexibility and discretion for the court—and in particular will allow an offender to be rewarded when all parties agree that in the light of the offender's good compliance the order should not proceed to completion. New clause 5 empowers the court, again on the recommendation of a youth offender panel, to extend a referral order by up to three months. The extension is, however, subject to the overall maximum for a referral order of 12 months, as I believe that it would be unduly onerous to exceed that period. New clause 5 negates the need for the Opposition's new clause 10, which sought to achieve much the same end. Amendments 111 and 112 are consequential on new clauses 4 and 5.
	I hope that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate will welcome those changes, which were made as a result of his contributions in Committee. I am sure that he will give his views shortly.
	Amendments Nos. 82, 83, 104, 106 and 107 were tabled in response to debates on Second Reading and in Committee. They create a new "intoxicating substance treatment requirement" which can be attached to a youth rehabilitation order. The issue was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington, North (Helen Jones) on Second Reading, and in Committee by the hon. Members for Cambridge (David Howarth), for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), and for Enfield, Southgate.

Helen Jones: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for listening to the representations made by me and by others. Hopefully, along with education programmes, the amendments will go some way towards tackling the overindulgence in alcohol by young people that leads them on to crime and antisocial behaviour.

David Hanson: If the mutual appreciation society can continue, let me say that I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising the issue on Second Reading. I am also genuinely grateful to the official Opposition and to Liberal Democrat Front Benchers for supporting the discussion in Committee. This shows that the Committee stage was helpful in teasing out issues that needed to be dealt with on the Floor of the House. I am pleased that we have been able to agree on amendments that, I trust, deal with the points that were made in Committee.
	I have also tabled an amendment to the drug treatment requirement—amendment No. 105—which will allow a person with the necessary experience, as well as one with the necessary qualifications, to direct drug treatment under that requirement. That is consistent with the drug rehabilitation requirement for adults in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
	Amendment No. 86 removes young offenders from the ambit of clause 12,which confers greater discretion on the judiciary's setting of a tariff when they are imposing an indeterminate sentence in exceptionally serious cases. Again, that point was raised by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome in Committee. I am happy to accommodate his suggestion.
	Four sets of amendments respond to the concerns of the Opposition and my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington, North. I commend those amendments to the House. There are other amendments in the group that Members may speak to. If required, I will respond to them in due course.

Sally Keeble: I am extremely grateful that we do not have an amendment removing secure training centres from the remit of the commissioner. I am also glad to hear that the use of two restraint holds—the double basket hold and nose distraction hold—has been suspended. That is a real improvement in the management of young offenders.

David Hanson: Again I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the way in which she has approached that issue. She will know that her suggestions are being seriously considered and taken on board.
	With that, I hope, consensual approach—the first of the day—I commend the Government new clauses, and I will respond on other amendments and new clauses in the group if required.

David Burrowes: I am pleased to be able to welcome to a certain extent the progress that we have made. It is good to know that 47 hours or so in Committee have not been wholly in vain. I will be able to go to my local courts, where I practise as a solicitor, and hold my head high to some extent when the people there try to battle with yet another piece of criminal justice legislation and ask me, "Why has there not been proper scrutiny and why did you not come to us to ask for advice?"
	There has been some progress. It is welcome that we have an opportunity, albeit limited by the constraints of time, to consider what is in many ways the essence of the Bill: the part 1 youth rehabilitation orders. Now we have a maelstrom of other new clauses and amendments, but at least we have an opportunity to consider on Report what is a significant part of the youth justice system.
	The essence of the concern, which is reflected in the progress made by the Government in response to amendments, was that there needs to be proper discretion for magistrates, judges and indeed practitioners dealing with youth rehabilitation orders and that we should not over-legislate. The concern was that there needs to be proper evidence when putting more legislation in the way of the courts.
	On the issue of discretion, it is welcome that the Government, through new clauses 4 and 5, have recognised the arguments advanced in Committee. New clause 10 is in many ways replicated by new clauses 4 and 5. In the context of other orders before youth courts, referral orders have been relatively successful with regard to reconviction rates, which are generally woeful in respect of young offenders. Forty-four per cent. of those subject to referral orders are reconvicted, whereas the figure is 70 or 80 per cent. for those in detention.
	There is a need to deal properly and flexibly, and with discretion, with young offenders when imposing referral orders. New clauses 4 and 5, by way of revocation and extension, provide that element of discretion which we sought in Committee. There are certainly cases where the offender comes back before the court having passed the time of the referral order and the referral order has not had an opportunity properly to commence. That can often be through no fault of the offender: the youth offending team may have had problems trying to gain the agreement of other agencies to commence the order. It is therefore welcome that there is that extension within new clauses 4 and 5 to allow time for the order to put the wishes of the court in place.
	There is a need, in welcoming the opportunity to improve the effectiveness of the referral orders, to question whether there should not be further discretion. New paragraph 9ZD(2), which is introduced by new clause 5, places some restrictions on the order in that the order must not so extend a period
	"as to cause it to exceed twelve months."
	I ask the Minister to explain why there is that limitation on the court's discretion, when it might be in the interests of justice to extend a referral order further. In such exceptional circumstances, why should magistrates be prevented from exceeding the 12-month contract period?
	There is a need for further discretion, and amendment No. 129 seeks to provide that in circumstances in which a referral order needs to be replicated. In 2004, the Government announced proposals for extending referral orders in a limited way and they gave the example that where the young person received a referral order at least two years before, there would be a case for limited extensions to referral orders. Now, however, in yet another criminal justice Bill, the Government have not remained true to those early intentions to provide the flexibility and discretion that they promised back in 2004. There may be cases where a young offender has complied with an earlier referral order, but the youth offending team, local probation team or social workers—as referred to in our amendment No. 129—recommends a further referral order because that is in the interests of the young offender concerned as it would prevent them from reoffending. Under the current provisions, there is not the capacity for such discretion or flexibility, which the youth offending team in particular would want to be put in place. If there is time, I would like the Minister to outline why the promise of 2004 has not been made good.
	Another area of scrutiny in Committee was to do with the concern that we should not go where we do not need to go—that there does not need to be legislation where there is no evidence that it is required. There is a body of opinion that we should look to use properly the existing powers of the court and of practitioners, to ensure that we do what we all wish to do: stop the young offender who is before the court committing further offences.
	Amendment No. 116 seeks to preserve what already exists. It seeks to allow decisions on breaches of youth rehabilitation orders to remain subject to national guidance and standards, and to allow the youth offending team to be able to treat issues of enforcement flexibly, rather than that being on a statutory footing. Questions were raised in Committee about the need to legislate in this area. Where is the evidence that the national standards are not working in relation to breaches and the requirement for cases to go before a court? Is there a need to put the enforcement of orders on a statutory footing? The consequences—perhaps unintended—of the provisions in the Bill could be that local discretion is removed. Young people, who do not often fit into bureaucratic boxes in relation to timeliness and understanding, could well be victims of such a statutory enforcement of the limits. There is a concern that a youth offending team dealing with enforcement would be obliged by statutory duty to return a matter to court rather than being able to deal with it flexibly and locally with full discretion. When the youth offending team wishes to issue warnings and initiate proceedings for breach, there would be a concern that a case would have to go to court, rather than the team being able to comply properly with national standards within proper limits.
	Amendments Nos. 117 and 118 seek to deal flexibly and with discretion with other areas. They seek to maintain the existing powers of the court when dealing with breaches of community service. There might be cases where there has been a third unacceptable failure to attend appointments within 12 months, when court proceedings would inevitably be initiated; even if the offender has successfully attended, for example, 95 per cent. of appointments, the position is that it would go to court. Under the Bill's provisions, the court would have to deal with the matter by way of an additional community penalty or other additional punishments.
	Courts often deal with cases by acknowledging that technical breaches have taken place. If a young offender wanted to comply with an order, the courts would not be able to deal with the matter as they do at present—by warning that offender to comply with the order. They would be obliged to impose an additional punishment, thus ratcheting up the punishment, which may not be in the interests of the offender and the public at large. The Bill precludes discretion, and I again invite the Minister to justify that.
	There is a third area on which I should comment: Government amendments Nos. 82, 83, 104, 106 and 107, which concern intoxicating substance treatment requirements. The Government have moved to plug the gap caused by the fact that there was no treatment requirement to deal with alcohol and other such issues, and I welcome that. I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Kettering (Mr. Hollobone) for having raised concerns about volatile substance abuse. This issue should be properly dealt with by way of the new substance treatment requirement.
	It was welcome to hear today, as was mentioned in Committee, that an issue of practice and deliverability must be addressed. We must consider how deliverable the youth rehabilitation orders are. There are grand aims to have activity requirements, supervision requirements, programme requirements, attendance centre requirements, prohibited activity requirements, curfew requirements, exclusion requirements, residence requirements, local authority residence requirements, mental health treatment requirements, drug treatment requirements, education requirements and now intoxicating substance treatment requirements, but is there the ability to deliver on them?
	The concern that the courts have expressed, including in evidence to us, is whether the resources are in place to meet those requirements. Let us focus primarily on these new intoxicating substance treatment requirements. Are the resources available to deliver? Should we not heed the words of the chief inspector of probation? He says that
	"resources have in practice still not kept pace with the increase in demands."
	As there are a raft of new requirements, we must ask whether there are the resources to deliver. The Government have responded that £600,000 is available for training requirements, but no resources have been provided to deal properly with these requirements.
	If one looks in detail at the treatment requirements, one finds that little resource is available to deal with adolescents who have alcohol problems. Country-wide, some 6 per cent. of the budget that is focused on drugs is apportioned to alcohol. Alcohol services are the Cinderella of treatment services. Tomorrow, we will find out the latest pooled treatment budget, which will be predominantly fixed around drugs services. Alcohol will be very much down the list, as will other intoxicating substances. Inevitably, we will be dependent on the voluntary sector, which helps to provide treatment for an estimated 17,000 adolescents. That treatment is often limited, and it certainly does not extend to what the Government set out in amendment No. 106. That provision proposes a new paragraph 23(A) to schedule 1. Sub-paragraph (3) is where one finds a reference to the treatment that would be required to give any reality to this order. It states:
	(a) "treatment as a resident in such institution or place as may be specified in the order, or
	(b) treatment as a non-resident at such institution or place".
	Where are these residential treatment places? Where are these day place treatment services? Middlegate Lodge is the only residential place for adolescents in the whole of the country that will be giving effect to this new intoxicating substance treatment requirement. That illustrates a concern that exists about the whole of part 1 of the Bill: that the resources will not be in place to deliver, and that increasingly the probation service and youth offending teams, whose resources are focused on managing prolific offenders, and dealing with public protection expectations and the serious end of offending, will not be able to deal with the other end of offending, as all our communities want them to do.
	Although part 1 has many worthy intentions and although it is commendable that the Government have moved to recognise flexibility and discretion, as well as introducing treatment requirements for intoxicating substances, the concern is that there will not be the resources to match those intentions and that we will see more promises with little in return. I would be interested to hear the Minister's response to those concerns, if there is time, and I commend the move that has taken place.

John McDonnell: I want to address new clause 18, which is tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard). I shall be brief, as we have less than two hours to deal with another 10 groups of amendments.
	We have tabled the new clause to place on record the concerns expressed by the Children's Rights Alliance for England, the National Association of Probation Officers and a number of organisations that are concerned about the increase in the number of antisocial behaviour orders used against children. When the original ASBO legislation was introduced, it was not envisaged that it would be used extensively as part of a system of youth justice or against children. The original guidance notes for the use of ASBOs specified that they would not be used against young people unless they committed antisocial behaviour in the company of adults. The new clause reminds the House of those original proposals.
	Since that time, more than half the ASBOs that have been applied have been applied to young people. There is an alarming breach rate of 60 per cent. Half those who breach their ASBOs wind up incarcerated as a result. We see example after example of tragic cases when ASBOs are used against young people with mental health problems—young people who suffer from autism, Tourette's syndrome or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and require help and support rather than ASBOs, which drag them into the criminal justice system and have a long-term effect on their standing in the community. I tabled the new clause to enable us to put those concerns on the record. I urge the Government to stand back and consider the growth and development in the use of ASBOs against children, as now is the time to do so. They should consider alternative approaches that are more effective and supportive than dragging those young people into the criminal justice system.

David Heath: The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) raises an important issue. He may be pleased to note that it was frequently echoed in Committee, not least by the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael), who was, of course, the progenitor of the ASBO. It was clear that ASBOs were not intended to be part of the youth justice apparatus, which they have mutated into. It is important to remind ourselves of that, because of the way in which they have been used.

John McDonnell: Is that not an example not necessarily of mission creep but of the legislative creep that will be displayed in future as a result of parts of the legislation?

David Heath: I could not agree more.
	The record of today's proceedings ought to show that Report stage started at 5.40 pm, when the Minister of State stood up and, for the first time, addressed what we had done in Committee and the Bill that left Committee as opposed to what the Government have decided to interpolate since. The ridiculous nature of today's timetable is highlighted by the fact that we have only now started to deal with part 1 and the proposals to deal with youth offending.

John Gummer: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that some of these matters deserve considerably greater discussion, which we cannot have because other subjects will come up later with which we will have to deal before this short timetable comes into operation? We will not, therefore, hear the answers to the important points put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr. Burrowes), because the Government will not have time to give them.

David Heath: The right hon. Gentleman is right. I have tabled a number of the amendments in this group and I intend to speak to them, as I believe that they raise important matters to do with youth justice. I apologise in advance to other hon. Members who are waiting their turn to speak on other groups, but discussion cannot be attenuated to accommodate an insufficient programme motion.
	I want to put forward various points suggested by the Standing Committee for Youth Justice, an organisation that has taken a considerable interest in the first part of the Bill, which deals with youth rehabilitation orders. At the outset, let me say that the Public Bill Committee generally supported those orders and the principles that underlie them, and that hon. Members saw them as a better focused alternative option. However, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr. Burrowes) expressed real concern that the necessary resources must be made available so that the orders could function as intended.
	I begin by thanking the Minister of State for what he said in his remarks opening the debate on this group of amendments. I note that Government amendments Nos. 82 and 83 respond directly to points raised by me and my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge in Committee, and by others on Second Reading. It must be right to add an intoxicating substance treatment requirement to the provisions, and I am grateful to the Minister for recognising as much.
	In addition, I welcome Government amendment No. 86, which effectively replaces my amendment No. 173 and limits the effect of tariffs for indeterminate sentences for people under 18 years of age. He promised me in Committee that he would look at the matter, and he has been as good as his word. I am grateful to him for that.
	I turn now to new clause 40. In the main, our discussions in Committee on this section of the Bill were extremely positive and sensible. I am grateful to all who contributed, and considerable expertise was brought to our deliberations. In particular, I should like to thank the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, who I thought made an excellent contribution.
	New clause 40 would ensure that a child or young person would not receive a detention or training order
	"unless he has previously received a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance".
	The aim is that the intensive supervision and surveillance option will operate in such a way as to ensure that custody for young people is the last option.
	That is an important point. When we were talking earlier about the overcrowding and other inadequacies of our prison system, I made the point that prison is very often ineffective in dealing with young people. It can be a very inappropriate disposal, and better options exist. We maintain that custody is the last resort for young offenders, and that courts should not use it as an earlier option.

David Davies: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that prison is so ineffective because very little in the way of rehabilitation, education or vocational training is done in most custody environments? All too often, the offender's human right to sit in his cell with his Playstation and colour TV is given priority over the need to furnish him with skills of the sort that just might make him a useful member of society on his release.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is well known for his antediluvian views. I do not think that they are shared by hon. Members on his own Front Bench, let alone in the rest of the House. My starting point always on matters of deterrence and rehabilitation is to ask, "What works?" I agree with the hon. Gentleman to the extent that prison can work for some people, as long as the proper requirements in terms of rehabilitation and education are met. But it is transparently the case that for many young people prison is not the best disposal if we want to deter them from future criminality. There is abundant evidence for that, and that is why most sensible people realise that putting children—the hon. Gentleman will start to chunter about that in a moment, because he thinks that they are yobs, as he said last time we had this discussion—in jail is not necessarily the answer.

David Davies: Will the hon. Gentleman give way again?

David Heath: No, I will not.
	New clause 40 tries to ensure that the ISS option is available and that custody is genuinely the last resort. The Government's view that the ISS option is only available for offences punishable with imprisonment and where the court is of the opinion that the offence was so serious that custody would otherwise have been appropriate is not a sufficient safeguard to ensure that it is used appropriately. If we are sensible about youth penal processes, we will prevent the unnecessary use of short custodial sentences that do not work. We will recognise that some young people are a danger to the public and therefore have to be kept in custody. The new clause provides a bypass for serious offences, but it would also make it clear in statute that custody should be the last resort—and it is time that that was done.
	Amendments Nos. 176, 210, 212 and 213 reflect a discussion that we had in Committee. The Standing Committee for Youth Justice made comments that I was happy to repeat to the Committee, welcoming the proposal in the Bill to introduce a youth version of the conditional caution. However, it expressed the concern that the provision would be extended only to young people aged 16 and 17, and there is indeed little logic in doing so. Children younger than 16 are coming to the attention of the criminal justice system more and more, and the youth conditional caution should be available for anybody over the age of 10 years, provided there are certain safeguards. The child should be able to understand the implications of the conditional caution, and that would require an adult to be present and able to explain it. That could be accommodated within the proposed code of practice. The Minister had at least a glimmer of sympathy for that view in Committee and suggested that he would at least consider extending the age range at a later stage. I cannot see any particular argument for not taking this opportunity to do so.
	The intention of amendments Nos. 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207 and 208 is to ensure that proceedings on a breach of a youth rehabilitation order commence in the youth court, rather than the Crown court. I do not want to repeat the debate that we had in Committee, but the youth court is especially well informed on the progress or otherwise of a youth rehabilitation order. It would be a misuse of the Crown court's time—which is a very expensive resource—to spend it unnecessarily on such proceedings. If proceedings start in the youth court, the amendments would allow them to move to the Crown court if it first applied the order. Allowing the youth court to start such proceedings would not undermine the ability or authority of the Crown court to deal with serious instances of non-compliance. It would also allow the young person to be sentenced rapidly and with some sensitivity, and that would be appropriate.
	Amendments Nos. 206 and 209 would preclude the court from imposing an intensive supervision and surveillance requirement, or a custodial sentence, for breach of a youth rehabilitation order in cases in which the original offence did not warrant custody, or was non-imprisonable. That is simply a case of ensuring that the final disposal is commensurate with the gravity of the original offence. It simply is not right that a minor offence should become an imprisonable offence by virtue of a breach of order, although the original offence was not of sufficient gravity to warrant that sentence. I ask the Minister to consider the value of those amendments.
	I now come to the two most important sets of amendments that I am proposing in this group. The first set is amendments Nos. 196 to 200, which would ensure that a child or young person was legally represented before a youth rehabilitation order was imposed. The Government have moved some way in that direction in the Bill; there is already a proposal for legal representation when a custodial sentence is effectively being imposed by means of a youth rehabilitation order. However, because serious restrictions are involved, and because the young person is making serious undertakings that must be clearly understood and that should be properly argued through before the court, legal representation is appropriate, as it would be in most other circumstances. The Minister said that he would reflect on debate on the issue and would consider the points made, where the lines were drawn, and compatibility with human rights legislation. I invite him to give me the results of his contemplation and to say whether he would be amenable to further amendment at a later stage.
	My last point is on new clause 42, which is on a matter of real principle. It has to do with custodial sentences for offenders aged under 18. It seeks to reintroduce the situation that pertained some years ago, when there was a statutory custody threshold that had to be met before a child was sentenced to custody. The aim is to ensure that children are locked up only as a last resort for reasons of public protection, except when a mandatory custodial sentence applies. The Minister quite properly told me when we discussed the matter in Committee that he did not think it appropriate to override the mandatory custodial sentence, in respect of the threshold, and I accept his advice on that. The new clause has therefore been reworded to except the mandatory custodial sentence, and to accept his view on such sentences for serious crimes.
	However, to go back to the point on which I started my contribution, it is appropriate that there should be a high threshold for custodial sentences for young people because short custodial sentences for children are shown not to be effective—far from it. They actually appear to encourage recidivism, and there are other disposals that are much more effective at deterring offending. That is the crucial point. We have far too many young people in our prisons. They are taking up valuable resources, to no effect. Given that the recidivism rate is so high for youth offenders, we have to question whether it is value for money, quite apart from anything else—

David Davies: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

David Heath: No, I will not. We have to question whether it is value for money to lock up young people if the result is that they offend more than they would have done if they had been dealt with by other means.
	That is why a great number of people believe that a proper custody threshold for young offenders is appropriate. We used to have it, it was abolished, and it is time that we reintroduced it. That would be consistent with the Government's policies—not just their policies introduced through the Ministry of Justice, but the policies represented by the Home Office strategy paper and the children's plan. The Minister told us in Committee that he is working closely with children's Ministers in order to formulate a revision of the strategy for dealing with young offenders. I hope that part of that strategy will be the sort of proposal that I have put before the House today.
	This is an extremely important matter for many people, both inside and outside the House. If the opportunity arises later, I intend to test the opinion of the House on new clause 42.

David Hanson: We have had a useful debate following my opening consensual acceptance of amendments that were tabled in Committee. We have relived part of the debate in Committee, which I am sure has been of interest to other Members who have come into the Chamber for the discussion of later parts of the Bill.
	I shall respond briefly to some of the topics that were raised. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr. Burrowes) mentioned amendment No. 129, which would allow a court to give a second referral order to an offender on the recommendation of a youth offending team, probation officer or social worker. As he knows, the referral order operates on a restorative justice principle, with offenders being required to face up to their responsibility for their actions and to make redress to their victim. It is currently restricted to first-time offenders who plead guilty. In the Bill we are seeking to allow a referral order to be available to those who plead guilty on a second conviction, where they have not received a referral order previously.
	It is a step too far to broaden that out to a second referral order. The hon. Gentleman raised the matter in Committee. What we must do is address the offending behaviour of the young person. If they have not gained from the original referral order process, it is right that the court should consider other sentences. It is important that we retain the integrity of the referral order, which achieves the lowest reconviction rate of any juvenile court-awarded sentence—44 per cent. I do not wish to undermine that, and I cannot accept the amendments that the hon. Gentleman tabled.
	In his welcome for the new clauses and amendments that I tabled to deal with substance misuse, the hon. Gentleman mentioned funding. All youth offending teams are funded to provide substance misuse workers to support screening, early intervention and referral to specialist services. There is also funding via the National Treatment Agency pooled treatment budget, to which the hon. Gentleman referred. Funding is sufficient to meet the needs of the order.
	The hon. Gentleman mentioned the work of the hon. Member for Kettering (Mr. Hollobone) on volatile substance misuse. I am pleased that he did so. In a former life I was involved in dealing with individuals who engaged in volatile substance misuse, and I welcome the fact that the generic examination of substance misuse will cover all aspects of that.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), on behalf of himself and my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), proposed that we remove the antisocial behaviour order as an option for agencies to tackle antisocial behaviour if the person is under the age of 18, unless it is also proposed to make an order on an adult co-perpetrator. I know that my hon. Friends feel strongly about the matter. They know that the main purpose of an ASBO is to protect victims, many of whom are young persons.
	In addition, ASBOs, especially when used with individual support orders, have proved very beneficial in helping young people to tackle their antisocial behaviour. This is not about criminalising young people; I want to do quite the opposite. I want to ensure that young people, via the ASBO, have a last opportunity to mend their ways before entering the criminal justice system proper. Without ASBOs, that option would not be available to agencies tasked with protecting local communities. They are an important option available for tackling antisocial behaviour. I understand why the amendments were tabled, but I am not able to accept them today. Our approach has been commended by the National Audit Office, as well as by the Home Affairs Committee, the Audit Commission and the Youth Justice Board, and it is important to ensure that we retain that part of our armoury, while if possible limiting its use.
	Amendments Nos. 116 to 120 replicate those tabled in Committee by the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and for Enfield, Southgate. We had a great deal of discussion on amendment No. 116, but I was not persuaded of its merits in Committee and I am not persuaded of its merits now.
	Amendments Nos. 206 and 209 will remove the power for a court to deal with a wilful and persistent breach of a youth rehabilitation order by imposing a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance or custody. It is essential to preserve the credibility of the YRO as a robust and meaningful community sentence.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome referred to new clauses 40 and 42, which seek to place further restrictions on the use of custody. Again, although I tried to adopt a spirit of co-operation, I cannot accept them and do not believe that they are necessary. There are sufficient safeguards in the Bill on providing a YRO with intensive supervision and surveillance or intensive fostering requirements as alternatives to custody, and in section 152 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 there are provisions in respect of limiting the use of custody. For similar reasons, I am also unable to accept new clause 42, which would raise the custody threshold to an unacceptably high level that may put the public at significant risk.
	The hon. Gentleman also referred to amendments Nos. 210 and 213 in seeking to determine whether it would be appropriate to extend the youth conditional caution to 10 to 15-year-olds. Again, there is a glimpse of light for him at the end of the tunnel on this matter, in that, as I explained in Committee, I have not ruled out considering extending conditional cautions to 10 to 15-year-olds. I want to look at the matter in more detail so I am unable to bring forward such proposals at the moment, but I hope that he will take me at my word when I say that we are looking at that in a serious and effective way.
	The hon. Gentleman also referred to amendments Nos. l96 to 200, which focused on legal representation for young people. I understand that a number of safeguards may already be in place to ensure that a youth will be granted publicly funded representation where necessary. I do not wish to extend the scope because it would damage and sideline the interest of justice test under the Access to Justice Act 1999. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will recall my letter to him of 27 October, which was a copy of a letter to the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir Nicholas Winterton) who was a Chairman of the Committee, in which I said that since 2 October 2006, defendants appearing before magistrates and youth courts have also been required to pass a financial eligibility test in order to qualify for publicly funded representation. I also stressed that the passporting provisions on age would be extended from 1 November 2007, which means that all defendants under the age of 18 will now be exempt from the means test. I hope that that helped the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome then and today.
	I have tried to answer some of the brief points in the discussion. I hope that the Government's new clauses and amendments will be accepted and that hon. Members will understand the points that I have made in response to their concerns.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5
	 — 
	Referral orders: extension of period for which young offender contract has effect

'(1) Part 3 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6) (mandatory and discretionary referral of young offenders) is amended as follows.
	(2) After section 27A (as inserted by section (Referral orders: power to revoke a referral order) above) insert—
	"27B Extension of period for which young offender contract has effect
	(1) This section applies where at any time—
	(a) a youth offender contract has taken effect under section 23 above for a period which is less than twelve months;
	(b) that period has not ended; and
	(c) having regard to circumstances which have arisen since the contract took effect, it appears to the youth offender panel to be in the interests of justice for the length of that period to be extended.
	(2) The panel may refer the offender back to the appropriate court requesting it to extend the length of that period.
	(3) The requested period of extension must not exceed three months."
	(3) In Schedule 1 (youth offender panels: further court proceedings), after Part 1 insert—

"Part 1ZA
	 — 
	Referral back to appropriate court: extension of period for which contract has effect

Introductory
	9ZB (1) This Part of this Schedule applies where a youth offender panel refers an offender back to the appropriate court under section 27B of this Act with a view to the court extending the period for which the offender's youth offender contract has effect.
	(2) For the purposes of this Part of this Schedule and that section the appropriate court is—
	(a) in the case of an offender aged under 18 at the time when (in pursuance of the referral back) the offender first appears before the court, a youth court acting in the local justice area in which it appears to the youth offender panel that the offender resides or will reside; and
	(b) otherwise, a magistrates' court (other than a youth court) acting in that area.
	 Mode of referral back to court
	9ZC The panel shall make the referral by sending a report to the appropriate court explaining why the offender is being referred back to it.
	 Power of court
	9ZD (1) If it appears to the appropriate court that it would be in the interests of justice to do so having regard to circumstances which have arisen since the contract took effect, the court may make an order extending the length of the period for which the contract has effect.
	(2) An order under sub-paragraph (1) above—
	(a) must not extend that period by more than three months; and
	(b) must not so extend that period as to cause it to exceed twelve months.
	(3) In deciding whether to make an order under sub-paragraph (1) above, the court shall have regard to the extent of the offender's compliance with the terms of the contract.
	(4) The court may not make an order under sub-paragraph (1) above unless—
	(a) the offender is present before it; and
	(b) the contract has effect at the time of the order.
	 Supplementary
	9ZE The following paragraphs of Part 1 of this Schedule apply for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule as they apply for the purposes of that Part—
	(a) paragraph 3 (bringing the offender before the court);
	(b) paragraph 4 (detention and remand of arrested offender); and
	(c) paragraph 9ZA (power to adjourn hearing and remand offender)."'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21
	 — 
	Delivery of prisoner to place abroad for purposes of transfer out of the United Kingdom

'In section 2(1) of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47) (transfer out of the UK), for subsection (1) substitute—
	"(1) The effect of a warrant under section 1 providing for the transfer of the prisoner out of the United Kingdom shall be to authorise—
	(a) the taking of the prisoner to any place in any part of the United Kingdom, his delivery at a place of departure from the United Kingdom into the custody of an appropriate person and his removal by that person from the United Kingdom to a place outside the United Kingdom; or
	(b) the taking of the prisoner to any place in any part of the United Kingdom, his removal from the United Kingdom and his delivery, at the place of arrival from the United Kingdom, into the custody of an appropriate person.
	(1A) In subsection (1) "appropriate person" means a person representing the appropriate authority of the country or territory to which the prisoner is to be transferred."'.— [Mr. Hanson.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

David Hanson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 22— Issue of warrant transferring responsibility for detention and release of an offender to or from the relevant Minister.
	Government new clause 23— Powers to arrest and detain persons believed to fall within section 4A(3) of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984.
	Government new clause 24— Amendments relating to Scotland.
	Government amendments Nos. 144 to 155.

David Hanson: The Government have previously announced their intention to ratify the additional protocol to the Council of Europe convention on the transfer of sentenced persons. The protocol provides for the transfer of prisoners subject to a deportation order to the state to which they would ultimately be deported for the purpose of the continued enforcement of the sentence there. The prisoners' consent is not required. The protocol also provides for the transfer of responsibility for the enforcement of a sentence when a serving prisoner has fled from one jurisdiction to another to avoid the consequences of imprisonment.
	The United Kingdom has sufficient legislation in place to enable a prisoner to be transferred without his consent when a deportation order has been issued. However, existing legislation is not sufficient to provide for the transfer of responsibility for the continued enforcement of a sentence when no physical transfer of the prisoner takes place. The new clauses in this group and the related consequential amendments seek to rectify that omission and pave the way for the ratification of the additional protocol. I commend them to the House.

Edward Garnier: The Minister did not tell us that the amendment paper contains brand new additions to the Bill. They have not been discussed in Committee, but just plonked into the amendment paper in the past few days. They go from page 252 to 260. Hon. Members may or may not think that the provisions are more or less uncontroversial, but they are not negligible additions to the Bill.

Bob Spink: I have been reading the relevant parts of the amendment paper and I find them absolutely impenetrable. In some of the text, there is confusion between the relevant Minister and the appropriate authority. New clause 22(6)(b) refers to:
	"the relevant Minister...having regard to any close ties which that person has with the United Kingdom."
	We do not want such ties to override the interests of the UK in ensuring that undesirable or even dangerous people do not come to and stay in this country. Will my hon. and learned Friend consider that point carefully before we decide whether to accept those amendments, which have been dropped on us?

Edward Garnier: It is good of my hon. Friend to invite me to consider that issue; I have been having a careful look at it for a few hours, as I have been sitting in the Chamber. He picks up a perfectly legitimate concern; we do not really know, and the Minister did not tell us, what the definition of
	"close ties...with the United Kingdom"
	might be. One is immediately brought in mind of the Chindamo case. Although the teenager who murdered the headmaster Philip Lawrence is not a British citizen, the courts have held that he has, for one reason or another, close ties with this country and therefore is not susceptible to deportation. I do not want to argue the merits or demerits of that particular court decision, but it illustrates the point that my hon. Friend draws to our attention. I do not propose to have a vote on these new clauses, not because I do not think it proper to do so, but simply because there is not time.

Jeremy Corbyn: Like the hon. and learned Gentleman, I am slightly confused by the volume of amendments that have been put before us. From his studies, is he aware of any danger that may be implicit in the amendments of undermining international treaty obligations such as conventions on torture or other such obligations, in the same way as protocol agreements between the British Government and some of the Governments in north Africa and the middle east have undermined the conventions on torture?

Edward Garnier: The conventions on torture to which this country is party exist, and we should comply with them irrespective of legislation that this Government may or may not thrust upon us. Unless a measure such as that which we are considering expressly dissociates this country from a convention, that convention should be adhered to. The memorandums of understanding that the Government have entered into with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Libya and, possibly, Syria—I am not quite sure, but a number of middle eastern countries are involved—have proved to be rather ineffective, as they have not necessarily been accepted as workable by the courts when they have been tested. I may be corrected on that; I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has followed the detail of their progress more closely than I have.
	It is important that these measures are properly understood as regards the transfer of foreign national prisoners from our prisons back to their home states. We have 11,300 or so foreign national prisoners in our prisons; from our point of view, that is 11,300 places that should be freed up for use by English, or British, prisoners who can be imprisoned closer to their families, homes, jobs and communities, while the foreign national prisoners can be imprisoned closer to their families and so on. The problem that we face is that the Government, while arranging for these people to go to prison, have failed to make proper arrangements for their repatriation once they have completed their sentences. As a result, the Government have had to re-role HMP Canterbury and HMP Bulwood Hall as being dedicated entirely to the purpose of dealing with foreign national prisoners awaiting deportation, some of whom have been waiting well beyond their official release date. That is yet another example of the incompetence of this Government's management of the prison estate.
	The hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) will be concerned particularly about matters such as unlawful rendition—the taking of individuals from one jurisdiction to another, some of whom may have come via this jurisdiction on their way to Guantanamo Bay and other interesting places. The new clauses do not deal precisely with that issue, but they remind us that it is an important one to bear in mind, and one that we should keep a careful eye on.
	The Minister told us that the new clauses are designed to bring us into compliance with other existing international obligations. We do not have time to discover from him in any detail what those international obligations are and where they are to be found, so on this occasion we will just have to take his word for it. In normal circumstances, I would be happy to take his word without question, but I enter a note of scepticism into my voice because these new clauses have been sprung on us in the past few days.
	It is a pity that some other aspects have not been available for further discussion, such as new clause 11, which deals with extradition. We had a brief debate about it in Committee, but unfortunately it has not been selected for discussion this afternoon. None the less, I urge hon. and right hon. Members who are concerned about the unbalanced arrangements we have with the United States of America to look at new clause 11.
	That having been said, I bring my remarks to an end. I remind the House of my complaint about the way in which the Bill has been constructed. This is yet another example of the cack-handed legislative doodling that the Government seem to have entered into. I trust that at some stage the House of Lords will have the opportunity to deconstruct the Bill and turn it into something resembling a proper Act of Parliament.

David Howarth: I would simply like to add my own concern about the late tabling of such lengthy and complex provisions. I accept what the Minister says about the need to bring this country into line with its international obligations, and the Government are obviously taking the opportunity to do so, but I echo the concern of the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) about the relationship between this Bill and other international obligations. I should like the Minister to put it on the record that it is not the Government's intention to supersede any other international obligations. The provisions should be implemented subject to those other obligations.
	I shall mention only two other matters. First, I would like to respond to the point made by the hon. Member for Castle Point (Bob Spink) and remind the House that we are dealing with international obligations where reciprocity is the order of the day. It is impossible for this country to give itself rights and powers in such a field that it is unwilling to allow other countries to have. When the hon. Gentleman talks about the treatment of British citizens abroad and their being brought back to this country and raises the question of connection, he has to admit that other countries will apply the same rule about citizenship and connection. Such an arrangement has to have the best rules for all countries. It is unreasonable to expect this country to be given special privilege in international law, which is a theme that I might have expanded upon at great length were there an opportunity to do so.
	My other point concerns why it is necessary for there to be a provision in proposed new section 4C(6) in new clause 122 that specifically says that there is no
	"right of appeal on the relevant person against provisions contained"
	in previous subsections. I have two things to say about that. First, if there is no right of appeal, there will presumably still be a right to judicial review. The other, rather more obvious point is that, if it is necessary to say that there is no right of appeal every time someone is mentioned in legislation and no mechanism is set up to provide for appeals, the implication is that there is a right of appeal when such wording does not appear. It is not entirely obvious why a right of appeal has been withdrawn in this Bill.
	Subject to a response to those queries, and to the protest about the amount of time allowed for proper scrutiny of the provisions, I see no great objection to them.

Jeremy Corbyn: I will be very brief. I would like the Minister to deal with four points when he responds. First, why has such a huge volume of new clauses and proposals been put before the House? They have not been debated in Committee and, because of the timetabling, they are subject to extremely curtailed debate in this place.
	Secondly, treaty obligations, which I mentioned in an intervention on the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier), concern me greatly. When the previous Prime Minister exchanged a series of letters with several countries in the middle east and north Africa to allow terrorist suspects to be sent back to them, it undermined, in my view, the principle behind international treaty obligations, especially the treaty on torture. I should therefore like the Minister to assure the House that nothing in the amendments would continue that practice. I hope that the Government's policy will be, in future, to return prisoners only to countries that are, like us, signatories to international conventions on basic human rights, such as those on torture and people's treatment.
	Thirdly, the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) made an important point about reciprocity. Many of us have constituents who have unfortunately been arrested, charged and convicted abroad and are serving sentences abroad. Many of us have made representations to try to get those prisoners returned to this country to complete their sentences here. I wholly support that process. I, like, I imagine, many other hon. Members, have made representations on behalf of constituents in that position so that they can return and get the family support and rehabilitation that is necessary before release.
	I am worried that we might send prisoners to another jurisdiction where prison conditions are far worse than those in this country, where they could be subject to ill treatment, which they would not receive here, and where they may not have anything like similar rights. I would therefore be happier if we sent prisoners only to countries where there was a reciprocal agreement. In many cases, there is no reciprocal agreement. I would have thought that the principle should be to encourage reciprocity between jurisdictions, which would ensure at least some equality of standards.
	The hon. Member for Cambridge also made a point about the lack of an appeal against decisions. Surely it is basic natural justice that, if somebody who has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to prison in this country, where the sentence is passed, is then to be removed to another jurisdiction, where they may be subject to charges that would not apply in an English or British court, they should at least have an opportunity to appeal against the decision.
	I repeat that I am concerned that so many new clauses, which would make serious procedural changes, are suddenly dumped on us, with no scrutiny in Committee. The only people who will get a chance to examine them are their lordships. We will consider them only if the Lords decides to amend the measure and it returns. That is an unsatisfactory way of undertaking major legislative changes that may affect many people's rights.

David Hanson: The key point is that the purpose of the amendments is to support the Government's belief that, when possible, foreign national prisoners should serve their sentences in their home countries. I also believe that prisoners who are to be deported at the end of their sentence should, if possible, be transferred while still serving it.
	The issue is important because, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) said, some 11,211 foreign national prisoners were in jails in England and Wales as of 30 September. That is perhaps balanced in some way by the 2,500 British nationals who were held in prisons abroad as of 30 September.
	Hon. Members made several points, to which I shall try to respond. First, the hon. and learned Member for Harborough asked what "close ties" meant. The phrase, "close ties" mirrors existing provision in the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 and means, for example, the right of residence in the United Kingdom, or having close family here—some of the foreign national prisoners who might be subject to deportation or transfer might have lived here for many years and be parents of children born here. A number of issues are clearly defined in the Repatriation of Prisoners Act.
	In relation to the hon. Member for Cambridge's point about the lack of a right of appeal in proposed new section 4C(6), that provision is inserted simply for consistency with other provisions in the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984. He is correct that that is still subject to potential judicial review, if appropriate, but again, the provisions mirror those of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) and the hon. Member for Cambridge mentioned international obligations. I give them the commitment that we will maintain our international obligations in relation to such issues. It is important that we uphold those standards, and those obligations will be met within the framework that I have outlined today.
	As my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North mentioned, the amendments also allow the UK to ratify the additional protocol to the Council of Europe convention, so that transfer may take place only to countries that have signed the protocol. I hope that he will welcome that safeguard.
	I can only apologise, in a sense, for the extensive content of the new clauses, and for the time that the House has to debate them. They are significant issues, but as I mentioned in my opening remarks, I wished to bring them forward to ensure that the UK has sufficient legislation to ensure the transfer of responsibility for the continuing enforcement of a sentence when no physical transfer of the prisoner can take place.

Jeremy Corbyn: I thank the Minister for the assurance that he has just given. Is he in a position to say what negotiations are taking place with other countries that hold British nationals at present, and with which no normal repatriation agreement exists? Is his Department actively seeking reciprocity, so that we end up with better rights all round, and a better standard of treatment of people all round?

David Hanson: Currently, the UK has transfer agreements with approximately 100 countries, ranging from Albania, Andorra and Armenia through to Latvia, Korea, Japan, Italy, Tonga, Trinidad, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. In addition, a significant number of countries have ratified the protocol, and we are working to extend that to territories where the prison transfer agreement has been extended. We have recently signed transfer agreements with a number of other countries—such as Jamaica, in August last year—and I want additional transfer agreements to be put in place. At official level, we are continuing to try to do that on a regular basis. I commend the new clauses and amendments to the House.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22
	 — 
	Issue of warrant transferring responsibility for detention and release of an offender to or from the relevant Minister

'After section 4 of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47) (transfer into the United Kingdom) insert—

"Transfer of responsibility for detention and release of offender present outside the country or territory in which he is required to be detained

4A Issue of warrant transferring responsibility for detention and release of offender
	(1) This section enables responsibility for the detention and release of a person to whom subsection (2) or (3) applies to be transferred between the relevant Minister in the United Kingdom and the appropriate authority in a country or territory outside the British Islands.
	(2) A person falls within this subsection if that person—
	(a) is a person to whom section 1(7) applies by virtue of—
	(i) an order made in the course of the exercise by a court or tribunal in any part of the United Kingdom of its criminal jurisdiction; or
	(ii) any of the provisions of this Act or any similar provisions of the law of any part of the United Kingdom; and
	(b) is present in a country or territory outside the British Islands.
	(3) A person falls within this subsection if that person—
	(a) is a person to whom section 1(7) applies by virtue of —
	(i) an order made in the course of the exercise by a court or tribunal in a country or territory outside the British Islands of its criminal jurisdiction; or
	(ii) any provisions of the law of such a country or territory which are similar to any of the provisions of this Act; and
	(b) is present in the United Kingdom.
	(4) Terms used in subsection (2)(a) and (3)(a) have the same meaning as in section 1(7).
	(5) Subject to the following provisions of this section, where—
	(a) the United Kingdom is a party to international arrangements providing for the transfer between the United Kingdom and a country or territory outside the British Islands of responsibility for the detention and release of persons to whom subsection (2) or (3) applies,
	(b) the relevant Minister and the appropriate authority of that country or territory have each agreed to the transfer under those arrangements of responsibility for the detention and release of a particular person to whom subsection (2) or (3) applies (in this Act referred to as "the relevant person"), and
	(c) in a case in which the terms of those arrangements provide for the transfer of responsibility to take place only with the relevant person's consent, that consent has been given,
	the relevant Minister shall issue a warrant providing for the transfer of responsibility for the detention and release of the relevant person from that Minister (where subsection (2) applies) or to that Minister (where subsection (3) applies).
	(6) The relevant Minister shall not issue a warrant under this section providing for the transfer of responsibility for the detention and release of a person to the relevant Minister unless—
	(a) that person is a British citizen;
	(b) the transfer appears to the relevant Minister to be appropriate having regard to any close ties which that person has with the United Kingdom.
	(7) The relevant Minister shall not issue a warrant under this section where, after the duty in subsection (5) has arisen, circumstances arise or are brought to his attention which in his opinion make it inappropriate that the transfer of responsibility should take place.
	(8) The relevant Minister shall not issue a warrant under this section (other than one superseding an earlier warrant) unless he is satisfied that all reasonable steps have been taken to inform the relevant person in writing in his own language—
	(a) of the substance, so far as relevant to the case, of the international arrangements in accordance with which it is proposed to transfer responsibility for his detention and release;
	(b) of the effect in relation to the relevant person of the warrant which it is proposed to issue under this section;
	(c) in the case of a person to whom subsection (2) applies, of the effect in relation to his case of so much of the law of the country or territory concerned as has effect with respect to transfers under those arrangements of responsibility for his detention and release;
	(d) in the case of a person to whom subsection (3) applies, of the effect in relation to his case of the law relating to his detention under that warrant and subsequent release (including the effect of any enactment or instrument under which he may be released earlier than provided for by the terms of the warrant); and
	(e) of the powers of the relevant Minister under section 6;
	and the relevant Minister shall not issue a warrant superseding an earlier warrant under this section unless the requirements of this subsection were fulfilled in relation to the earlier warrant.
	(9) A consent given for the purposes of subsection (5)(c) shall not be capable of being withdrawn after a warrant under this section has been issued in respect of the relevant person; and, accordingly, a purported withdrawal of that consent after that time shall not affect the validity of the warrant, or of any provision which by virtue of section 6 subsequently supersedes provisions of that warrant, or of any direction given in relation to the prisoner under section 4B(3).
	(10) In this section "relevant Minister" means—
	(a) the Scottish Ministers in a case where the person who is the subject of the proposed transfer of responsibility is—
	(i) a person to whom subsection (2) applies who is for the time being required to be detained at a place in Scotland; or
	(ii) a person to whom subsection (3) applies, if it is proposed that he will be detained at a place in Scotland;
	(b) the Secretary of State, in any other case.
	4B Transfer of responsibility from the United Kingdom
	(1) The effect of a warrant under section 4A relating to a person to whom subsection (2) of that section applies shall be to transfer responsibility for the detention and release of that person from the relevant Minister (as defined in section 4A(10)) to the appropriate authority of the country or territory in which he is present.
	(2) Subject to subsections (3) to (6), the order by virtue of which the relevant person is required to be detained at the time such a warrant is issued in respect of him shall continue to have effect after the transfer of responsibility so as to apply to him if he comes to be in the United Kingdom at any time when under that order he is to be, or may be, detained.
	(3) If, at any time after the transfer of responsibility, it appears to the relevant Minister appropriate to do so in order that effect may be given to the international arrangements in accordance with which the transfer took place, the relevant Minister may give a direction—
	(a) varying the order referred to in subsection (2); or
	(b) providing for the order to cease to have effect.
	(4) In subsection (3) "relevant Minister" means—
	(a) the Scottish Ministers, where Scotland is the part of the United Kingdom in which the order referred to in subsection (2) has effect; and
	(b) the Secretary of State in any other case.
	(5) The power by direction under subsection (3) to vary the order referred to in subsection (2) includes power by direction—
	(a) to provide for how any period during which the detention and release of the relevant person is, by virtue of a warrant under section 4A, the responsibility of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom is to be treated for the purposes of the order; and
	(b) to provide for the relevant person to be treated as having been released or discharged as mentioned in any paragraph of section 2(4)(b).
	(6) Except in relation to any period during which a restriction order is in force in respect of the relevant person, subsection (2) shall not apply in relation to a hospital order; and, accordingly, a hospital order shall cease to have effect in relation to that person—
	(a) at the time of the transfer of responsibility, if no restriction order is in force in respect of him at that time; and
	(b) if at that time a restriction order is in force in respect of him, as soon after the transfer of responsibility as the restriction order ceases to have effect.
	(7) In subsection (6) "hospital order" and "restriction order" have the same meaning as in section 2(6).
	(8) References in this section to the order by virtue of which a person is required to be detained at the time a warrant under section 4A is issued in respect of him include references to any order by virtue of which he is required to be detained after the order by virtue of which he is required to be detained at that time ceases to have effect.
	4C Transfer of responsibility to the United Kingdom
	(1) The effect of a warrant under section 4A relating to a person to whom subsection (3) of that section applies shall be to transfer responsibility for the detention and release of that person to the relevant Minister (as defined in section 4A(10)) and to authorise—
	(a) the taking of that person in custody to such place in any part of the United Kingdom as may be specified in the warrant, being a place at which effect may be given to the provisions contained in the warrant by virtue of paragraph (b); and
	(b) the detention of that person in any part of the United Kingdom in accordance with such provisions as may be contained in the warrant, being provisions appearing to the relevant Minister to be appropriate for giving effect to the international arrangements in accordance with which responsibility for that person is transferred.
	(2) A provision shall not be contained by virtue of subsection (1)(b) in a warrant under section 4A unless it satisfies the following two conditions, that is to say—
	(a) it is a provision with respect to the detention of a person in a prison, a hospital or any other institution; and
	(b) it is a provision which at the time the warrant is issued may be contained in an order made either—
	(i) in the course of the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction by a court in the part of the United Kingdom in which the person is to be detained; or
	(ii) otherwise than by a court but for the purpose of giving effect to an order made as mentioned in sub-paragraph (i).
	(3) Section 3(3) applies for determining for the purposes of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) above what provisions are appropriate for giving effect to the international arrangements mentioned in that paragraph in a relevant person's case as it applies for the purposes of section 3(1)(c) in the case of a prisoner who is to be transferred into the United Kingdom.
	(4) Subject to subsection (6) and Part 2 of the Schedule to this Act, a provision contained by virtue of subsection (1)(b) in a warrant under section 4A shall for all purposes have the same effect as the same provision contained in an order made as mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) or, as the case may be, sub-paragraph (ii) of subsection (2)(b).
	(5) A provision contained by virtue of subsection (1)(b) in a warrant under section 4A shall take effect with the delivery of the relevant person to the place specified in the warrant for the purposes of subsection (1)(a).
	(6) Subsection (4) shall not confer any right of appeal on the relevant person against provisions contained by virtue of subsection (1)(b) in a warrant under this section.
	(7) Part 2 of the Schedule to this Act shall have effect with respect to the operation of certain enactments in relation to provisions contained by virtue of subsection (1)(b) in a warrant under section 4A.
	(8) For the purposes of determining whether at any particular time any such order as is mentioned in subsection (2)(b) could have been made as so mentioned, there shall be disregarded both—
	(a) any requirement that certain conditions must be satisfied before the order is made; and
	(b) any restriction on the minimum period in respect of which the order may be made."'.— [ Ms Diana R. Johnson .]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 23
	 — 
	Powers to arrest and detain persons believed to fall within section 4A(3) of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984

'After section 4C of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47) (as inserted by section (Issue of warrant transferring responsibility for detention and release of an offender to or from the relevant Minister)) insert—

"Persons believed to fall within section 4A(3): powers of arrest and detention

4D Arrest and detention with a view to establishing whether a person falls within section 4A(3) etc.
	(1) The Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers may issue a certificate stating that the issuing authority—
	(a) considers that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person in the United Kingdom is a person falling within section 4A(3), and
	(b) has requested written confirmation from the country or territory concerned of the details of that person's case.
	(2) The issuing authority may send the certificate (with any other documents appearing to the authority to be relevant) to the appropriate judge with a view to obtaining the issue of a warrant under subsection (3).
	(3) The appropriate judge may, on receiving the certificate, issue a warrant for the arrest of the person concerned if the judge is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person falls within section 4A(3).
	(4) The warrant may be executed anywhere in the United Kingdom by any designated person (and it is immaterial whether or not he is in possession of the warrant or a copy of it).
	(5) A person arrested under this section shall, as soon as is practicable—
	(a) be given a copy of the warrant for his arrest; and
	(b) be brought before the appropriate judge.
	(6) The appropriate judge may order that a person before him who is the subject of a certificate under this section is to be detained from the time the order is made until the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day after that on which the order is made.
	(7) The purpose of an order under subsection (6) is to secure the detention of the person concerned while—
	(a) written confirmation is obtained from a representative of the country or territory concerned of the details of his case;
	(b) it is established whether he is a person falling within section 4A(3); and
	(c) any application for an order under section 4E(6) is made in respect of him.
	(8) Subject to subsection (9), a person detained under such an order may be released at any time during the period mentioned in subsection (6) and shall be released at the end of that period (if not released sooner).
	(9) Subsection (8) ceases to apply to the detained person if, during that period, an order under section 4E is made in respect of him.
	(10) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (6) whether or not the person concerned has previously been arrested under this section.
	4E Arrest and detention with a view to determining whether to issue a warrant under section 4A
	(1) The Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers may issue a certificate stating that the issuing authority—
	(a) considers that a person in the United Kingdom is a person falling within section 4A(3), and
	(b) has received written confirmation from a representative of the country or territory concerned of the details of that person's case;
	and it is immaterial for the purposes of this section whether or not the person concerned has been previously arrested or detained under section 4D.
	(2) The issuing authority may send the certificate (with a copy of the written confirmation mentioned in subsection (1)(b) and any other documents appearing to that authority to be relevant) to the appropriate judge with a view to obtaining the issue of a warrant under subsection (3).
	(3) The appropriate judge may, on receiving the certificate, issue a warrant for the arrest of the person concerned if the judge is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person falls within section 4A(3).
	(4) The warrant may be executed anywhere in the United Kingdom by any designated person (and it is immaterial whether or not that person is in possession of the warrant or a copy of it).
	(5) A person arrested under this section shall, as soon as is practicable—
	(a) be given a copy of the warrant for his arrest; and
	(b) be brought before the appropriate judge.
	(6) The appropriate judge may, on the application of the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers, order that a person before the judge who—
	(a) is the subject of a certificate under this section, and
	(b) the judge is satisfied is a person falling within section 4A(3),
	shall be detained from the time the order is made until the end of the period of fourteen days beginning with the day after that on which the order is made.
	(7) The purpose of an order under subsection (6) is to secure the detention of the person concerned until—
	(a) it is determined whether to issue a warrant under section 4A; and
	(b) if so determined, such a warrant is issued.
	(8) Subject to subsection (9), a person detained under such an order may be released at any time during the period mentioned in subsection (6) and shall be released at the end of that period (if not released sooner).
	(9) Subsection (8) ceases to apply to the detained person if, during that period, a warrant under section 4A is issued in respect of him.
	(10) It is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (6) whether or not the person concerned has previously been arrested or detained under section 4D or arrested under this section.
	4F Sections 4D and 4E: supplementary provisions
	(1) This section has effect for the purposes of sections 4D and 4E.
	(2) A "designated person" is a person designated by the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers.
	(3) The appropriate judge is—
	(a) in England and Wales, any District Judge (Magistrates' Courts) who is designated for those purposes by the Lord Chief Justice after consulting the Lord Chancellor;
	(b) in Scotland, the sheriff of Lothian and Borders; and
	(c) in Northern Ireland, any county court judge or resident magistrate who is designated for those purposes by the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland after consulting the Lord Chancellor.
	(4) A designation under subsection (2) or (3)(a) or (c) may be made—
	(a) for the purposes of section 4D or 4E (or both); and
	(b) for all cases or only for cases (or cases of a description) specified in the designation.
	(5) A designated person shall have all the powers, authority, protection and privileges of a constable in any part of the United Kingdom in which a person who may be arrested under section 4D or 4E is for the time being."'.— [ Ms Diana R. Johnson .]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 24
	 — 
	Amendments relating to Scotland

'(1) The amendments of section 1 of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47) made by section 44(2) and (3) of the Police and Justice Act 2006 (c.48) (which amend the requirement for the prisoner's consent to any transfer to or from the United Kingdom) apply in relation to cases in which the relevant Minister for the purposes of section 1 is the Scottish Ministers as they apply in other cases.
	(2) In section 2(6) of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47) (transfer out of the United Kingdom) in the definition of "hospital order", after "1986" insert "or a compulsion order under section 57A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995".
	(3) In section 8(1) (interpretation etc.), before the definition of "international arrangements" insert—
	"enactment" includes an enactment comprised in, or in an instrument under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament."'.— [ Ms Diana R. Johnson .]
	 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1
	 — 
	Blasphemy

'The offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel are abolished.'.— [Dr. Evan Harris.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Evan Harris: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	New clause 14— Hatred against persons on transgender grounds—
	'The Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64) is amended in accordance with Schedule  [Hatred against persons on transgender grounds] to this Act, which creates offences involving stirring up hatred against persons on transgender grounds.'.
	New clause 15— Increase in sentences for aggravation related to transgender—
	'The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) is amended in accordance with Schedule  [Increases in sentences for aggravation related to transgender] to this Act, which creates increased tariffs where offences are on transgender grounds.'.
	New clause 16— Amendment of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—
	'In section 24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (c. 60) (arrest without warrant by persons other than constables) in subsection (5) leave out from 'or' to end and insert ', 3A or 3B of the Public Order Act 1986.'.
	New schedule 1— 'Hatred against persons on transgender grounds—
	In the Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64), after Part 3A insert—

"Part 3B
	 — 
	Hatred against persons on transgender grounds

Meaning of "transgender hatred"
	29P Meaning of "transgender hatred"
	In this Part "transgender hatred" means hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to transgender identity or appearance.
	 Acts intended to stir up transgender hatred
	29Q Use of words or behaviour or display or written material
	(1) A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, is guilty of an offence if—
	(a) he intends thereby to stir up transgender hatred, or
	(b) having regard to all the circumstances transgender hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.
	(2) An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the written material is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and are not heard or seen except by other persons in that or another dwelling.
	(3) A constable may arrest without warrant anyone he reasonably suspects is committing an offence under this section.
	(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for the accused to prove that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour used, or the written material displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other dwelling.
	(5) This section does not apply to words or behaviour used, or written material displayed, solely for the purpose of being included in a programme service.
	29R Publishing or distributing written material
	(1) A person who publishes or distributes written material which is threatening is guilty of an offence if—
	(a) he intends thereby to stir up transgender hatred, or
	(b) having regard to all the circumstances transgender hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.
	(2) References in this Part to the publication or distribution of written material are to its publication or distribution to the public or a section of the public.
	29S Public performance of play
	(1) If a public performance of a play is given which involves the use of threatening words or behaviour, any person who presents or directs the performance is guilty of an offence if—
	(a) he intends thereby to stir up transgender hatred, or
	(b) having regard to all the circumstances (and, in particular, taking the performance as a whole) transgender hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.
	(2) This section does not apply to a performance given solely or primarily for one or more of the following purposes—
	(a) rehearsal,
	(b) making a recording of the performance, or
	(c) enabling the performance to be included in a programme service;
	but if it is proved that the performance was attended by persons other than those directly connected with the giving of the performance or the doing in relation to it of the things mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c), the performance shall, unless the contrary is shown, be taken not to have been given solely or primarily for the purpose mentioned above.
	(3) For the purposes of this section—
	(a) a person shall not be treated as presenting a performance of a play by reason only of his taking part in it as a performer,
	(b) a person taking part as a performer in a performance directed by another shall be treated as a person who directed the performance if without reasonable excuse he performs otherwise than in accordance with that person's direction, and
	(c) a person shall be taken to have directed a performance of a play given under his direction notwithstanding that he was not present during the performance;
	and a person shall not be treated as aiding or abetting the commission of an offence under this section by reason only of his taking part in a performance as a performer.
	(4) In this section "play" and "public performance" have the same meaning as in the Theatres Act 1968.
	(5) The following provisions of the Theatres Act 1968 apply in relation to an offence under this section as they apply to an offence under section 2 of that Act—
	(a) section 9 (script as evidence of what was performed),
	(b) section 10 (power to make copies of script),
	(c) section 15 (powers of entry and inspection).
	29T Distributing, showing or playing a recording
	(1) A person who distributes, or shows or plays, a recording of visual images or sounds which are threatening is guilty of an offence if—
	(a) he intends thereby to stir up transgender hatred, or
	(b) having regard to all the circumstances transgender hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.
	(2) In this Part "recording" means any record from which visual images or sounds may, by any means, be reproduced; and references to the distribution, showing or playing of a recording are to its distribution, showing or playing to the public or a section of the public.
	(3) This section does not apply to the showing or playing of a recording solely for the purpose of enabling the recording to be included in a programme service.
	29U Broadcasting or including programme in programme service
	(1) If a programme involving threatening visual images or sounds is included in a programme service, each of the persons mentioned in subsection (2) is guilty of an offence if—
	(a) he intends thereby to stir up transgender hatred, or
	(b) having regard to all the circumstances transgender hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.
	(2) The persons are—
	(a) the person providing the programme service,
	(b) any person by whom the programme is produced or directed, and
	(c) any person by whom offending words or behaviours are used.
	 Inflammatory material
	29V Possession of inflammatory material
	(1) A person who has in his possession written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting, or a recording of visual images or sounds which are threatening, abusive or insulting, with a view to—
	(a) in the case of written material, its being displayed, published, distributed, or included in a programme service whether by himself or another, or
	(b) in the case of a recording, its being distributed, shown, played, or included in a programme service, whether by himself or another,
	is guilty of an offence if he intends transgender hatred to be stirred up thereby or, having regard to all the circumstances, transgender hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.
	(2) For this purpose regard shall be had to such display, publication, distribution, showing, playing, or inclusion in a programme service as he has, or it may reasonably be inferred that he has, in view.
	29W Powers of entry and search
	(1) If in England and Wales a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath laid by a constable that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has possession of written materials or a recording in contravention of section 29V, the justice may issue a warrant under his hand authorising any constable to enter and search the premises where it is suspected the material or recording is situated.
	(2) If in Scotland a sheriff or justice of the peace is satisfied by evidence on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person has possession of written material or a recording in contravention of section 29V, the sheriff or justice may issue a warrant authorising any constable to enter and search the premises where it is suspected the material or recording is situated.
	(3) A constable entering or searching premises in pursuance of a warrant issued under this section may use reasonable force if necessary.
	(4) In this section "premises" means any place and, in particular, includes—
	(a) any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or hovercraft,
	(b) any offshore installation as defined in section 12 of the Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971, and
	(c) any tent or movable structure.
	29X Power to order forfeiture
	(1) A court by or before which a person is convicted of—
	(a) an offence under section 29Q relating to the display of written material, or
	(b) an offence under section 29R, 29T or 29V,
	shall order to be forfeited any written material or recording produced to the court and shown to its satisfaction to be written material or a recording to which the offence relates.
	(2) An order made under this section shall not take effect—
	(a) in the case of an order made in proceedings in England and Wales, until the expiry of the ordinary time within which an appeal may be instituted or where an appeal is duly instituted, until its finally decided or abandoned;
	(b) in the case of an order made in proceedings in Scotland, until the expiration of the time within which, by virtue of any statute, an appeal may be instituted or, where such an appeal is duly instituted, until the appeal is finally decided or abandoned.
	(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)—
	(a) an application for a case stated or for leave to appeal shall be treated as the institution of an appeal, and
	(b) where a decision on appeal is subject to a further appeal, the appeal is not finally determined until the expiry of the ordinary time within which a further appeal may be instituted or, where a further appeal is duly instituted, until the further appeal is finally decided or abandoned.
	(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b) the lodging of an application for a stated case or note of appeal against sentence shall be treated as the institution of an appeal.
	 Supplementary provisions
	29Y Saving for reports of parliamentary or judicial proceedings
	(1) Nothing in this Part applies to a fair and accurate report or proceedings in Parliament or in the Scottish Parliament.
	(2) Nothing in this Part applies to a fair and accurate report of proceedings publicly heard before a court or tribunal exercising judicial authority where the report is published contemporaneously with the proceedings or, if it is not reasonably practicable or would be unlawful to publish a report of them contemporaneously, as soon as publication is reasonably practicable and lawful.
	29YA Procedure and punishment
	(1) No proceedings for an offence under this Part may be instituted in England and Wales except by or with the consent of the Attorney General.
	(2) For the purposes of the rules in England and Wales against charging more than one offence in the same count or information, each of sections 29Q to 29V creates one offence.
	(3) A person guilty of an offence under this Part is liable—
	(a) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years or a fine or both;
	(b) on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
	29YB Offences by corporations
	(1) Where a body corporate is guilty of an offence under this Part and it is shown that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance of a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body, or a person purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
	(2) Where the affairs of a body corporate are managed by its members, subsection (1) applies in relation to the acts and defaults of a member in connection with his functions of management as it applies to a director.
	29YC Interpretation
	In this Part—
	"distribute", and related expressions, shall be construed in accordance with section 29R(2) (written material) and section 29T(2) (recordings);
	"dwelling" means any structure or part of a structure occupied as a person's home or other living accommodation (whether the occupation is separate or shared with others) but does not include any part not so occupied, and for this purpose "structure" includes a tent, caravan, vehicle, vessel or other temporary or movable structure;
	"programme" means any item which is included in a programme service;
	"programme service" has the same meaning as in the Broadcasting Act 1990;
	"publish", and related expressions, in relation to written material, shall be construed in accordance with section 29R(2);
	"recording" has the meaning given by section 29T(2) and "play" and "show", and related expressions, in relation to a recording, shall be construed in accordance with that provision;
	"transgender hatred" has the meaning given by section 29P;
	"written material" includes any sign or other visible representation."'.
	New schedule 2— 'increase in sentences for aggravation related to transgender—
	1 Section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) (increase in sentences for aggravation related to disability or sexual orientation) is amended as follows.
	2 In the heading, after "disability" insert ", transgender".
	3 In subsection (2)(a)(ii) at end insert—
	"(iii) the transgender identity or appearance (or presumed transgender identity) of the victim, or".
	4 In subsection (2)(b)(ii) at end insert ", or
	(iii) by hostility towards persons who have a transgender identity or appearance."'.
	Amendment No. 214, line 4, schedule 22, at end insert—
	'(2A) After subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) An action under subsection (1) may include any action intending to equate sexual orientation with a propensity or intention to commit an imprisonable offence, where such action is threatening and intended to incite hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation."'.
	Amendment No. 231, line 4, at end insert—
	'(2A) After subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) When considering whether to consent to a prosecution under subsection (1) the Attorney General must have particular regard to the importance of the right to freedom of expression provided by the European Convention on Human Rights."'.
	Amendment No. 1, in page 234, line 26, at end insert—
	'13A After section 29J insert—
	"29JA Protection of freedom of expression (sexual orientation)
	Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion of, criticism of or expressions of antipathy towards, conduct relating to a particular sexual orientation, or urging persons of a particular sexual orientation to refrain from or modify conduct related to that orientation.".'.
	No. 215, line 26, at end insert—
	'13A After subsection 29I insert—
	"29IA European Convention on Human Rights
	Unless expressly limited by any provision within this Part, no right under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights shall be affected."'.

Evan Harris: I am pleased to move the abolition of the ancient discriminatory, unnecessary, illiberal and non-human rights compliant offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel. It is the litany of faults with those offences that explains why the new clause has attracted so much support from all parts of the House. I would like to place on record my thanks to my co-sponsors, especially to the right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson), the hon. Members for Salisbury (Robert Key) and for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire), my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), the hon. Members for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) and for Reading, West (Martin Salter), and my hon. Friend the Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes). They were all were extremely helpful in ensuring that the House has this opportunity to debate the matter, and that broad support for the abolition of these offences was expressed.
	As well as being cross-party, support has also crossed lines of religious belief. I note that support has also been previously expressed by the current leader of the Conservative party—and, indeed, by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), who has an excellent reputation in standing up for freedom of expression. The last time the matter was raised, support was also forthcoming from the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) who, along with the hon. Member for Salisbury, represents a religious point of view in these matters. Let me add the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field), who also identifies with a religious point of view. I am grateful that 76 Members were willing to sign a potentially controversial new clause—albeit one proposed by a very sensible Liberal Democrat Back-Bench MP who does not really adopt controversial positions, at least most of the time.
	The degree of support across the rest of society is also noteworthy. A letter in  The Daily Telegraph yesterday had a remarkable list of co-signatories calling for the abolition of those offences. They included the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, who has spoken publicly about the need to abolish them; the author—and my constituent—Philip Pullman; my former constituent and former Bishop of Oxford, Lord Harries; Ricky Gervais, the comedian; Nick Hytner, the director of the National theatre; Shami Chakrabarti, the director of Liberty; Professor Richard Dawkins, who is well known and admired by many of us; Michael Cashman; novelists Hari Kunzru and Hanif Kureishi; Sir Jonathan Miller; Baroness Frances D'Souza, who was a long-standing executive director of Article 19; and human rights campaigner Peter Tatchell.
	Interestingly, another supporter is the comedian and writer of "Jerry Springer: The Opera", Stewart Lee, who faced a great deal of difficulty in staging his award-winning production because of claims that it was blasphemous. Those were a catalyst for the organising of the sort of demonstrations that, although they should be permitted, should not have the imprimatur of being backed up by any part of common law. I also want to pay special thanks to the National Secular Society and English PEN, which have campaigned for a long time on this issue.
	Blasphemy is an ancient law going back hundreds of years. I do not have time to provide a full history, but it should be pointed out that the last conviction for the offences in question was in 1977, and that the last successful public prosecution was in 1922. It is an old-fashioned, ancient law that is out of time and not needed any more. One does not have to be an ultra-moderniser to recognise that.
	Those laws are also unnecessary in two significant ways. First, enough laws dealing with outraging public decency and public order offences are already on the statute book to ensure that the removal of these two offences will not lead to widespread outrageous behaviour in public. We are talking about people being able to see theatre productions, watch television programmes, attend readings, and publish books and documents for specific audiences, without the threat of prosecution under the blasphemy laws. Secondly, as has been pointed out by a number of people more qualified than me to say it, the Almighty does not need the protection of these ridiculous laws, which is why many people with a religious perspective share the view that these offences should be abolished.
	The offence of blasphemy is illiberal because its scope is uncertain. Its terms do not define—because the offence is not statutory, for one thing—what someone must do or say to be arrested, prosecuted and convicted. It is also an offence of strict liability, so not having intended to blaspheme is no defence to prosecution. One therefore cannot know when one is committing the offence, which was the main reason given by the Law Commission for seeking its abolition as long ago as 1985. Although people do not know whether they have committed the offence, it also commands an unlimited penalty, because no penalty is laid down in statute. The offence is discriminatory, in that it applies only to the Christian religion—and within that, only to the tenets of the Church of England.
	For both the reasons that I have given—the lack of clarity and its discriminatory nature—the offence does not comply with the European convention on human rights, or, indeed, with our own law now that it incorporates the convention.

Ann Widdecombe: Will the hon. Gentleman confirm that within the last two years the European Court has ruled first that countries may have blasphemy laws, and secondly that those laws are permitted to apply to one religion and not to others?

Evan Harris: I can tell the right hon. Lady that in my opinion, and in that of the human rights lawyers whom I have consulted, it is unlikely that under the Human Rights Act the blasphemy offence would pass muster in United Kingdom courts, where there is no margin of appreciation on national grounds because they are our courts. It is extremely unlikely that the English blasphemy offence would survive Strasbourg nowadays, and I think it right and proper that it would be struck down, but I do not think we need wait for that. The offence is not necessary, it does not work, it is ancient, it is discriminatory, and it ought to be abolished.
	The offence is also divisive in terms of social cohesion, partly because it is discriminatory. The corollary of that is that it raises a sense of unfairness among other religions, particularly those whose adherents are more sensitive than adherents to the Christian faith—a sense that they are being singled out because they are not protected. It raises the expectation, which previous Governments may have sought to keep going, that they will be entitled to their own—Islamic, say—version of a blasphemy law. The best way in which to make clear to the communities and people of this nation that we do not expect there to be protection of beliefs, or indeed of people's sensibilities about their beliefs, is to abolish the existing blasphemy offences, and that is one of the strongest arguments for so doing.
	As many Members will recall, when we last discussed the religious hatred offences a couple of years ago, it was made clear even by those who supported the Government's original wide offence that we did not want to prevent attacks—including scurrilous, lampooning and offensive attacks—on religious or indeed other beliefs. That is one of the main reasons why the House was right to narrow the offence, so that insulting and abusive language and unintentional words and behaviour would not be covered by the law relating to incitement to religious hatred. The House was right to do that, and anyone who voted in favour of narrowing that offence must surely also be in favour of abolishing these laws. They have even less justification than over-wide offences aimed at protecting people and their sensibilities, because they purport directly to protect people's beliefs.

Alan Beith: Is my hon. Friend not making a rather persuasive case for amendment No. 1, which seeks to make it clear that free speech should not be impaired by the provisions that it amends?

Evan Harris: No. My right hon. Friend makes the case that when it comes to incitement of hate-crime offences, there is a balance to be struck between free speech and the needs of those who require protection from the consequences of incitement to hatred. I think that the House got the balance right when it voted on the religious hatred law, and that the Government are now pretty close to getting it right on homophobic hatred, since the Secretary of State for Justice agreed with me on Second Reading that it should be treated in broadly the same way as religious hatred. I am sure that more will be said on that point. However, there is no balancing issue here. There is no balancing argument about the human rights and other rights of others because the blasphemy offences are not purporting to defend the rights of others. They are there to defend the tenets of the Church of England from attack. We should not have criminal offences preventing such attacks.

Roger Gale: As the hon. Gentleman knows, I came to this debate with an open mind because I wanted to hear the argument. I have heard it, and I now do not accept it. Can he explain why it is wrong to protect the tenets of the Church of England?

Evan Harris: Yes. I am disappointed that the hon. Gentleman is not persuaded, but I do not doubt that he came in with an open mind. It is wrong that points of view should be defended through the criminalisation of attacks on them. I do not think that there is any point of view that is so special that it requires the defence of the criminal law, especially this criminal law, for its defence. It is a sign of weakness. That is why many people, including now the Church of England, recognise that there is no argument in principle against abolition of these offences.

Chris Bryant: As a former curate in the Church of England, I could not tell the hon. Gentleman what the tenets of the Church of England are. I do not suppose that he could tell the House what they are. I am sure that the hon. Member for North Thanet (Mr. Gale) does not know the first thing about the tenets of the Church of England. Surely the law should not be telling us what they are.

Evan Harris: The hon. Gentleman puts it correctly. Most of those who are liable to be accused of blasphemy have the least ability to know what the tenets that they are supposed to be offending against are.
	There are further problems with this offence; it creates real problems. Although it has not been used for a long time, it has a chilling effect. There can be a reluctance among some theatre directors, publishers or press people to print material that might be alleged to be blasphemous, because there is a criminal offence.
	There is another chilling effect. The existence of such offences catalyses attempts at private prosecution. For example, the extreme Christian Voice group sought to bring such a prosecution against the BBC. That cost hundreds of thousands of pounds for the BBC to defend, money that I at least—I do not say this in the hope of a good write-up—believe would be better spent on salaries for journalists.

Mark Pritchard: Is this not really an indirect argument—an argument by stealth—for the eventual disestablishment of the Church of England? As the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who is the Prime Minister's adviser on constitutional affairs, will admit, he has a similar view on disestablishment.

Evan Harris: I have never accepted slippery slope arguments, whether they are to do with embryology or anything like that. This House is able to decide each of the issues regarding the constitutional settlement point by point, time by time. If I had intended the new clause to go wider, one is quite capable of writing amendments to that effect. Hon. Members can be sure that in voting for the new clause, they are not signalling any intention to change the fundamental relationship between the Church of England and the state, although I for one—it is my party's policy, too—would like to see that change. However, it is not the purpose of the new clause.

John Gummer: As the hon. Gentleman knows, I find myself in some difficulty being in the same Lobby as him, but he will perhaps make this point. It is very difficult for many of us to believe that blasphemy, which is technically about the insulting of the deity, can be possibly lined up with the tenets of the Church of England, as those are difficult to discern, and most members of the Church of England disagree about them gravely.

Evan Harris: That is a private argument—or indeed now a public argument—between the right hon. Gentleman and people who may believe in the same God but have different interpretations of that God.
	As I was saying, there is the problem of catalysing private prosecutions. That has an impact on the livelihood of people seeking to work in the arts, theatre, literature and publishing.

John Hayes: Rather ungenerously, I was tempted to say that the reason the hon. Gentleman is not attracted by slippery slope arguments is that there is no depth to which he will not fall—but to say that would be unkind and unnecessary. However, my point is that he seems to be making a case around the idea that it is a bad thing to discourage theatre directors and others from insulting, upsetting or offending people. I ask him whether it is, indeed, a bad thing to discourage people from insulting, upsetting or offending people—because that seems to be what he is saying.

Evan Harris: People will buy tickets if they want to watch the sort of stuff that is put on. That is, I think, called the free market, which I know the hon. Gentleman supports. I certainly do not think—and I did not think that he did—that we should start to use the criminal law or criminal offences to describe what art, literature or publishing is acceptable. That might have happened in the 17th century, but I would like to feel that I exist in the 21st century, and I hope that one day the hon. Gentleman will see that that is an inappropriate form of censorship—and has been for at least the past two centuries.
	The Church of England has made it clear that it does not have any reasons in principle to oppose the abolition of these offences. The then Bishop of Oxford made it clear in the debate on the abolition of blasphemy laws in November 2005 that the Church of England did not take that view; indeed, it argued that it was only a question of timing.
	That point is of some relevance to the history of repeal or abolition of these offences. The Law Commission recommended that in 1985. It was raised first, in recent times, in the House of Lords in 2001, during the passage of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, when there was a proposal for a religious hatred law. As a result of that debate, a Select Committee of the House of Lords on religious offences was set up under the chairmanship of Viscount Colville. It took evidence over a period of a year, including oral evidence on a number of occasions from various faith groups discussing not only religious hatred, but blasphemy and ecclesiastical Acts. There was then a debate in which it was made clear that the Church of England, in its evidence to that Select Committee, had argued not for retention of the blasphemy law but that religious hatred needed to be dealt with first. In February 2005, during the passage of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill, I tabled an amendment to abolish blasphemy, and the Minister at the time, the present Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, said that she opposed new clause 4 on the abolition of blasphemy
	"because I do not think that this is the right time for us to repeal the blasphemy laws...we will keep the matter under review."—[ Official Report, 7 February 2005; Vol. 430, c. 1224.]
	The argument was that we had to deal with religious hatred first. Well, religious hatred was dealt with two years ago. There was a settlement; it is done. People are protected from the incitement of hatred against them on the basis of their beliefs when intentional and threatening language or behaviour is used. Therefore, there is no longer an excuse for prevarication. The same point was made in November 2005 by the Bishop of Oxford—and also by the Bishop of Portsmouth, who both said that once religious hatred was sorted out it would be time to abolish the blasphemy law.

Angela Watkinson: Does the hon. Gentleman not recognise that gratuitously and grossly offensive material, of a sort that would never be tolerated or permitted against the Prophet Mohammed, is routinely published against the Christian religion?

Evan Harris: It is not the case that attacks on the Prophet Mohammed would be covered by criminal law in this country, so the toleration of such things is a matter for individuals, and I am afraid this House is incapable of legislating on how offended people are when their beliefs—sincerely held, and sometimes sacredly held—are offended. As I think the hon. Lady would be the first to accept, it is not a role of the criminal law to protect offence taken to words against the Prophet Mohammed, and the same applies to the Christian religion.

David Wilshire: As a co-sponsor of the new clause, I say that the hon. Gentleman has hit on the real issue: this is not about the Church of England or even about Christianity, but about faith. If anyone's faith is real and strong, it should not need or seek the support and defence of the secular courts.

Evan Harris: I agree with everything that the hon. Gentleman has said.

Martin Salter: I support the new clause, and I joined the hon. Gentleman, and the present Leader of the Opposition, in the Lobby in 2005, along with the late and lamented Robin Cook. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that our prime motivation in seeking to push this issue and to abolish this discriminatory and outdated piece of common law was the fact that we fundamentally believed that all faiths should be treated equally?

Evan Harris: Indeed, and in my view all beliefs should be treated equally.
	The final reason for seeking to abolish this law is its impact on our ability to conduct our affairs in terms of international human rights and international relations, and to criticise other countries' uses of their blasphemy laws—for example, Sudan's outrageous use of its blasphemy laws against a UK subject over the naming of a teddy bear. It would be much easier to say that that was unacceptable if we did not have our own, albeit less effective, version of a blasphemy law. The same applies in respect of offences of apostasy in countries such as Pakistan. We would also be in a position to argue against the extremist reaction to the Danish cartoons if we did not have an offence purporting to defend Christian sensibilities. The argument for abolition is clear, and I hope that the Government have moved from their previous position that the time is not right.
	Because of the lack of time, it falls to me to say a brief word about amendment No. 231, which deals with homophobic hatred. On Second Reading, the Secretary of State agreed that it was right that a new offence of inciting homophobic hatred should be closer to the religious hatred end rather than the race hate end of the spectrum, in that such incitement would have to be intentional, and the provision should deal with threatening words and behaviour only. I welcome the fact that, true to his word, the Government are introducing an offence along those lines. We wanted to see that, because the clear mischief exists of people being attacked and hate being incited against them on the basis of their sexual orientation. Unlike religion, and more like race, sexual orientation is innate: it is not a matter of someone's opinion; it is a part of their humanity and our common humanity, and it is right that people should be protected.
	My view, which is reflected in one of the amendments, is that attacks on homosexuals involving an implication that they are paedophiles should be covered, and I hope that the Government will give more thought to that. There is a case for tightening the provision further by ensuring that the Attorney-General's fiat—the decision that the Attorney-General makes to give consent to a prosecution—should have particular regard to article 10 of the European convention on human rights. Amendment No. 231 uses exactly the same language that the Government used in section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 when they called on courts to have particular regard to freedom of expression when considering issues concerning privacy law and the press. On that basis, I hope that the Government will give serious thought to amendment No. 231, and I commend new clause 1 to the House.

Jim Dobbin: I want to speak specifically to amendment No. 1. I should point out at the beginning that I am aware that the Government do not think that there is any need for this provision, but I shall develop the case that I think is necessary. It is my pleasure to speak to this cross-party ecumenical amendment, which basically aims to protect free speech, and I am delighted that many hon. Members have added their names to it. It is not a party political issue, as the list of names illustrates.
	May I say at the outset that I would like to have a vote on this amendment when the time comes, with your indulgence, Mr. Speaker? The amendment is ecumenical because it was drafted with the help of the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church. The two Churches took the unusual step of making a joint submission to the Public Bill Committee. What excited their concern was a Government amendment, which became clause 107, to make it a criminal offence to incite hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. I am aware that some hon. Members disagree strongly with some of the teachings of England's two largest denominations, but I hope that no one would accuse either of them of wanting to protect the right to incite hatred against anyone.
	So why is anybody worried about the clause? Let me read from the Churches' submission, which draws a comparison with identical provisions in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, which criminalised incitement to religious hatred:
	"In religious hatred debates, both supporters and opponents of the Bill maintain a distinction between protection of people from personal attack, which was agreed to be desirable, and protection of their beliefs and practices from criticism or satire, which was generally thought to be undesirable."
	A similar distinction should be maintained in the field of sexuality. Sexual activity and lifestyle, as distinct from sexual orientation, are matters of choice and impinge on the public sphere. As such, they are subject to evaluation and criticism and the freedom to discuss them should be preserved.
	The Churches' submission goes on to refer to accepted Christian teaching about human sexuality, marriage and family, and asserts that it would be impossible for Christianity to be practised and taught without those convictions being widely and freely discussed within the Churches and wider society. They are also concerned that clause 107 may impinge on their basic freedom to practise their religion. We cannot ignore such a serious concern from two important national religious institutions.

David Heath: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has had the chance to look at the Committee proceedings, but it was important to us all that we should balance the offence, which we feel it is right to put in place, with the defence that he has given of people's non-threatening profession of faith, which falls outside the scope of the Bill. Does he not accept that amendment No. 231, which I would have liked to press to a Division if possible, would do what he wants to do and ensure that those of faith and others could express views that some might find abhorrent or offensive, but which were not threatening, without undermining the offence that we want to be created?

Jim Dobbin: I accept that the hon. Gentleman is supporting some of the evidence that I have put forward. Amendment No. 1 is about freedom of speech, and that is basically it.
	The Churches went on to say:
	"As with incitement to religious hatred, we believe it is vital that there should be the maximum possible clarity about what is forbidden and what is permitted. Christians engaged in teaching or preaching and those seeking to act in accord with Christian convictions in their daily lives need to be assured that the expression of strong opinions on marriage or sexuality will not be illegal."

Chris Bryant: My hon. Friend is arguing that people of faith should be allowed to use threatening words, and that their mere expression of them as faith should let them off under the clause.

Jim Dobbin: I disagree with my hon. Friend. I am not suggesting that at all. The main purpose of the amendment is merely to seek reassurance.
	I know that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), has met some Christian groups and sought to assure them that infringing the freedom of speech and of religion is not the purpose of clause 107. However, without the necessary words in the Bill, concerns will remain. It is particularly worrying that a police officer or CPS lawyer who draws a comparison between religious hatred and homophobic hatred will see that free speech is specifically protected in one but not the other.
	The joint Church submission also drew attention to the possible chilling effect on free speech, saying:
	"Uncertainty in the law has the effect of inhibiting behaviour which may not in fact be illegal. People holding firm opinions on sexuality will generally be reluctant to risk the emotional and financial costs of being challenged by a neighbour or colleague and investigated by the police, even if this does not lead to prosecution or conviction. We are not encouraged by some examples of over-zealous action by the police, apparently under current legislation, against Christians who have publicly expressed traditional views on sexuality."
	I shall list a few examples shortly.
	The Churches welcomed the narrow focus of clause 107 on threatening words or behaviour that are used with the intention of stirring up hatred, but they pointed out that in earlier debates on incitement to religious hatred a further safeguard was considered necessary to protect freedom of expression. Section 29J of the Public Order Act 1986, as inserted by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, states:
	"Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief system."
	The Churches have used that as a basis for drafting the amendment that I have tabled. However, the amendment is narrower and less far reaching, and the Churches have restricted the free speech protection to "discussion", "criticism" and "antipathy".

Robert Key: The hon. Gentleman has twice said that the Churches have drafted the amendment, but they have not. I have checked with Lambeth and I can tell him that no one among the Church of England's archbishops, bishops, house of clergy or house of laity—and I am a member of that latter body—has ever heard of it. It has been run past the lawyers, who said that it looked legal. That is the extent of the Churches' drafting.

Jim Dobbin: When I talked about the Churches drafting the amendment, I said that they helped to draft it.

Ann Widdecombe: The hon. Gentleman is concentrating quite heavily on the clause's effect on the freedom of religious conscience. Does he agree that it is in the interests of society as a whole that we preserve the right to free speech? Should people not be able to express free opinions, whether or not they are religiously motivated in the way that he and I are?

Jim Dobbin: I have also made it clear that the amendment would be appropriate for the whole of society. The wording of amendment No. 1 is far milder than the form of words used in section 29J, which I quoted earlier and which the House was happy to insert in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006.
	Indeed, it is not just religious people who are worried that clause 107 could restrict free speech. Peter Tatchell, the homosexual rights activist, has argued that existing laws are adequate to protect homosexual people, and he opposes the proposed new offence. Journalists Matthew Parris and Iain Dale, themselves gay men, also oppose the new offence on free speech grounds.
	I could list the many occasions on which leading Church people have been visited, telephoned or placed under scrutiny by the police for sermons that they have given in their churches. That is what people are worried about. For example, Mario Conti, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Glasgow, was reported to the police in 2006 for a sermon in which he asserted that civil partnerships undermined marriage.
	Ministers may say that amendment No. 1 is unnecessary, but the Churches whose members and leaders may be on the receiving end of malicious complaints under the new law do not agree. If the words used in the amendment do not do any harm to the Government's intentions for this offence, I do not see why the Government should resist it.

Nick Herbert: I want to speak to new clause 1, which proposes the abolition of blasphemy laws, and to amendment No. 1, which has been spoken to by the hon. Member for Heywood and Middleton (Jim Dobbin). I emphasise that the Conservative party regards them both as matters of conscience that call for a free vote, and that I am speaking personally in this regard.
	The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) made the case for the abolition of the blasphemy laws perfectly clearly. He talked about their redundancy, which has become more evident since the failure of the prosecution of "Jerry Springer: The Opera". Indeed, it is hard to understand how any prosecution under the blasphemy laws could succeed when that action did not.
	As the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon noted, the Law Commission recommended abolition in 1985. It could be said that that would be the natural consequence of the introduction of the incitement to religious hatred provisions, and the Government accepted that at the time.
	I agree that the existence of the blasphemy laws in this country is an impediment to the stand that we would like to take against repressive blasphemy laws elsewhere, whose effect was illustrated recently by the teddy bear case in Sudan. It is true that the blasphemy laws are limited to the Anglican Church: they cannot apply to other religions, and they do not apply in Scotland or Northern Ireland.
	A summary of the case for abolition might be that
	"it was thought that a denial of Christianity was liable to shake the fabric of society, which was itself founded upon Christian religion. There is no such danger to society now and the offence of blasphemy is a dead letter."
	That was said by Lord Denning in 1949.
	The arguments that have been advanced for the retention of the blasphemy laws are serious ones. The argument for some kind of chilling effect cuts both ways. If the blasphemy law is repealed, what kind of signal will that send and what will be the reaction of broadcasters and others, who might no longer feel constrained as to what they could say about the Christian faith? What proposals are there to ensure that they treat the Anglican faith respectfully?

Edward Leigh: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Nick Herbert: I apologise to my hon. Friend, but I am not going to give way. I have so little time and I want to leave time for the Minister and others at the end.
	It is still true, as was said in 1676 by Lord Chief Justice Hale, that Christianity is
	"parcel of the laws of England".
	It may not be as much parcel as it was then, but it is true that Christianity is integral to the constitution. Every day, we have Prayers before Mr. Speaker takes his place in this Chamber. We should pull at the threads of the constitution with care and an hour's debate is wholly inadequate to decide a matter of this gravity. If it comes to a vote, I shall personally vote for an abolition of the blasphemy laws, but the matter needs far more careful consideration. In particular, the Church of England is entitled to be consulted properly about the proposal.
	I turn now to the amendment to clause 107, which creates the new offence and outlaws incitement to hatred on grounds of people's sexuality. I do not take the libertarian view of the role of such legislation. The criminal law has a proper role to play in protecting people from harm. Just as we accepted that laws protecting a minority from hatred on grounds of their race were right 30 years ago, so there is a case for similar, if not directly comparable, protection for gay people, who do not choose their sexuality any more than people choose their ethnic origin.
	Enormous strides have been made in this country towards tolerance for homosexual people, but it remains the case that gay people can live in fear and can be subject to violent attacks, and that hateful websites and lyrics promote hate against them. I pay tribute to the work of Stonewall in drawing attention to that. We would all agree that such incitement to violence is wrong, and I believe that there is a role for the criminal law in outlawing it. My colleagues on the Front Bench supported in general terms—

John Bercow: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Nick Herbert: I am not going to give way.
	We supported the principle in general terms in Committee. However, such legislation needs very careful drafting, especially when it comes to scope. While clause 107 is more tightly drafted than some feared—it is limited to intentional acts and threatening words, not merely abusive or insulting words—it remains unclear what words and behaviour would be caught by the offence. I believe that Church groups are right to seek clarity on that point.
	Amendment No. 1 does not seek to exempt expressions of dislike, insult or abuse of gay people. It relates only to conduct. The question before us is whether criticism of such conduct should be a matter for the criminal law. In my view, it should not. None of Stonewall's examples of hateful words against gay people would fall within the scope of that defence. The examples that it gives criticise not conduct, but people. We have to beware of clumsy police investigations and the chilling effect of the law. There is an important balance to be achieved between free speech, including what Stonewall rightly calls "temperate comment", which it agrees should not be outlawed, and the protection of a minority from harm.
	Edmund Burke said that we
	"ought to know...what belongs to laws, and what manners alone can regulate. To these...politicians may give a leaning, but they cannot give a law."
	Hatred towards gay people has no place in a civilised society, but the mark of a civilised society is that, except where harm is done, people are free and have freedom of expression. I would not support amendment No. 1 if I thought it weakened gay people's protection from incitement to hateful violence, but I do not believe that it does so weaken it; I believe that it helpfully clarifies the law. That is why I will support amendment No. 1.

Maria Eagle: I welcome the opportunity to make the Government's position clear on the two issues that we have dealt with in the debate on this group of amendments. In speaking to new clause 1, the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) set out in some detail the case for getting rid of the blasphemy laws, helped by interventions from Members of all parties. The issue has been around for many years. As he said, as long ago as 1985 the Law Commission recommended that the common law offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel be abolished. The hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) has given quotations from eminent lawyers and others that go even further back, which shows that the issue was around even before then. We can therefore agree that the issue has been debated at great length.
	I agree with the many hon. Members who put their names to new clause 1 that it is high time that Parliament reached a settled conclusion on the issue. We accept that the offences have largely fallen into desuetude. The last prosecution for blasphemy was in 1977, in the case of Whitehouse and Gay News Ltd, as Members will recall. It follows that there have been no cases since the Human Rights Act 1998. The idea that the offences appear to be moribund was reinforced by the High Court's decision on 5 December 2007 that the Theatres Act 1968 and the Broadcasting Act 1990 prevent the prosecution of a theatre, the BBC or another broadcaster for blasphemous libel. That was the result of a case brought by Christian Voice in response to the play "Jerry Springer: The Opera". I understand that it is seeking leave to appeal.
	Against that background, I can say that we have every sympathy for the case for formal abolition. However, we believe it necessary to consult the Anglican Church before bringing forward a provision that particularly affects it. That is what we are now doing urgently. Subject to that consultation, which I can assure hon. Members will be short and sharp, the Government intend to table amendments in another place to achieve the aims of new clause 1.

Evan Harris: I welcome what the Minister says, and in the light of her comments, I will not press new clause 1 to a Division.

Maria Eagle: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that. I shall move on, without further ado, to amendment No. 1, which was spoken to by my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton (Jim Dobbin). The Opposition appear to have changed their position since Committee, when the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) put forward his own, well-constructed version of a clause that would achieve what clause 107 has achieved. It did not include an equivalent to the amendment, so that is an interesting nuance in their position.

John Bercow: I put it to the hon. Lady that amendment No. 1, whatever the intention of its proposers, is entirely superfluous. What we are talking about in clause 107 is intentional acts and threatening language. The clause is clear and explicit; it does not require diluting. It should stand as it is.

Maria Eagle: The hon. Gentleman is correct and is assisting me greatly. The reason the Government oppose amendment No. 1 and would have done so had it been tabled in Committee is that the offence as drafted in clause 107 seeks, for the purposes of making sure that we properly protect freedom of speech, to pitch the offence at the highest level. So we are not talking about insulting words or behaviour. We are talking about threatening words or behaviour intended to incite hatred against a group of people on the basis of their sexuality. That is very narrow and very clear.
	Although I appreciate the concerns expressed by many of those who have been quoted, they evidently have not read the Committee proceedings. We believe that clarity is preserved in the clause as it stands.

Ann Widdecombe: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I am particularly grateful to her for rushing through her own amendments earlier to try and ensure greater debate, although the Government's role in the amount of time that they have given us today is a shambles.
	Already there have been three high-profile incidents where the police have questioned people such as Iqbal Sacranie, who have done nothing more than express a religious view. Why should we believe that the amendment is not necessary to make it explicit that that should not be a criminal offence?

Maria Eagle: The matter that the right hon. Lady raises is about proper guidance and training. Those matters will be dealt with once the law is passed. Clarity is what we need in the law, and clause 107, as it is drafted, is clear. It does not need clarifying further. The amendment proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton would muddy rather than clarify.

Dominic Grieve: Even though there may be a clarity of intention that will prevent prosecutions from taking place, there is ample evidence that the lack of a saving clause of this kind will cause problems, because the public authorities and the police misinterpret what the law says. The amendment will work effectively and will in no way diminish what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve.

Maria Eagle: Unfortunately I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman says. We have had extensive debate and I stick to my position that we are okay with clause 107 as it stands. I have made the Government's views clear.

Evan Harris: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	 Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2
	 — 
	Paying for sexual services in zones of safety

'(1) A local authority may designate any part of its area as a zone of safety.
	(2) A chief officer of police may, with the approval of the Secretary of State, designate any area as a zone of safety.
	(3) The Secretary of State may approve a designation under subsection (2) if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the incidence of prostitution in the proposed zone has contributed to an increase in criminality in the locality.
	(4) It, in a zone of safety, a person (A)—
	(a) intentionally obtains for himself the sexual services of another person (B), and
	(b) before obtaining those services, has made or promised payment for those services to B or a third person, or knows that another person has made or promised such a payment,
	the local authority or the chief officer of police may apply to a magistrates' court for an order forbidding A from doing those things again anywhere.
	(5) In subsection (4)(b) "payment" means any financial advantage, including the discharge of an obligation to pay or the provision of goods and services (including sexual services) gratuitously or at a discount.
	(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations made such supplementary provision about orders under subsection (4) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
	(7) Regulations under subsection (6) are to be made by statutory instrument and are subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
	(8) A person who is the subject of an order under subsection (4) and who fails to comply with the terms of that order is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale or to a community punishment order or to both.'.— [Fiona Mactaggart.]
	 Brought up, and read the First time.

Fiona Mactaggart: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
	Amendment No. 181, clause 104, page 71, line 13, after 'person', insert 'aged 18 or over'.
	Amendment No. 11, line 24, leave out Clause 105.
	Government amendment No. 41
	Amendment No. 195, clause 175, page 121, line 12, at end insert—
	'( ) Sections 104 to 106 come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint, provided that the United Kingdom shall have ratified the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings prior to that day.'.
	Government amendment No. 76

Fiona Mactaggart: I have seconds to speak to new clause 2. The situation is straightforward. Hundreds of thousands of women have been trafficked, many of them into prostitution in Britain. Others have been forced into prostitution because of drug addiction, grooming—
	 It being seven hours after  the  commencement of proceedings on the  programme  motion, Madam Deputy Speaker  put forthwith the Question s necessary for the disposal of business to be concluded at that hour, pursuant to Order [this day].

Clause 1
	 — 
	Youth rehabilitation orders

Amendment made: No. 82, in page 2, line 12, leave out 'and' and insert—
	'(ma) an intoxicating substance treatment requirement (see paragraph 23A of that Schedule), and'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 7
	 — 
	Youth rehabilitation orders: interpretation

Amendment made: No. 83, page 5, line 16, at end insert—
	'"intoxicating substance treatment requirement", in relation to a youth rehabilitation order, has the meaning given by paragraph 23A of Schedule 1;'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 9
	 — 
	Purposes etc. of sentencing: offenders aged under 18

Amendments made: No. 84, page 6, line 41, leave out 'by children and other' and insert '(or re-offending) by'.
	No. 85, in page 7, line 44, at end insert—
	'(5) In section 42(1) of that Act (interpretation of Part 3 of Act), after the definition of "local authority" insert—
	""offending" includes re-offending;".'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 12
	 — 
	Indeterminate sentences: determination of tariffs

Amendment made: No. 86, in page 8, line 37 , after 'where' insert
	'the offender was aged 18 or over when he committed the offence and'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 16
	 — 
	Release of prisoners after recall

Amendments made: No. 137, page 11, line 21 after 'is' insert
	'eligible to be considered for automatic release and is'.
	No. 138, page 11, line 27, at end insert
	'or if he is not eligible to be considered for automatic release by virtue of subsection (2)(b)'.
	No. 139, page 12, line 35, after 'prisoner' insert—
	'( ) is not eligible to be considered for automatic release by virtue of section 255A(2)(b);'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 17
	 — 
	Further review and release of prisoners after recall

Amendment made: No. 140, page 14, line 15, at end insert—
	'( ) The Secretary of State—
	(a) where the Board makes a recommendation under subsection (4)(a) for the person's immediate release on licence, must give effect to the recommendation; and
	(b) where the Board fixes a release date under subsection (4)(b), must release the person on licence on that date.'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 19
	 — 
	Removal under Criminal Justice Act 1991 (offences before 4th april 2005 etc)

Amendment made: No. 14, page 15, line 25, leave out subsection (8).— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 20
	 — 
	Removal under Criminal Justice Act 2003

Amendments made: No. 15, page 16, line 3, after 'removal)' insert '—
	(c) for "subsections (2) and (3)" substitute "subsection (2)",'.
	No. 16, line 5, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
	'(5) For subsection (2) (conditions relating to time) substitute—
	"(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a prisoner unless he has served at least one-half of the requisite custodial period."
	(5A) Subsections (3) and (3A) (cases where subsection (1) does not apply) cease to have effect.'.
	No. 17, line 16, at end insert—
	'(6A) In subsection (6) (order-making powers)—
	(a) in paragraph (a) omit "or (3)(e)",
	(b) omit paragraph (b), and
	(c) in paragraph (c) for "subsection (2)(b)(ii)" substitute "subsection (2)".'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 36
	 — 
	Eligible complaints: specific requirements applicable to all complaints

Amendments made: No. 18, page 26, line 10, leave out 'matters giving rise to the substance of' and insert 'events giving rise to'.
	No. 19, line 26, leave out 'matters' and insert 'events'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 37
	 — 
	Treatment by commissioner of complaints

Amendments made: No. 20, page 27, line 18, leave out from 'Where' to end of line 20 and insert 'the Commissioner—
	(a) rejects the whole or any part of the complaint, or
	(b) declines to take or stops taking action to deal with the whole or any part of the complaint,'.
	No. 21, line 29, leave out 'take any step mentioned in' and insert 'exercise a power under'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 40
	 — 
	Investigation of deaths

Amendments made: No. 22, page 29, line 6, after 'conducted' insert 'in the United Kingdom'.
	No. 23, line 8, at end insert—
	'( ) The Commissioner shall defer the whole or any part of the investigation at the request of the Lord Advocate.
	( ) Such a request may be made if the Lord Advocate considers that the whole or any part of the investigation might adversely affect a criminal investigation, or an investigation of a death, which is being or is to be conducted by the Lord Advocate or the procurator fiscal.'. — [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 42
	 — 
	Investigations requested by the Secretary of State

Amendments made: No. 24, page 30, line 39, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
	'(aa) is made by virtue of subsection (3)(h) and specifies a matter relating to events which have (or may have) occurred while a person was in the custody of immigration officers, or under their control or escort, in Scotland; or
	(b) is made by virtue of subsection (4) and specifies a matter which the Secretary of State considers is (or may be) linked to events of the kind mentioned in paragraph (a) or (aa).'.
	No. 25, page 31, line 9, leave out from 'defer' to 'might' in line 10 and insert
	'the whole or part of an investigation under this section at the request of the Lord Advocate.
	( ) Such a request may be made if the Lord Advocate considers that the whole or any part of the investigation'. — [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 49
	 — 
	Disclosure of information etc.

Amendment made: No. 26, page 35, line 18, leave out second 'of' and insert 'conducted by'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 51
	 — 
	Notification of matters of potential concern to the police or other authorities

Amendment made: No. 27, page 36, line 29, leave out 'the police' and insert 'a police force'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 54
	 — 
	The Prisons and Probation Ombudsman

Amendment made: No. 28, page 37, line 22, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Ombudsman'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 55
	 — 
	Interpretation of Part 4

Amendments made: No. 29, page 38, line 26, at end insert—
	'"police force" means—
	(c) a police force in England, Wales or Scotland;(d) the Police Service of Northern Ireland;(e) the Ministry of Defence Police;(f) the British Transport Police Force;
	and "police officer" shall be construed accordingly;'.
	No. 30, page 39, line 9, leave out from 'in' to end of line 10 and insert
	'section 13 of the Offender Management Act 2007 (c.21)'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 59
	 — 
	Eligible complaints: general

Amendment made: No. 31, page 41, line 32, at end insert—
	'( ) action taken by or on behalf of a health and social services body,'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 60
	 — 
	Eligible complaints: specific requirements applicable to all complaints

Amendments made: No. 32, page 42, line 15 , leave out 'matters giving rise to the substance of' and insert 'events giving rise to'.
	No. 33, line 31, leave out 'matters' and insert 'events'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 61
	 — 
	Treatment by Commissioner of complaints

Amendments made: No. 34, page 43, line 23, leave out from 'Where' to end of line 25 and insert 'the Commissioner—
	(a) rejects the whole or any part of the complaint, or
	(b) declines to take or stops taking action to deal with the whole or any part of the complaint,'.
	No. 35, line 34, leave out 'take any step mentioned in' and insert 'exercise a power under'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 64
	 — 
	Investigation of deaths

Amendment made: No. 36, page 45, line 19, after 'conducted' insert 'in the United Kingdom'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 65
	 — 
	Reports on the outcome of a death investigation

Amendment made: No. 37, page 46, line 6, leave out 'close'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 67
	 — 
	Reports on the outcome of an investigation under section 66

Amendment made: No. 38, page 47, leave out line 37 and insert
	'a report published under subsection (3)(c) must not identify the deceased person'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 72
	 — 
	Disclosure of information etc.

Amendment made: No. 39, page 50, line 8, at end insert—
	'( ) to the Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints for the purposes of the exercise of any functions of that office;'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 77
	 — 
	Transitional provision: the Prisoner Ombudsman for Northern Ireland

Amendment made: No. 40, page 52, line 21, leave out 'Commissioner' and insert 'Ombudsman'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 90
	 — 
	SFO's pre-investigation powers in relation to bribery and corruption: foreign officers etc

Amendment made: No. 87, page 63, line 5, leave out from 'section' to end of line 7 and insert '17 (extent)—
	(a) in subsection (2) (provisions of Act extending to Scotland), for "section 2" substitute "sections 2 and 2A"; and
	(b) in subsection (3) (provisions of Act extending to Northern Ireland), after "sections 2" insert ", 2A".'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 91
	 — 
	Contents of an accused's defence statement

Amendment made: No. 88, page 63, line 12, at end insert—
	'(2) In section 11(2)(f)(ii) of that Act (faults in disclosure by accused), after "matter" insert "(or any particular of any matter of fact)".'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 105
	 — 
	Orders to promote rehabilitation

Amendment made: No. 41, page 71, line 33, leave out from 'to' to 'the' in line 34 and insert 'assist'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 109
	 — 
	Imprisonment for unlawfully obtaining etc. personal data

Amendment made: No. 89, page 74, line 31, leave out from beginning to 'and' in line 33.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 110
	 — 
	Requests to other member States: England and Wales

Amendments made: No. 42, page 76, line 4, leave out 'the' and insert 'a'.
	No. 43, line 12, at end insert—
	'(da) any sum payable by virtue of section 137(1) or (1A) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (c. 6) (orders requiring parents to pay fines etc.);'.
	No. 44, line 13, leave out 'to (iii)' and insert 'to (iiia)'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 112
	 — 
	Requests to other member States: Northern Ireland

Amendments made: No. 45, page 77, line 27, leave out 'the' and insert 'a'.
	No. 46, line 35, at end insert—
	'(iiia) any sum payable by virtue of Article 35 of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (S.I. 1998/1504 (N.I. 9) (orders requiring parents to pay fines etc.);'.
	No. 47, line 36, leave out 'to (d)' and insert 'to (da)'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 114
	 — 
	Requests from other member States: England and Wales

Amendment made: No. 48, page 79, line 7, after 'central authority' insert 'of the other member State'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 117
	 — 
	Requests from other member States: Northern Ireland

Amendment made: No. 49, page 80, line 42, after 'central authority' insert 'of the other member State'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 119
	 — 
	Modification of Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981

Amendment made: No. 50, page 81, line 34, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
	'(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), if the amount of a financial penalty is specified in a currency other than sterling, that amount must be converted to sterling by reference to the London closing exchange rate on the relevant date.'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 121
	 — 
	Requests from other member States: supplemental

Amendments made: No. 51, page 82, line 28, leave out 'subsection (3)' and insert
	'section 111(4), 113(4) or subsection (3) of this section'.
	No. 52, leave out lines 29 to 32.
	No. 53, line 33, at beginning insert 'modify,'.
	No. 54, line 34, after 'including' insert 'this Act and'.
	No. 218, line 39, after 'legislation' insert
	'passed, or made, before the passing of this Act'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 135
	 — 
	Notification requirements: periodic notification

Amendments made: No. 90, page 92, line 16, leave out 'period of one year' and insert 'applicable period'.
	No. 91, line 23, leave out 'period mentioned in subsection (1)' and insert 'applicable period'.
	No. 92, line 31, at end insert—
	'(4A) In this section "the applicable period" means—
	(a) in any case where subsection (4B) applies, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State, and
	(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
	(4B) This subsection applies if the last home address notified by the relevant offender under section 133(1) or 134(1) or subsection (1) above was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in section 133(5)(b).'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 140
	 — 
	Offences

Amendments made: No. 93, page 95, line 33, leave out '12 months' and insert 'the relevant period'.
	No. 94, line 36, at end insert—
	'(6A) In subsection (6)(a) "the relevant period" means—
	(a) in relation to England and Wales and Scotland, 12 months;
	(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, 6 months.'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 165
	 — 
	Disclosure of information about convictions etc of child sex offenders to members of the public

Amendments made: No. 95, page 111, line 21, after 'causing' insert 'serious'.
	No. 96, line 26, after 'from' insert 'serious'.
	No. 97, line 37, after first 'to' insert 'serious'.
	No. 98, page 112, line 38, at beginning insert 'serious'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 167
	 — 
	Notification requirements: prescribed information

Amendment made: No. 99, page 114, line 13, at end insert—
	'(5A) Section 85 of that Act (notification requirements: periodic notification) is amended as follows.
	(5B) In subsection (1), for "the period of one year" substitute "the applicable period".
	(5C) In subsection (3), for "the period referred to in subsection (1)" substitute "the applicable period".
	(5D) After subsection (4) insert—
	"(5) In this section, "the applicable period" means—
	(a) in any case where subsection (6) applies to the relevant offender, such period as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State, and
	(b) in any other case, the period of one year.
	(6) This subsection applies to the relevant offender if the last home address notified by him under section 83(1) or 84(1) or subsection (1) was the address or location of such a place as is mentioned in section 83(7)(b)."
	(5E) In section 138(2) of that Act (orders and regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure), for "86 or 130" substitute "any of sections 83 to 86 or section 130".'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 170
	 — 
	Orders and regulations

Amendments made: No. 55, page 117, line 23, after 'section' insert '111(4), 113(4) or'.
	No. 100, line 25, leave out 'section' and insert 'any of sections 133 to'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 171
	 — 
	Consequential etc. amendments and transitional and saving provision

Amendments made: No. 141, page 118, line 11, leave out from 'any' to 'has' in line 12 and insert
	'amendment or other provision made by this Act which comes into force before any other provision (whether made by this or any other Act or by any subordinate legislation)'.
	No. 142, line 18, after 'legislation' insert
	'passed, or made, before the passing of this Act'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 174
	 — 
	Extent

Amendments made: No. 101, page 119, line 38, at end insert—
	'(fa) section 140 (together with such of the other provisions of Part 9 as relate to the commission of offences under that section);'.
	No. 144, line 38, at end insert—
	'( ) section (Amendments relating to Scotland);'.
	No. 56, line 49, after 'sections' insert '116 and'.
	No. 57, page 120, line 4, leave out 'and 118' and insert 'to 119'.
	No. 58, line 6, leave out paragraph (e).
	No. 145, line 18, at end insert—
	'( ) In section 9(4) of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47) (power to extend provisions of that Act to the Channel Islands etc.) the reference to that Act includes a reference to that Act as amended by any provision of this Act.'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Clause 175
	 — 
	Commencement

Amendments made: No. 59, page 120, line 45, at end insert—
	'(e) paragraph 17 of Schedule 33.'.
	No. 60, page 121, line 10, at end insert—
	'(e) paragraph 22 of Schedule 33.'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Schedule 1
	 — 
	Further provisions about youth rehabilitation orders

Amendments made: No. 104, in page 122, line 19, leave out 'and' and insert—
	'(ja) paragraph 23A(2) and (4) (intoxicating substance treatment requirement), and'.
	No. 105, page 133, line 47, at end insert 'or experience'.
	No. 106, page 135, line 21, at end insert—
	 'Intoxicating substance treatment requirement
	23A (1) In this Part of this Act, "intoxicating substance treatment requirement", in relation to a youth rehabilitation order, means a requirement that the offender must submit, during a period or periods specified in the order, to treatment, by or under the direction of a person so specified having the necessary qualifications or experience, with a view to the reduction or elimination of the offender's dependency on or propensity to misuse intoxicating substances.
	(2) A court may not include an intoxicating substance treatment requirement in a youth rehabilitation order unless it is satisfied—
	(a) that the offender is dependent on, or has a propensity to misuse, intoxicating substances, and
	(b) that the offender's dependency or propensity is such as requires and may be susceptible to treatment.
	(3) The treatment required during a period specified under sub-paragraph (1) must be such one of the following kinds of treatment as may be specified in the youth rehabilitation order—
	(a) treatment as a resident in such institution or place as may be specified in the order, or
	(b) treatment as a non-resident at such institution or place, and at such intervals, as may be so specified,
	but the order must not otherwise specify the nature of the treatment.
	(4) A court may not include an intoxicating substance treatment requirement in a youth rehabilitation order unless—
	(a) the court is satisfied that arrangements have been or can be made for the treatment intended to be specified in the order (including, where the offender is to be required to submit to treatment as a resident, arrangements for the reception of the offender),
	(b) the requirement has been recommended to the court as suitable for the offender by a member of a youth offending team or by an officer of a local probation board, and
	(c) the offender has expressed willingness to comply with the requirement.
	(5) In this paragraph "intoxicating substance" means—
	(a) alcohol, or
	(b) any other substance or product other than a drug which is, or the fumes of which are, capable of being inhaled or otherwise used for the purpose of causing intoxication.
	(6) In sub-paragraph (5)(b) "drug" means a controlled drug as defined by section 2 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c. 38).'.
	No. 107, page 141, line 28, at end insert—
	
		
			 'An intoxicating substance treatment requirement. The person specified under paragraph 23A(1).'.

Schedule 9
	 — 
	The Commissioner's deaths remit

Amendments made: No. 61, page 205, line 12, leave out 'or premises in Scotland'.
	No. 62, page 205, line 20, leave out 'or in Scotland'.
	No. 63, line 24, leave out 'or premises in Scotland'.
	No. 64, line 28, leave out 'or in Scotland'.— [Mr. Khan.]

Schedule 22
	 — 
	Hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation

Amendment proposed: No. 231, in page 234, line 4, at end insert—
	'(2A) After subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) When considering whether to consent to a prosecution under subsection (1) the Attorney General must have particular regard to the importance of the right to freedom of expression provided by the European Convention on Human Rights."'.— [Mr. Heath.]
	 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
	 The House divided: Ayes 64, Noes 316.

Question accordingly negatived.
	 Amendment proposed: No. 1, page 234, line 26, schedule 22, at end insert—
	'13A After section 29J insert—
	"29JA Protection of freedom of expression (sexual orientation)
	Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion of, criticism of or expressions of antipathy towards, conduct relating to a particular sexual orientation, or urging persons of a particular sexual orientation to refrain from or modify conduct related to that orientation.".'.— [Jim Dobbin.]
	 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
	 The House divided: Ayes 169, Noes 338.

Question accordingly negatived.

Schedule 23
	 — 
	Offences relating to nuclear material and nuclear facilities

Amendment made: No. 108, page 242, line 20, leave out ', the Isle of Man'.— [Mr. Blizzard.]

Schedule 24
	 — 
	Penalties suitable for enforcement in England and Wales or Northern Ireland

Amendment made: No. 65, page 245, line 8, after 'person' insert
	'required to pay the financial penalty'. — [Mr. Blizzard.]

Schedule 25
	 — 
	Grounds for refusal to enforce financial penalties

Amendments made: No. 66, page 245, line 22, leave out 'offender' and insert 'liable person'.
	No. 67, page 245, line 25, leave out 'offender' and insert 'liable person'.
	No. 68, page 246, line 3, leave out from 'conduct' to end of line 4 and insert
	'by a person who was under the age of 10 when the conduct took place.'.
	No. 69, line 7, leave out 'offender' and insert 'liable person'.
	No. 70, line 11, leave out first 'offender' and insert 'liable person'.
	No. 70A, page 246, line 11, leave out second 'offender' and insert 'liable person'.
	No. 71, line 14, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
	'(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1), if the amount of a financial penalty is specified in a currency other than the euro, that amount must be converted to euros by reference to the London closing exchange rate on the date the decision was made.'.
	No. 72, line 19, leave out 'sub-paragraphs (1) and (2)' and insert 'sub-paragraph (1)'.
	No. 73, page 247, line 33, at end insert—
	'( ) "conduct" includes any act or omission;'.
	No. 74, line 36, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
	'(b) "liable person" means the person required to pay the financial penalty to which the certificate relates.'.
	No. 75, line 36, at end insert—
	'( ) If the decision was made in respect of conduct by a person other than the liable person, the references in paragraph 6 to the liable person are to be read as references to that other person.'.— [Mr. Blizzard.]

Schedule 28
	 — 
	Police misconduct and performance procedures

Amendments made: No. 109, in page 262, line 40, leave out 'and'.
	No. 110, page 262, line 41, at end insert 'and
	(e) persons employed by a police authority who are under the direction and control of the chief officer of police of the police force maintained by that authority.'.— [Mr. Blizzard.]

Schedule 32
	 — 
	Minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: No. 76, page 286, line 33, at end insert—
	 'Bail Act 1976
	4A In section 4 of the Bail Act 1976 (c. 63) (general right to bail of accused persons), in subsection (3) after paragraph (b) insert ", or
	(c) the Schedule to the Street Offences Act 1959 (breach of orders under section 1(2A) of that Act)." '.
	No. 146, page 287, line 8 at end insert—
	 'Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47)
	6A The Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 has effect subject to the following amendments.
	6B Before section 1 insert—

"Transfer of prisoners to or from the United Kingdom"

6C (1) Section 1 (issue of warrant for transfer) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsections (2) and (3) for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under this section".
	(3) In subsection (4)—
	(a) for "warrant under this Act" (in both places) substitute "warrant under this section";
	(b) in paragraph (b) omit the words "under this Act".
	(4) In subsection (5) (as it applies in cases in which the relevant Minister is the Scottish Ministers and in cases in which the relevant Minister is the Secretary of State) for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under this section".
	(5) In subsection (6) after "warrant" (in the first place it appears) insert "under this section".
	(6) In subsection (7)(b) after "under" insert "any of".
	(7) In subsection (8)—
	(a) after "similar to" insert "any of";
	(b) after "respect to" insert "—
	(a) "; and
	(c) at the end insert "; or
	(b) the transfer between different countries and territories (or different parts of a country or territory) of responsibility for the detention and release of persons who are required to be so detained in one of those countries or territories (or parts of a country or territory) but are present in the other country or territory (or part of a country or territory)."
	6D (1) Section 2 (transfer out of the United Kingdom) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1) after "warrant" insert "under section 1".
	(3) In subsection (4)—
	(a) in paragraph (a) for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under section 1"; and
	(b) in paragraph (b)(i) after "33(1)(b)" insert ", (1A)".
	(4) In subsection (7) for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under section 1".
	6E (1) Section 3 (transfer into the United Kingdom) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1), after "a warrant" insert "under section 1".
	(3) In subsections (2), (4) and (6), for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under section 1".
	(4) In subsection (7)—
	(a) at the beginning insert "Part 1 of"; and
	(b) for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under section 1".
	(5) Subsection (10) is omitted.
	6F (1) Section 4 (temporary return) is amended as follows
	(2) In subsection (1)—
	(a) for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under section 1";
	(b) in paragraph (a), after "Kingdom" (in the second place it appears) insert ", or from which responsibility for his detention and release has previously been transferred to the United Kingdom,";
	(c) in paragraph (b), after "transferred" insert ", or to which responsibility for his detention and release has previously been transferred,".
	(3) In subsection (2)—
	(a) for "a warrant under this Act" substitute "a warrant under section 1";
	(b) for "earlier warrant under this Act" substitute "earlier warrant under section 1 or section 4A".
	(4) In subsection (3)—
	(a) for "issued under this Act" substitute "issued under section 1";
	(b) after "an earlier warrant" insert "under section 1 or section 4A";
	(5) In subsection (4) for "warrant under this Act" substitute "warrant under section 1".
	(6) After subsection (5) insert—
	"(6) Any reference in subsection (5)(a) to the prisoner having previously been transferred into or from Scotland includes a reference to responsibility for his detention and release having previously been transferred to or from the Scottish Ministers (as the case may be).".
	6G Before section 5 (operation of warrant and retaking prisoners) insert—

"Supplementary and general provisions"

6H (1) Section 5 (operation of warrant and retaking prisoners) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1)—
	(a) for "under this Act" substitute "under section 1"; and
	(b) after "this section" insert "(apart from subsection (9))".
	(3) After subsection (8) insert—
	"(9) Where—
	(a) a warrant under section 4A has been issued, and
	(b) the relevant person is a person to whom subsection (3) of that section applies,
	subsections (2) to (8) above apply for the purposes of that warrant (but with the modifications contained in subsection (10)), except (without prejudice to section 4C(4) or any enactment contained otherwise than in this Act) in relation to any time when the relevant person is required to be detained in accordance with provisions contained in the warrant by virtue of section 4C(1)(b).
	(10) In their application for the purposes of a warrant under section 4A those subsections shall have effect as if—
	(a) any reference to the warrant under section 1 (however expressed) were a reference to the warrant under section 4A;
	(b) any reference to the prisoner were a reference to the relevant person;
	(c) in subsection (4)—
	(i) in paragraph (a) for "that person" there were substituted "the authorised person"; and
	(ii) paragraph (b) were omitted; and
	(d) in subsection (8)(a) for "transfer of a prisoner to or from Scotland" there were substituted "transfer of responsibility for the detention and release of the relevant person to the Scottish Ministers".
	6I (1) Section 6 (revocation etc. of warrants) is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1)—
	(a) for "warrant under this Act" (in the first place they appear) substitute "warrant under section 1";
	(b) in paragraph (b) for "this Act" substitute "that section".
	(3) After subsection (1) insert—
	"(1A) Subject to section 4A(8), if at any time it appears to the relevant Minister appropriate, in order that effect may be given to any such arrangements as are mentioned in section 4A(5)(a) for a warrant under section 4A to be revoked or varied, he may as the case may require—
	(a) revoke that warrant; or
	(b) revoke that warrant and issue a new warrant under section 4A containing provision superseding some or all of the provisions of the previous warrant."
	(4) In subsections (2) and (3) after "subsection (1)(b)" insert "or (1A)(b)".
	(5) In subsection (5)(a), for the words from "where" to the end substitute "in a case where—
	(i) the warrant was issued under section 1 and provides for the transfer of the prisoner to or from Scotland; or
	(ii) the warrant was issued under section 4A and provides for the transfer of responsibility for the detention and release of the relevant person to those Ministers;".
	6J (1) Section 8 is amended as follows.
	(2) In subsection (1) after the definition of "the prisoner" insert "; and
	"the relevant person" has the meaning given by section 4A(5)(b)."
	(3) In subsection (3)—
	(a) in paragraph (a) after "section 1(1)(a)" insert "or 4A(5)(a)";
	(b) in paragraph (b) for "such a party" substitute "a party to such international arrangements as are mentioned in section 1(1)(a)";
	(c) after paragraph (b) (but before the "or" after that paragraph) insert—
	"(ba) that the appropriate authority of a country or territory which is a party to such international arrangements as are mentioned in section 4A(5)(a) has agreed to the transfer of responsibility for the detention and release of a particular person in accordance with those arrangements;".
	6K (1) The Schedule (operation of certain enactments in relation to the prisoner) is amended as follows.
	(2) For the cross-heading before paragraph 1 substitute—

"Part 1
	 — 
	Warrants under section 1

Application of Part 1".
	(3) In paragraph 1—
	(a) at the beginning insert "This Part of";
	(b) after "under" insert "section 1 of".
	(4) After paragraph 8 insert—

"Part 2
	 — 
	Warrants under section 4A transferring responsibility to the relevant minister

9 This Part of this Schedule applies where a warrant is issued under section 4A providing for the transfer of responsibility for the detention and release of the relevant person to the relevant Minister (within the meaning of that section).
	10 Paragraphs 2 to 8 above apply as they apply where a warrant is issued under section 1, but with the following modifications.
	11 Any reference to "the relevant provisions" is to be read as a reference to the provisions contained in the warrant by virtue of section 4C(1)(b).
	12 (1) Any reference to the prisoner is to be read as a reference to the relevant person.
	(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply to the words "a short-term or long-term prisoner" in paragraph 2(3) (as it applies in Scotland to repatriated prisoners sentenced on or after 1 October 1993).
	13 In paragraph 2 (as it applies in Scotland to repatriated prisoners sentenced on or after 1 October 1993) the reference to prisoners repatriated to Scotland is to be read as a reference to any relevant person sentenced on or after 1 October 1993 in whose case the warrant under section 4A transfers responsibility for his detention and release to the Scottish Ministers.
	14 The reference in paragraph 7 to the time of the prisoner's transfer into the United Kingdom is to be read as a reference to the time at which the warrant under section 4A was issued."'.
	No. 147, page 287, line 37, at end insert—
	 'Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 (c. 5)
	10A In section 6(7) of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 (transfer of overseas prisoner to give evidence or assist investigation in the United Kingdom), for the words from "having been" to the end of paragraph (b) substitute "—
	(c) having been transferred there, or responsibility for his detention and release having been transferred there, from the United Kingdom under the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984;
	(d) having been transferred there, or responsibility for his detention and release having been transferred there, under any similar provision or arrangement from any other country or territory,".'.
	No. 148, page 288, line 17, at end insert—
	 'Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 (c. 9)
	12A In section 10 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 (life prisoners transferred to Scotland), after subsection (4) insert—
	"(4A) The reference in subsection (4)(b) above to a person who has been transferred to Scotland in pursuance of a warrant under the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 includes a reference to a person who is detained in Scotland in pursuance of a warrant issued by the Scottish Ministers under section 4A of that Act (warrant transferring responsibility for detention and release of offender) (referred to in subsection (4B) below as "a relevant person)".
	(4B) Such a person is to be taken to have been transferred when the warrant under section 4A of that Act was issued in respect of that person."'.
	No. 111, page 289, line 42, at end insert—
	'20A In section 24(5)(a) (first meeting: duration of contract), after "under paragraph" insert "9ZD,".
	20B In section 28(a) (offender etc. referred back to court), for "Part I" substitute "Parts 1 and 1ZA".'.
	No. 112, page 290, line 4, at end insert—
	'22D (1) Schedule 1 (youth offender panels: further court proceedings) is amended as follows.
	(2) In the heading for Part 1, at the end insert ": REVOCATION OF REFERRAL ORDER".
	(3) In paragraphs 5(3), 9 and 14(2)(b), after "under paragraph" insert "9ZD,".'.
	No. 149, page 290, line 11, at end insert—
	 'Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 (S.I. 2001/2564) (N.I. 2)
	23A In Article 10 of the Life Sentences (Northern Ireland) Order 2001 life prisoners transferred to Northern Ireland), after paragraph (5) insert—
	"(6) The reference in paragraph (4)(b) to a person transferred to Northern Ireland in pursuance of a warrant under the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 includes a person who is detained in Northern Ireland in pursuance of a warrant under section 4A of that Act (warrant transferring responsibility for detention and release of offender)."'.
	No. 150, page 290, line 11, at end insert—
	 'Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (c. 32)
	23B In section 48(2)(b) of the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (transfer of EU etc prisoner to assist UK investigation), for the words from "having been" to the end of paragraph (b) substitute "—
	(a) having been transferred there, or responsibility for his detention and release having been transferred there, from the United Kingdom under the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984;
	(b) having been transferred there, or responsibility for his detention and release having been transferred there, under any similar provision or arrangement from any other country or territory."'.
	No. 151, page 291, line 32, at end insert—
	'32I In section 273 (life prisoners transferred to England and Wales), after subsection (4) insert—
	"(5) The reference in subsection (2)(b) above to a person who has been transferred to England and Wales in pursuance of a warrant issued under the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 includes a reference to a person who is detained in England and Wales in pursuance of a warrant under section 4A of that Act (warrant transferring responsibility for detention and release of offender)."'.— [Mr. Blizzard.]

Schedule 33
	 — 
	Transitory, transitional and saving provisions

Amendments made: No. 143, page 295, line 40, leave out paragraph 8.
	No. 226, in page 296, line 21, at end insert—

'Part 2A
	 — 
	Appeals

Appeals against conviction etc.
	10A (1) The amendments made by sections 26 and 28 apply in relation to an appeal under Part 1 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (c. 19) if the proceedings on appeal begin on or after the date on which those sections come into force.
	(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the proceedings on appeal begin—
	(a) if the appellant appeals with leave of the Court of Appeal, on the date the application for leave is served on the Crown Court officer,
	(b) if the judge of the court of trial grants a certificate that the case is fit for appeal—
	(i) on the date the application for the certificate is served on the Crown Court officer or, in the case of an oral application, on the date the application is made to the judge, or
	(ii) in a case where a certificate is granted without any application being made, on the date the certificate is granted, or
	(c) if the Criminal Cases Review Commission refer the case to the Court of Appeal under Part 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 (c. 35), on the date the reference is made.
	(3) In this paragraph, references to service on the Crown Court officer are to be read in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (S.I. 2005/384).
	10B (1) The amendments made by sections 27 and 29 apply in relation to an appeal under Part 1 of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (c. 47) if the proceedings on appeal begin on or after the date on which those sections come into force.
	(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the proceedings on appeal begin—
	(a) if the appellant appeals with leave of the Court of Appeal, on the date the application for leave is served on the proper officer,
	(b) if leave to appeal is not required, on the date notice of appeal is served on the proper officer,
	(c) if the judge of the court of trial grants a certificate that the case is fit for appeal—
	(i) on the date the application for the certificate is made to the court of trial or lodged with the proper officer, or
	(ii) in a case where a certificate is granted without any application being made, on the date the certificate is granted, or
	(d) if the Criminal Cases Review Commission refer the case to the Court of Appeal under Part 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 (c. 35), on the date the reference is made.
	(3) In this paragraph, "the proper officer" has the same meaning as in the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Rules 1968 (S.R & O (N.I.) 1968/218).
	 Prosecution appeals
	10C (1) The amendment made by section 30 applies in relation to an appeal under Part 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44) if the proceedings on appeal begin on or after the date on which that section comes into force.
	(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the proceedings on appeal begin—
	(a) if the prosecution appeals with leave of the Crown Court judge, on the date the application for leave is served on the Crown Court officer or, in the case of an oral application, on the date the application is made, or
	(b) if the prosecution appeals with leave of the Court of Appeal, on the date the application for leave is served on the Crown Court officer.
	(3) In this paragraph, references to service on the Crown Court officer are to be read in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (S.I.2005/384).
	10D (1) The amendment made by section 31 applies in relation to an appeal under Part IV of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/1500 (N.I.9)) if the proceedings on appeal begin on after the date on which that section comes into force.
	(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, the proceedings on appeal begin—
	(a) if the prosecution appeals with leave of the Crown Court judge, on the date the application for leave is made,
	(b) if the prosecution appeals with leave of the Court of Appeal, on the date the application for leave is served on the proper officer, or
	(c) if leave to appeal is not required, on the date the prosecution informs the Crown Court judge that it intends to appeal.
	(3) In this paragraph, "the proper officer" has the same meaning as in the Criminal Appeal (Prosecution Appeals) Rules (Northern Ireland) 2005 (S.R (N.I.) 2005/159).'.
	No. 152, page 299, line 32, at end insert—
	'22A The amendment made by section (Delivery of prisoner to place abroad for purposes of transfer out of the United Kingdom) does not apply to warrants under section 1 of the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 issued before the commencement of that section.'.
	No. 114, page 300, line 4, leave out '140(6)(a)' and insert
	'140(6A)(a) in its application in relation to England and Wales'.— [Mr. Blizzard.]

Schedule 34
	 — 
	Repeals and revocations

Amendments made: No. 77, page 307, column 2, leave out lines 6 and 7.
	No. 78, page 307, column 2, leave out lines 27 and 28.
	No. 79, line 29, column 2, leave out 'subsections (2) and (3)' and insert 'subsections (3) and (3A)'.
	No. 80, line 31, column 2, leave out 'paragraphs (b) and (c)' and insert 'paragraph (b)'.
	No. 81, line 47, at end insert—
	
		
			 'Armed Forces Act 2006 (c. 52) In Schedule 16, paragraph 225.'. 
		
	
	No. 153, page 310, line 18, at end insert—
	
		
			 'Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 (c. 47) In section 1(4)(b) the words "under this Act". 
			  Section 3(10). 
			  In section 8(1) the word "and" after the definition of "order".'. 
		
	
	No. 154, page 310, line 18, at end insert—
	
		
			 'Police and Justice Act 2006 (c.48) Section 44(4).'. 
		
	
	Title
	 Amendment made: No. 155, in title, line 8, after 'penalties;' insert
	'to amend the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984;'.— [Mr. Blizzard.]
	 Order for Third Reading read.

David Hanson: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
	I thank hon. Members on both sides of the House for their contribution both in Committee and on the Floor of the House today— [Interruption.]

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. Will Members who do not wish to participate in the Third Reading of the Bill please leave the Chamber quickly and quietly?

David Hanson: I pay particular tribute to the Opposition spokesmen, the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) and the hon. Members for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), for Enfield, Southgate (Mr. Burrowes) and for Cambridge (David Howarth). They have led for their parties both in Committee and on the Floor of the House, and I hope that they have seen some fruits from their labour. I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling, for their support in Committee—

Ann Widdecombe: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I note that we have about half an hour for Third Reading. Large groups of amendments have already gone completely undebated, and a Minister had to gallop through and not give any rationale for some amendments in order to facilitate debate. On a very major amendment, we did get a vote but had very restricted debate. Other major amendments, particularly the group introduced by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), have not even been discussed. This is an important Bill, and I would be grateful to know whether it is your view that we, as Back Benchers with the right to scrutinise legislation, have had a fair crack of the whip.

Madam Deputy Speaker: The occupant of the Chair is governed by the decisions taken earlier today when the programme motion was agreed. The right hon. Lady's comments are none the less on the record.

Gerald Howarth: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. In supporting my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe), I also believe that it is a contempt of Parliament that so little time should have been—

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman's point follows on from that of his right hon. Friend, and I have already ruled on that point of order.

Gerald Howarth: May I then ask you to be kind enough to convey to Mr. Speaker the fact that many Members believe that it is in contempt of Parliament that so little time has been made available? Speaker Lenthall stood out against an overbearing Government, so will Mr. Speaker stand out against this overbearing Government?

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. Mr. Speaker reads a copy of  Hansard each and every morning, so the hon. Gentleman's comments will be relayed to him.

David Hanson: When Mr. Speaker looks at those comments, Madam Deputy Speaker, he will see that the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) was not present during the whole of today's debate.

Gerald Howarth: rose—

Fiona Mactaggart: rose—

David Hanson: I give way to my hon. Friend.

Fiona Mactaggart: I was present during our debate and the Minister will be aware that this is the first time in five years that the House has been in a position to reform the prostitution laws, which the Bill is designed to do. In an era when hundreds of thousands of women are trafficked into sexual slavery, face daily rape and even murder, it has to be said that the Bill does not deal sufficiently with those problems. Will the Minister take an early opportunity to legislate to tackle the demand for prostitution? Sweden has shown that it works and we should follow its lead.

David Hanson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point. Like her, I am sorry that we did not have sufficient time to debate those matters today. Tomorrow, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Mr. Coaker), along with the Solicitor-General and the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage (Barbara Follett), are visiting Sweden as part of a six-month review of the demand side of prostitution. I can assure my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) that those Ministers are conducting the review fully and, I hope, speedily. I expect the review to conclude in no more than six months, and we hope to announce the outcome as soon as possible with a view to legislating as necessary in the next Session.
	I should like to pay tribute to my hon. Friend for her work on prostitution. I fully recognise that we need to tackle the demand for it, as well as continue to take action against the vile trade of human trafficking. I know that these issues are of great concern to Members. It is time for a real debate on those issues; it is time for change; it is time for further—

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I remind hon. Members that a Third Reading debate should be about the contents of the Bill under consideration.

David Hanson: I accept that, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am simply responding to the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Slough and explaining that it is our firm intention to consider introducing legislation at an early opportunity in order to take that agenda forward.

Gerald Howarth: The Minister accused me of not being present during much of the earlier debate. That is perfectly true, as I had an appointment at the Ministry of Defence, having been invited by a Government official. I came here specifically to support my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe), and I have to say that what the Minister has just said is a travesty. The hon. Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) was unable to debate the issue of prostitution as she wanted to. Furthermore, we were told by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle)—I would like the Minister to confirm this—that the Government are apparently going to introduce, either in this Bill or in some other measure, a law to repeal the blasphemy provisions. Will he confirm whether that will be done in this Bill? Will he confirm whether the Government have made up their minds on the matter before consulting the Church of England? Parliament has not had the opportunity to debate it.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The House needs to get back to the idea that we should be conducting a traditional Third Reading debate. Mrs. Heal has already made it clear that that requires the debate to be focused on what is in the Bill at this stage. I cannot begin to anticipate what might be done in other ways in other Bills in other places— [Interruption.] Order. My ruling applies across the House—to the Minister and all Members.

David Hanson: Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Brian Iddon: rose—

John McDonnell: rose—

John Bercow: Will the Minister give way?

David Hanson: I cannot give way to three Members at once. The hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) should know that.
	In response to the hon. Member for Aldershot, let me simply say that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department gave a commitment today that the issue would be considered in another place very shortly in the context of blasphemy legislation. I will now give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton, South-East (Dr. Iddon).

Brian Iddon: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. I am also grateful for the fact that we are to have a much-needed full debate on the issue of prostitution, which is of great concern to me for constituency reasons. May I ask him, however, whether he would be prepared to remove the relevant clauses from the Bill as it is today and transfer them to the final Bill? We have not discussed them on this occasion, and some of us would certainly have objected to clause 105. Removing them from this Bill and proposing them in, I understand, the fourth session of this Parliament would allow us a full debate on the whole subject of prostitution, and enable us to get the law absolutely right this time.

David Hanson: As my hon. Friend will know, the issue of prostitution is not currently in the Bill in terms of the proposals from my hon. Friend the Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart), but I have already said that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office is considering these matters and will report to the House in due course. I will now give way to the hon. Member for Buckingham.

John Bercow: I am grateful to the Minister. Thankfully, in my view, clause 107, which creates the offence of homophobic hate crime, remains unamended in the Bill. On the assumption that that continues to be the case after the other place has considered these matters, can the Minister tell us roughly how soon the Government expect to be able to issue the invaluable guidance to which they have already committed themselves?

David Hanson: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's support for those measures. I think that they are supported across Government and the Opposition, and I am pleased that my colleagues were able to introduce them. We are working at official level to complete the process as speedily as possible, subject to the consideration of another place and to Royal Assent.

John McDonnell: rose—

David Hanson: I will give way to my hon. Friend, but I must then make some progress.

John McDonnell: On Second Reading, Back Benchers were given a maximum of three minutes each in which to debate prostitution, and only three were able to speak. We have not been able to debate any amendments on the subject today. Now, in the middle of the Third Reading debate, the Minister has announced a Government review of the prostitution legislation that may result in subsequent legislation. In the meantime, we are producing legislation that may lead to the imprisonment of thousands of women. May I urge him to think again? If there is to be a delegation and a review, can we remove clause 105 and end up with a decent Bill, a decent proposal, and a decent period in which we can debate the matter properly? What has happened today has been a fiasco.

David Hanson: As my hon. Friend will know, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, who is dealing with this matter, said in Committee before Christmas that he was undertaking the review that I have just mentioned, along with my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General and the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage. They will visit Sweden on Thursday to examine the legislative position there. In the context of the amendments that were not considered today, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department has said he will ensure that the issues are considered in another place following a review of the legislation and the visit to Sweden. That may involve legislation in another place and in this place at a future date, but he will examine the issues in detail. I appreciate the concerns that Members have expressed, but I must make some progress now.

Paul Beresford: rose—

David Hanson: I will take one more intervention, but then I must make some progress.

Paul Beresford: Part 13 of the Bill includes a clause on child sex offenders. On Second Reading, I raised two issues with the Minister in that regard. Two new clauses were proposed, but fell. I intend, with the help of my colleagues on the Front Bench, to pursue them in another place. I should be grateful if the Minister examined them carefully and positively. He will find support on his side of the House, including in the Home Department.

David Hanson: The hon. Gentleman did refer to those issues on Second Reading, and of course I will examine the proposals.
	This Bill is a key Bill for the Government, and I am proud to have introduced it in the House with the Lord Chancellor. It brings into effect not just violent offender orders, the extension of existing crack house closure proposals and measures to deal with nuisance and disturbance on NHS premises, but strong preventive measures on youth rehabilitation orders, measures for the early removal of foreign national prisoners, measures to place the prison and probation ombudsman on a statutory footing, measures to create a youth conditional caution for offenders aged 16 and 17, and a new offence of extreme pornography—a matter on which hon. Members have campaigned for many years.
	I am particularly pleased that we have brought forward measures to make incitement to homophobic hatred an offence and to end such incitement. I am also pleased that, following the Carter proposals, we brought forward before Christmas major measures not just to support the building of prison places that Carter proposed but to make effective changes on indeterminate public protection sentences, bail conditions and other matters.

Lynne Jones: I welcome the provisions against incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation, but is not it illogical for the Government to introduce those measures without also legislating against incitement to hatred on grounds of transgender issues? Will my right hon. Friend look at that matter and perhaps meet me and other hon. Members who are concerned about it with a view to introducing appropriate amendments in the other place?

David Hanson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point. I have some considerable sympathy with the points that she makes. I know that the Lord Chancellor and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston, will be happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss those matters in due course in relation to the legislation.
	This Bill is an important piece of legislation. It brings forward a number of measures that have been long expected and which will help to continue the Government's record on reducing crime. Crime has fallen by 35 per cent. since 1997. The risk of being a victim of crime has fallen since 1997. The number of crimes detected has risen and public confidence in the criminal justice system has increased. The Bill will help to add to those measures and to that record of success, and I commend it to the House.

Nick Herbert: Today, we debated for just an hour new clauses that were tabled just 48 hours ago to outlaw industrial action in prisons. We also debated for just under an hour and a half new proposals that the Secretary of State tabled following his speech to the Labour party conference on important matters relating to home owners' ability to defend their properties. One of my hon. Friends who introduced a private Member's Bill on the subject was unable to be called because there was insufficient time.
	We then debated sentencing provisions in the Bill for just an hour and a quarter: provisions of serious controversy, particularly in relation to the fettering of indeterminate sentences for public protection, the recall of prisoners and the new bail provisions. All the provisions that I have mentioned so far are in some way new to the Bill—they go beyond the Bill that was introduced on Second Reading.
	We debated youth justice for just an hour, including—the point was raised by the Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath)—the fundamental principle of the extent to which we should be incarcerating juveniles. We debated the repatriation of prisoners for just a few minutes. We debated blasphemy and incitement to hatred, fundamentally important matters, in less than an hour—

David Hanson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Nick Herbert: No, I will not.
	Back Benchers barely had a chance to intervene, let alone to make a speech.
	We debated prostitution, or rather one hon. Member moved her new clause on prostitution and was able to speak for 15 seconds. We did not reach at all the powers of magistrates courts—very controversial measures to restrict magistrates' ability to suspend sentences. We did not discuss provisions on pornography and sex offenders. We did not reach the issue of personal data, and Opposition Members were unable to move an amendment proposing an offence of recklessly mishandling data—an offence that is currently of enormous interest to the public given the debacle in relation to data loss by the Government, and which has been proposed by the Justice Committee and the Information Commissioner. We did not debate miscarriages of justice or powers to restrict the Court of Appeal, which have caused enormous controversy outside the House, and on which the Government have been completely at sea.

David Hanson: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Nick Herbert: No, I will not give way.
	We did not debate violent offender orders, which raise fundamental issues.  [Interruption.] I am talking about the debate we have just had, in case that has escaped the Minister. We did not debate nuisance on NHS premises, either. The Home Office promised a debate on tobacco sales—the promise was made in Committee—but that did not happen.

Jack Straw: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Nick Herbert: I shall not give way to the right hon. Gentleman for the moment; I wish to make an additional point.
	I want the Government, and particularly the right hon. Gentleman, to understand that I am not going through the motions in relation to the criticisms that Conservative Members frequently make about criminal justice Bills: that they are often unprepared, that they change, and that there has been a series of them. It would be easy to make those criticisms in relation to this Bill, and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) did so, but I am making a specific and serious point, which I hope the right hon. Gentleman will take seriously, about the pitiful lack of scrutiny that this House has just given to this important Bill.

Jack Straw: rose—

Nick Herbert: The right hon. Gentleman will have a chance to reply in a minute. There are serious issues that have simply not been given proper consideration by this House. I believe that we in the House of Commons have today treated the public, and in particular groups within the public, with complete contempt. What will gay people think about the House debating for only half an hour an important measure relating to their protection, in respect of which hon. Members, including me, were also suggesting that there should be restrictions on that protection? What do the Anglican Church and its members, and other people of faith, think about the fact that we chose to debate the blasphemy laws for only a few minutes? What do prison officers think about the fact that a proposal that was first made on Monday and was the subject of a statement, and has now received less than an hour's debate, has already gone through the House of Commons? The Government said it was not an emergency measure, but it looked like that to me.
	I am being serious when I say that I do not believe that this is any way for the House of Commons to behave. What has happened today is made worse by the Government's posturing in relation to their pledge to strengthen Parliament. Those words have rung particularly hollow today. I ask the Secretary of State—who I believe is committed to, and personally supports, the strengthening of the powers of this place and of the role of the legislature—to reflect on whether he really believes that this has been Parliament's finest hour. I believe that we in this House should have cause to be ashamed of ourselves about the fact that we have debated and considered these matters with such little scrutiny, when we are making the criminal law. Above all, I think the Government should be genuinely ashamed about the way they have behaved, and I would like them to reflect seriously on that point.

David Heath: Without employing hyperbole, I must say that I think this has been a deplorable advertisement for the powers of this House to scrutinise legislation effectively. I am serious when I say that nothing this House does is more important than looking at criminal justice legislation. A superfluity of such legislation is going through, and it has a direct effect on the life and liberty of individuals in this country. If the House of Commons is not employed in giving it proper scrutiny before it passes from this Chamber, it is worthless in protecting the interests and liberties of this country's people.

Philip Hollobone: I served with the hon. Gentleman for some 47 hours on the Public Bill Committee. Does he agree that the promising start to the Committee, whereby a new process invited witnesses to give evidence, was a good departure from the norm and is in sad contrast with what has happened today, when consideration of the Bill has ended in such a shabby way after such a promising start?

David Heath: It is indeed, and I am glad that the hon. Gentleman made that point. The Committee did its work well, and I paid tribute earlier, and I do so again, to the Ministers who went before it and to those who represented the Conservatives. We did our job as well as could be expected within the constraints of the Committee system, but the parliamentary system is supposed to be an iterative one. It is not supposed to be a system whereby Committee does it all and then something is rubber-stamped on Report in this Chamber. The Report stage is the opportunity for the wider House to have its say on issues that engage it, yet today's Report stage effectively started at 5.40 pm, because until then we were considering new measures. We were considering new Government proposals that the Committee had never considered, so this House was sitting as a rather inadequate committee for the first few hours of today's consideration of the Bill. We had just two hours to deal with what took the Committee many days to consider, and that is simply inadequate. It is also unfair, not only to the Members who came to this House this evening, some of whom were keen to debate issues that were of great importance to them and to their constituencies, but to the people outside this House whom we represent.
	I shall not go through all the areas that we did not touch upon, but the Bill contains vital measures. We have not had the opportunity to test on Report, on the Floor of this Chamber, matters that it is impossible to suggest are trivial. After all the years of controversy about how we protect the public against sex offenders who have been released—the multi-agency public protection arrangements and the so-called Sarah's law—I cannot believe that the Bill will have gone through without a word being said this evening on the subject. The House has had no opportunity to talk about a fundamental change in this country's public protection systems.
	The proposals on extreme pornography are controversial in some circles and will have an effect. People might be expected to be able to express a view on them, but again we have not had the opportunity to discuss them at all. I could also mention the prostitution issues. We know that Ministers are going to Sweden, and I believe that they are going to Holland too, so we are not simply looking at one country's experiences. I welcome that, because it is a sensible way of gathering evidence to see what might be a proper future response. If something is going to form part of this Bill, it is proper for this House to have the opportunity to debate it, yet, as we know, this House was prevented from doing so. The changes to the Court of Appeal are matters of fundamental legal substance. They are not a trivial matter or an afterthought that can simply be swept along.
	In passing this Bill to another place we will sub-contract our primary purpose as a House to an unelected House, so that it can do the work that we apparently cannot do. I find it offensive that we spend time talking about the primacy of this House of Commons but the Executive then treat it in this way. I am sorry if this is, to an extent, a continuation of our debate on the programme motion, but that is inevitable, because this seriously large and important Bill has received inadequate scrutiny. If we cannot say that on Third Reading, when can we say it? In a few moments, the Bill will have left this House and gone to another place for consideration. We will not have a similar opportunity to affect the shape of the Bill again. The House has failed in its duty.
	The Bill has its good points and its bad points. It is open to amendment, and we are now relying on those in another place to make those amendments for us. It would have been so simple for the Government to have provided another day of debate, which would have satisfied the House and the requirements of scrutiny and would not have thrown the Government's legislative programme into disarray.

Edward Garnier: In the event that the other place sends back amendments, does the hon. Gentleman think that we will be given adequate time to consider them?

David Heath: The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that that is a rhetorical question. He knows perfectly well that the procedures of the House do not allow proper consideration of Lords amendments and that the ping-pong system offers scant scrutiny of what the other House says with no attempt to coalesce ideas from both Chambers and reconcile them constructively. Today has set out in stark contrast all the deficiencies of the legislative process in this House.
	As I said earlier, the Lord Chancellor is responsible for the Bill. Before he was Lord Chancellor, he was Leader of the House. He committed himself to making the legislative process work properly. He said how important this Chamber and the Report stage were.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but he has admitted that this is a continuation of the earlier debate. I ask him to bear it in mind that other Members may wish to participate in the debate in the last few remaining minutes.

David Heath: There may indeed, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The sad truth is that I cannot possibly cover the content of the Bill, because we do not have time to do so. That is the sad tragedy in the way in which the Government have chosen to address the Bill tonight. It is a shame on the House.

Ian McCartney: I think I have one minute, and I want to support the Government. In particular, I want to thank them for their proposals in clause 107 and schedule 22. The truth is that they are a logical extension of the law, and have been the law in Northern Ireland for some time. There is no evidence in Northern Ireland that the law curtails religious freedom, comment or thought. With Northern Ireland being as it is, if that was the case we would have heard about it. The truth is that the British public will welcome the debate.
	On the subject of the religious divide, gay people are religious and carry through their religious belief. People who are not gay who are religious still support those who are gay. The issue is not about a division between those who are religious and those who are not. Human rights are about all people. Sexuality is not a gateway to a human right. A human right is—
	 It being eight hours after  the  commencement of proceedings on the programme motion, Mr. Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [this day].
	 Question agreed to.
	 Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

John McDonnell: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The role of the Speaker in the House has traditionally been to protect the rights of Back Benchers. May I ask you to engage in discussions with the Speaker about what has happened today and about how the role of the Speaker can be used to protect the rights of Back Benchers?
	Even on Third Reading, only one Back Bencher has been allowed to speak for 90 seconds. That has been the practice throughout the Bill—although not in Committee—for those Back Benchers who did not serve on Committee. Some have described that as a disgrace. Today, we have sunk to a new level in the House in failing properly to scrutinise the Bill and in involving the whole House in the process. I ask you to engage in that discussion with the Speaker, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and to come back with some proposals about how Back Benchers' rights can be protected.

Edward Garnier: Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. On behalf of Opposition Front Benchers, may I associate my party entirely with what the hon. Gentleman has said?

Mr. Deputy Speaker: The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means responded to a point of order on the same lines when she was in the Chair earlier. The discontent felt in certain parts of the House is on the record and Mr. Speaker will be aware of that, but he is the servant of the House and must preside over what the House agrees to do. It is not possible to involve the Chair in determining the length of time devoted to any particular item of business, or indeed what the business before the House is. That has not been how things have been done, and any change would require a radical rethink.
	However, the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) is quite right to say that Mr. Speaker is concerned about the rights of Members, and no doubt he will study carefully the views that have been expressed in the House today.

PETITION

Post Office Closures (Harrogate)

Phil Willis: I have pleasure in presenting a petition signed by more than 7,000 Harrogate residents. They are dismayed and angered that their local sub-post office in Cold Bath road is faced with closure when it is highly profitable, well used by a wide selection of the local community and provides vital services, particularly to the elderly and the less mobile.
	The petition states:
	The Petition of residents, employees in and visitors to the Borough of Harrogate and Knaresborough and all those seriously concerned about the decision of the Post Office to review the future of Cold Bath Road Sub Post Office at 109 Cold Bath Road, Harrogate HG2 0NU,
	Declares that the importance of this Sub Post Office to thousands of people living, working in and visiting Cold Bath Road and surrounding areas, including the more elderly and disabled; recalls this Office was retained when the Harlow Hill Sub Post Office was closed; and reminds Members of Parliament of the number of closures of Local Sub Post Offices in the Harrogate and Knaresborough area over recent years.
	The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform to make clear to the Post Office the importance of this Office continuing as a Sub-Post Office and the benefit of withdrawing as soon as possible any proposals which put at risk any of the existing services provided from this Office. And the Petitioners remain, etc.
	[P000103]

INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn. —[Mr. Blizzard.]

David Amess: In this Adjournment debate, I want to explore how complaints against the police are handled. I do not expect the Minister responding to the debate to be able to reply in detail to the matters that I am about to raise, but although I never intended to develop expertise in the process involved in complaints against the police, I should be grateful if we continued the dialogue at a later stage.
	No one likes to be the subject of a complaint. The process can be tiresome and a nuisance, but public bodies such as the police must be open to real scrutiny. The question of who polices the police is one of the matters that I want to cover tonight. In other words, to which organisations are the police responsible for their actions? In addition, I want to examine the role of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the powers of the Independent Police Complaints Commission. I also want to find out who enforces the judgment when the IPCC finds against the police after a complaint has been made. Finally, what is the purpose of the police authorities, and how are they independent from the police force?
	I have been a Member of Parliament for 25 years, and in that time there have been big changes in the way in which the police operate as an organisation. It is not the role of this Adjournment debate to go into too much detail about how things have changed, but they certainly have changed. All Members of Parliament have been flooded with faxes and emails from serving police officers, complaining about their pay and conditions. The Minister will be only too well aware of that. While police officers are complaining about their pay and conditions, the general public, who pay for the service, also raise with MPs their concerns about the way in which police officers do their job today.
	I feel very strongly about the poor example of leadership given to the force by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. On 1 January he appeared on the "Today" programme—he seems not to be inhibited in any way in his dealings with the media, unlike those who have held the post before—and he said that there was a growing problem in the relationship between the police and the public whom they are supposed to serve. He is right, and I think that he is part of the problem. He talks and acts like a politician, but he has not been elected and he does not seem to be accountable.
	There is a growing sense that the police see themselves as controlling us, rather than serving us. That clearly starts at the top. The present head of the Met has politicised the job since he took over, and I can prove that. In September 2005, the head of the Met made history when he appeared on "Any Questions". That was ridiculous. If I had been Home Secretary, I would have called him in on Monday morning to find out what on earth he was playing at. He was the first serving police commissioner to appear on that programme. Listeners were treated to his opinions on the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, racial segregation and the meaning of being British.
	Shortly afterwards, the head of the Met even gave the Richard Dimbleby lecture. In the same month, he openly lobbied Members of Parliament in support of the extension of the detention of terror suspects to 90 days. He cannot have it both ways. Either he is a policeman or he is a politician. He cannot continue to be both. Recently, five former heads of the armed services made speeches in the other place, but they were not in post at the time. We cannot continue with the present head of the Met giving his opinions on anything and everything. Indeed, the problem is much more serious than that.
	I turn to the terrible case of the killing—murder—of Mr. de Menezes. No Member of Parliament who has children will be content with matters as they stand at the moment. I shall not bore the House with the precise details of the case, but before the Independent Police Complaints Commission reported, the head of the Met clearly said that if it found evidence of systemic failure, he would resign. Well, the IPCC found that there was significant corporate failing, and that is exactly the same thing. We should not play with semantics. The head of the Met said that he would resign, and he has not done so. Even more appallingly, he decided that the IPCC would not be allowed to investigate the killing of Mr. de Menezes. It emerged, of course, that he had no power to decide that, and the IPCC work was soon under way. I repeat to the Minister that that sort of behaviour is not acceptable. As we all know, the Greater London authority passed a motion of no confidence, and all sorts of people have given a view about the behaviour of the Met, but its head is still there.
	The purpose of this debate is to examine the role of the IPCC. Let me tell the Minister at the outset that I have the highest regard for that organisation. It is definitely an improvement on the old Police Complaints Authority. I congratulate the chairman of the IPCC on his appointment; he has splendid hard-working staff behind him. At the end of my remarks, I will tell the Minister that I want the IPCC's powers to be increased. I have been given a splendid briefing by the Library on the powers to investigate complaints about the police. The control of policing is shared between the Home Secretary, chief constables and local police authorities, but I must say that, with the best will in the world, the system just is not working. When there is a tough complaint, we end up being given the runaround.
	All Members of Parliament take up complaints on behalf of constituents, particularly relating to the health service. Some of the issues go on for a year, or two or three years. The staff investigating the complaints move on. I think that in certain respects it is rather hoped that the complainant will eventually give up, but I will not give up on any of the issues, because I feel strongly that the system is not working.
	As an Essex Member of Parliament, I have dealt with a number of issues concerning the police on behalf of constituents, particularly when David Stevens was the chief constable of Essex, and Michael Thwaites the chief superintendent of Southend. The sort of complaints that I used to hear were that there were not enough police officers; that is hardly a new complaint. A view was taken that many of the complaints, such as those to do with graffiti and noise nuisance, were trivial, and that the police were concentrating on serious crime. All my constituents pay for the police service, and they were just not satisfied with the way in which matters were dealt with. I shall briefly mention three complaints on which I have spent a huge amount of time trying to help my constituents to resolve the issue—but, in a way, to no effect.
	On 7 November 2001, there was a terrible car crash on Hamlet Court road in Westcliff-on-Sea. It took place in heavy, congested, slow-moving traffic. The 19-year-old lady driving the car, who had her boyfriend next to her, found a vehicle coming towards her, swerved to avoid it, and crashed into a wall. She died a week later in hospital. Her mother was a magistrate. The person responsible for the accident had one eye, no car insurance and no MOT certificate. I could go on and on about all the issues involved. The Crown Prosecution Service in Essex did not do a good job on that case, to say the least. At the end of it all, the police were blamed for being a week too late in laying the matter before the court, and the person responsible for the incident ended up paying a fine of £60.
	I had a debate in Westminster Hall, which was answered by one of the Law Officers—the then Solicitor-General, now the deputy leader of the Labour party. She admitted all those points—the police were at fault, the Crown Prosecution Service was at fault—but no one was held responsible. I say again to the Minister that I hope that when he gets a chance, he will ask his officials to look again at that case.
	The second case is that of Mr. Phil Collings. Mr. Collings, who happened to be a twin, died on 3 December 2004, at the age of 19 coming up to 20. He left the Talk nightclub in Southend and became involved in an altercation with a number of youths. Moments later, Mr. Collings was found not to be breathing. An ambulance was called, but Mr. Collings passed away at 3 am.
	Mr. Collings had been lying on the floor, and on top of him was the son of a local police officer. I will not go into huge detail about what went on, but the police did not inform the pathologist that Mr. Collings had suffered a blow outside the Talk nightclub. Again, the Crown Prosecution Service and the IPCC were involved. I have raised the matter in the House of Commons many times, but at the end of it all it was claimed that Mr. Collings died as a result of sudden adult death syndrome. There was insufficient evidence of a physical altercation.
	As the Minister can see, I have dealt with two cases involving youngsters. The families will never get over those deaths. The third and final case is that of Mr. Faisal Al-Ani, who died in July 2005. He died in police custody, and the case has not been resolved; it is ongoing.
	When complaints are made to the police, the police never seem to admit that they are wrong. They never apologise. One gets what I regard as an arrogant, silly, insulting letter that ends, "I am sorry that you felt the need to complain about the actions of Essex Police." I am more than sorry that I continually have to complain about the actions of police. I want some acceptance of the complaints. These are not trivial matters. None of us should ever be above the law.
	The Home Affairs Committee fourth report of Session 2004-05 made some excellent recommendations. The then Chairman of the Committee is now in the Cabinet, but there is another splendid Chairman. I understand that the Committee may well examine the way in which the IPCC works, and I hope the Minister will take those representations into account.
	There is statutory guidance on how the IPCC should operate. The guidance makes it clear what the responsibilities of police authorities are. The role of police authorities in complaints forms part of their core duties around promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of policing locally. Section 15 of the Police Reform Act 2002 sets out the responsibilities of police authorities to keep themselves informed about complaints, provide the IPCC with the information and documentation that it needs, and so on.
	I have found my dealings with the police authority to be somewhat pointless. Many people do not know what police authorities do. I know what they are charged to do, and it costs a lot of money to keep the system going, but in trying to hold them to account I have found them wanting. I should be grateful if the Minister assisted me in this drive to make the Essex police authority more proactive in these matters.
	Given the current review of the complaints system, I very much hope that the Government will carefully consider making the system more complainant-centred, which would be a big step forward, and making it quicker and more open, and consider conciliatory payments. The IPCC is doing a splendid job examining complaints—huge money is being spent on this—and a judgment is made, yet the police do nothing. There is no reporting back, no apology and no suggestion of some sort of settlement. There seems to be no process whereby the hard work of the IPCC is delivered.

Vernon Coaker: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Southend, West (Mr. Amess) for raising this subject. I am also extremely grateful for the measured way in which he made his important points. The debate gives me the opportunity to explain the work of the Independent Police Complaints Commission and of police authorities in relation to the accountability of the police in England and Wales, much of which the hon. Gentleman will be familiar with.
	Before I do that, given that I may not cover all the remarks and points that the hon. Gentleman made, it may be particularly helpful to say that, in respect of the cases that he has raised regarding matters of concern to him in his constituency, I will undertake to look into those with my officials and I will write to him about them. That will probably be the most appropriate way forward and I hope that it is of help to him.
	In addition, I will be happy, either on my own or with my hon. Friend the Minister of State, to meet the hon. Gentleman to consider some of the issues in more detail with our officials to see whether we can take on board some of the points that he has made, and whether we can use his experience, knowledge and views to inform some of the processes and discussions that are going on at the moment about accountability but also about the stock-take that the IPCC is undertaking, which will bring forward recommendations in due course. I hope that that will help us to take these matters forward.
	The relationship between the police service and the communities that it serves is a consensual one, and it is important that the public can have confidence in the police and the safeguards put in place to ensure their accountability. I am aware that the hon. Gentleman has on a number of occasions expressed his interest in ensuring that the police are accountable for their actions and that the police complaints system, as overseen by the IPCC, and the oversight exercised by police authorities and Her Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary are both effective, albeit that they have different remits. As the hon. Gentleman said, he met the chair of the IPCC, Nick Hardwick, yesterday to discuss its work, and I welcome that contact. I too am impressed with the work that Mr. Hardwick has done and with the general work of the IPCC.
	As I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware, the IPCC was established by the Government through the Police Reform Act 2002 and became operational on 1 April 2004. It has statutory guardianship of the police complaints system and has specified functions in relation to the recording and investigation of complaints and conduct matters. It provides an independent oversight of the police complaints system by holding police officers to account for their actions, and as a barometer of public opinion. The hon. Gentleman will also be aware that the IPCC was granted considerably more powers than those enjoyed by the Police Complaints Authority, the predecessor organisation—for example, in being given the powers to undertake independent investigations with its own trained investigators.
	In addition, the Police Reform Act 2002 provides that no commissioner, including the chair, may previously have been a police officer in any part of the United Kingdom. That is an important point. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the IPCC does not itself investigate every complaint made by a member of the public or every conduct matter that is identified. In most cases, the matter is handled by the relevant police force. That is only right, and the hon. Gentleman wants that point to have real credibility. Chief officers have responsibility for the conduct of the police officers and police staff in their force, and it was never the intention of the 2002 Act that they would relinquish that role. However, the hon. Gentleman's point is how to make the system credible and give people in the locality the confidence that the police are investigating complaints in their areas as thoroughly as they should. In many cases they do, although no doubt sometimes there are problems.
	The IPCC undertakes independent investigations into the most serious matters and may also choose to manage or supervise investigations undertaken by a police force. In those cases, once the investigation has been concluded, the IPCC will also have a role in respect of whether disciplinary proceedings should be taken against any of those involved. In many cases, there will be agreement between the IPCC and the chief officer or police authority about what action should be taken. However, when there is no agreement, the commission can ultimately direct that disciplinary proceedings be taken.
	Inevitably, there will be occasions when a complainant or members of the police service concerned do not agree with the action being taken. The IPCC, in common with many other organisations, has an appeals procedure through which its decisions can be challenged and reviewed. It can also make recommendations to chief officers as a result of an investigation. Depending on the nature of the recommendations, it is a matter for the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Association of Police Authorities, the Home Office, the National Policing Improvement Agency or Her Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary to consider them. The IPCC also chairs a "learning the lessons" committee, on which key stakeholders are represented. We hope to ensure that that makes a difference.
	Importantly, the IPCC is a statutory independent body and is therefore independent of Ministers and Government Departments, which rightly have no role in influencing the commission's decisions. There is, however, a final right of challenge available through judicial review in the administrative court.
	I turn now to some of the issues that the hon. Gentleman discussed when he met the chair of the IPCC yesterday. I know of the hon. Gentleman's interest in the complaints statistics for 2006-07 in England and Wales which were published by the IPCC on 14 November 2007, and in the increase in allegations involving neglect of duty, incivility and the quality of service that police officers provide to crime victims or others asking for their assistance.
	The hon. Gentleman will be aware that there was an increase of 10 per cent. in complaints compared with the previous year. Although that is not an insignificant increase, it appears that the rate of increase has been steadying since the IPCC was established in 2004. Taken together, the categories to which I have referred account for about half the allegations made in 2006-07. Although that is clearly a matter of concern, it may also indicate that the public have a greater awareness of, and willingness to use, the police complaints system, which can only be an encouraging sign. Almost half of all complaints were dealt with through local resolution by the police. Just under a third—30 per cent.—of the complaints were investigated and, of them, 11 per cent. of allegations were upheld.
	As I mentioned at the beginning, the IPCC is currently undertaking a stocktake of the complaints system to consider how it is operating and to make recommendations for further improvements. The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to know it is anticipated that the IPCC will conclude its stocktake in March and will submit its views to the Home Office—together with any recommendations, which we will consider. I will ensure that the hon. Gentleman is given a copy of those recommendations; he may well then wish to comment on them so that he can feel involved in the process.
	The hon. Gentleman will know that police authorities have a direct role in police complaints and disciplinary matters in respect of the most senior officers within the force for which they have responsibility. Police authorities are independent bodies that hold the local police force to account on behalf of the people who live and work in that area. Their job is to ensure that there is an efficient and effective local police force that gives best value to local people. They set the strategic direction for their force and hold the chief officer to account, on behalf of the local community, for the policing service delivered. However, it is the responsibility of the chief officer to deliver those policing services.
	Police authorities have a statutory duty under the Police Reform Act 2002 to ensure that it is kept informed of all matters concerning complaints against the police and a role in deciding whether disciplinary proceedings should be taken against senior officers, including chief officers. They also have the power to refer certain cases to the IPCC where they consider that it would be appropriate to do so by reason of the gravity of the matter or any exceptional circumstances. A police authority cannot, however, act as an avenue of appeal for decisions made by the IPPC.
	I disagree with the hon. Gentleman's seeking to castigate Sir Ian Blair. I am happy to endorse and repeat the Home Secretary's continuing support for the commissioner and the Metropolitan police, who remain in the forefront of the fight against crime and terrorism. Sir Ian Blair did not decide that the IPPC should not investigate—he asked whether the investigation should go ahead during an ongoing counter-terrorism investigation, and he received advice from the Home Office that the law could not be set aside and that the investigation should go ahead, as it did. Sir Ian Blair and the Metropolitan police have our full confidence and our thanks and support in the difficult job that they do.
	We have had an important debate. I believe that the system does allow for independent scrutiny. There is clearly a need for us to consider the recommendations that come from the IPCC, and I would like to involve the hon. Gentleman in that. I will write to him about the individual cases that he mentioned, and if he would like to come and meet us to consider how we take this whole agenda forward, I will be only too happy to arrange that.
	 Question put and agreed to.
	 Adjourned accordingly at seventeen minutes past Nine o'clock.